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 After the British “conquest” of the French colony of Acadia in 1710, the British 
Empire sought ways to transform what was in practice the sovereign homeland of several 
Wabanaki nations into a loyal Protestant colony. In addition to subduing French and 
Indigenous populations militarily, British plans centered on increasing the number of 
loyal, white, Protestant settlers. These settlers, however, proved stubbornly illusive, 
forcing British imperial and colonial governments to turn to experimental strategies 
which ranged from using Parliamentary money to pay for settlers’ transportation, 
provisions, and land to encouraging private speculative companies. This study examines 
these colonization schemes in the far northeast of North America from 1710 to 1800. It 
makes two key interventions. The first is to bring state power into the discussion of settler 
colonialism and expansion in the colonial era. My research shows that rather than an 
unstoppable herd of white settlers that only incidentally overwhelmed Native 
communities, white Protestant expansion was a process actively pursued from the top 
down as early as the first decade of the eighteenth century. The second argument is that 
government officials and others in a position to plan settlements were well aware of the 
disruptive and dispossessive power of settlers. Throughout the eighteenth century, British 
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men in power tried to deploy planned settlements of “loyal” settlers in an attempt to 
control or eliminate “non-loyal” populations — Indigenous, French, and, later, citizens of 
the nascent United States. I refer to this vision of state-directed expansion as weaponized 
settlement. Weaponized settlement is an approach to colonization that is directed from the 
top down, rather than led by settlers themselves, and that sees settlers as a means to 
achieve greater geopolitical goals. Despite a large expenditure of money and effort, 
however, these schemes were almost all failures until after the American Revolution. 
Ultimately, the cost of a loyal British northeast would be the majority of the British North 
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Kluskap, the man from nothing, didn’t create the world, or even human life; but 
he did create the Dawnland.1 Stories told from Southern New England to Cape Breton 
tell of his interactions with land, people, and animals, and how in the process he molded 
the earth around him into the familiar coastline of eastern North America. In Nova Scotia, 
he was said to live on or inside Cape Blomidon, and many of the geographic features in 
the Bay of Fundy were created or altered by him.2  Spencer’s Island was his kettle for 
cooking meat, which, in some versions, he overturned when he left the land in disgust at 
the actions of newly-arrived Europeans.3 According to Penobscot stories, one of 
Kluskap’s first hunting expeditions with his dog was responsible for the geographic 
features around Cape Rosier. There, he turned the guts of his kill, his kettles, and even his 
dog into stone to mark the event.4 
 
1 “Kluskap” represents the modern orthography for this figure’s Mi’kmaq name; in in 
Nova Scotia, where he still figures prominently in tourism campaigns, the name is 
rendered, after Rand, as Glooscap. In modern Maliseet-Passamaquoddy orthography, his 
name is “Koluskap.” In Penobscot, Joseph Nicolar refers to this same figure as “Klose-
kur-beh,” or Kəloskαpe in modern orthography. “Man from nothing” is following 
Nicolar’s explanation of the name in Joseph Nicolar, The Life and Traditions of the Red 
Man (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 100–101. 
2 Trudy Sable and Bernie Francis, The Language of This Land, Mi’kma’ki (Sydney, NS: 
Cape Breton University Press, 2012), 43–48. 
3 Sable and Francis, Language of This Land, 46; Silas Tertius Rand, Legends of the 
Micmacs (New York and London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1894), xlvi. 
4 Nicolar, The Life and Traditions of the Red Man, 132–133. Stories recorded in Nova 
Scotia similarly involve Kluskap turning his dogs into stone and used as landmarks; see 
for example Sable and Francis, Language of This Land, 46.  
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Kluskap stories are just one of many shared cultural features that bring together 
the First Peoples of what is now Northern New England and Atlantic Canada.5 First on 
the continent to greet the rising sun, the area's original inhabitants called the region "the 
Dawnland." Indeed, "Wabanaki" and "Abenaki," the general terms most often used to 
describe the people of the region, derives from the terms for "dawn" or "white" in the 
several eastern Algonquian dialects spoken by the people who lived—and still live—in 
the region.6 Bordered roughly by the French settlements on the St. Lawrence River, 
Iroquoia, and Puritan Southern New England to the west and south and otherwise 
surrounded by the Gulf of Maine, Atlantic Ocean, and Gulf of St. Lawrence, seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century Wabanakiak was a maritime-oriented world of bays, rivers, and 
 
5 Archeologist David Sanger argues that the region northeast of the Kennebec constituted 
a "natural culture area" with a "high level of cultural commonality" during the pre-
European and early-European eras. British colonial administrators agreed, referring to the 
whole area northeast of Cape Anne as "the Eastward" and its inhabitants as "the Eastern 
Indians.” David Sanger, “Pre-European Dawnland: Archaeology of the Maritime 
Peninsula,” in New England and the Maritime Provinces: Connections and Comparisons, 
ed. Stephen Hornsby and John G. Reid (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2005), 15, 31. For eighteenth-century administrators referring to the 
area as the Eastward, see for example, Orders of the Massachusetts Bay Council to 
Cyprian Southack, 8 May 1702, folder 1, Cyprian Southack Collection, New York Public 
Library. 
6 Some scholars, including myself in other writings, have taken to calling the region 
Wabanakia, presumably following the increasingly-familiar "Iroquoia." Following 
eastern Algonquian grammatical structure, the proper term for the region would end in 
"kik" or "ki" rather than "ia"; for example, the Western Abenaki term for the region is 
"Wôbanakik" and the Mi'kmaw homeland is generally referred to as "Mi'kma'ki"; For 
Wôbanakik, see Frederick Matthew Wiseman, Reclaiming the Ancestors: Decolonizing a 
Taken Prehistory of the Far Northeast (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 
2005); For "Wabanakia," see Matthew R. Bahar, “People of the Dawn, People of the 
Door: Indian Pirates and the Violent Theft of an Atlantic World,” The Journal of 
American History 101, no. 2 (September 2014): 401–26. For “Wabanakiak,” see Ian 
Saxine, “Properties of Empire: Indians, Colonists, and Land Speculators on the Maine 
Frontier, 1713-1763” (Ph.D., Northwestern University, 2016). 
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gulfs, where agriculture was limited by short growing seasons and unforgiving soil, and 
the ability to navigate waterways and seas was a central aspect of everyday life for both 
Natives and newcomers.7    
Although the Dawnland was one of the first sites of European and Indigenous 
contact and trade, it was one of the last places on the Atlantic coast to be colonized by 
Euramerican people. Until the eve of the American Revolution, Wabanaki people 
remained able to set policy in their homelands and maintain their sovereignty and 
territorial base. Wabanaki power in their homelands persisted not because of a lack of 
Euramerican interest in settlement, but despite it. From the late seventeenth century on, 
European governments, companies, and individuals — particularly associated with the 
British Empire — spent untold sums of money attempting to transform the far northeast 
into a settler colony like those that extended down the coast from Massachusetts to South 
Carolina. For generations, they failed. 
 
This study examines these colonization schemes in the far northeast of North 
America from 1710 to 1800. It makes two key interventions. The first is to bring state 
power into the discussion of settler colonialism and expansion in the colonial era. My 
research shows that rather than an unstoppable herd of white settlers that only 
incidentally overwhelmed Native communities, white Protestant expansion was a process 
actively pursued from the top down as early as the first decade of the eighteenth century. 
The second argument is that government officials and others in a position to plan 
 
7 For a particularly strong statement of Wabanaki maritime orientation, see Bahar, 
“People of the Dawn, People of the Door.” 
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settlements were well aware of the disruptive and dispossessive power of settlers. 
Throughout the eighteenth century, British men in power tried to deploy planned 
settlements of “loyal” settlers in an attempt to control “non-loyal” populations — 
Indigenous, French, and, later, citizens of the nascent United States.  
I refer to this quixotic vision of state-directed expansion as weaponized 
settlement. Weaponized settlement is an approach to colonization that is directed from the 
top down, rather than led by settlers themselves, and that sees settlers as a means to 
achieve greater geopolitical goals. Throughout the eighteenth century, a significant subset 
of British and Euramerican politicians were convinced, I argue, that wars and territory 
could be won by the strategic placement of ostensibly peaceful settler families just as it 
could be won by armed combat.  
This mindset was not unique to Nova Scotia and the northeasternmost reaches of 
empire. The idea of “buffer colonies” and militarizing frontiers by settling disbanded 
soldiers in planned communities dates from at least the Roman Empire.  For the British, 
the best immediate precedent was probably the Ulster Plantation. However, the role of 
the state in facilitating settler expansion in eighteenth century North America has been 
almost entirely neglected. Instead, historians have examined how, elsewhere in North 
America, the arrival of too many settlers, and the inability of colonial governments to 
control them, created conflict between Native people and newcomers and put a strain on 
settler-imperial relations.  Focusing largely on the Ohio country and interior 
Pennsylvania, these narratives often center on the Proclamation Line of 1763, which 
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banned white settlement west of the Appalachians in an attempt to prevent conflicts with 
Native people and control Anglo-American settlement.8  
In contrast, by shifting attention to the fringes of the Atlantic coast, my work 
reveals a region where such settlers were actively desired by colonial and imperial 
authorities, in part because of their power to dispossess and disempower the Indigenous 
inhabitants of the area. It therefore contributes to our understanding of imperialism, 
settler colonialism, and the contested meanings of settler expansion more generally. 
Additionally, by highlighting intra-imperial conflict and debate over both the control and 
meaning of Anglo-American settlement, my work places our understanding of the 
imperial conflict and American Revolution in a new light and helps explain why some 
regions remained loyal and others joined the Revolutionary cause. 
While the mindset of weaponized settlement was never unique to greater Nova 
Scotia, it was, perhaps, uniquely ubiquitous during the period covered by this study. The 
rocky shores and difficult weather of the far northeast made it a much less tantalizing 
destination for farm families than, for example, the Ohio Country. This drastically limited 
the amount of “natural,” unregulated expansion. At the same time, because it was seen as 
 
8 For books that focus on the problem of Anglo-American settlement in the Ohio country 
and Pennsylvania and argue that this created unsurmountable tensions with both Native 
people and the Imperial state, see Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing 
Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997); James Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania 
Frontier (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999); Jane T. Merritt, At the 
Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2003); Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War 
Transformed Early America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009); David L. 
Preston, The Texture of Contact: European and Settler Communities on the Frontiers of 
Iroquoia, 1667-1783 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2009). 
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key to controlling both the rich north Atlantic fishery and access to the interior via the St. 
Lawrence River, many British planners felt that full control of the region was a political 
necessity. These factors combined to make weaponized settlement a particularly central 
concept in the far northeast. As a result, studying Nova Scotia in its broadest sense — 
which I take to include all of modern Maritime Canada and parts of northern Maine — 
provides crucial insight into this way of thinking that also, I argue, spilled over into 
considerations of and plans for more populous colonies and as-yet unconquered lands. 
 
This dissertation begins during a crucial period in the history of eastern North 
America. The closing decades of the seventeenth century saw the maturation of the 
British and French settlement colonies that ringed the Atlantic coast and St. Lawrence 
River. The field of imperial competition narrowed as Dutch, Swedish, and, to a lesser 
extent, Spanish competition was removed from mainland North America. A series of 
violent, racially-tinged wars between settlers and Indigenous nations climaxed in the third 
quarter of the century, most notably the French-Iroquois wars of the 1660s, King Philip’s 
War (1675-1678), and Bacon’s Rebellion (1676-1677), ensuring that the way forward 
would very likely not be marked by any significant degree of native-newcomer 
intermixing. In the aftermath of these conflicts, and in response to the belated realization 
that the colonies might be very profitable, both French and British imperial officials took 
new interest in their previously neglected colonies from the 1660s on.9 The overall result 
 
9 For the renaissance of imperial interest in North American holdings, see, for example, 
Owen Stanwood, The Empire Reformed: English America in the Age of the Glorious 
Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Steven Pincus, 1688: 
The First Modern Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011); Stephen 
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was a shift from the multi-polar political climate of the early- and mid-seventeenth 
century to a world in which all political conflict—including with Indigenous nations—
was increasingly understood as part of an imperial struggle between the French and the 
English.  
Weaponized settlement, which understood control over settler bodies to be part of 
a larger struggle for geopolitical dominance, was a vision perfectly suited to this 
polarizing world. Calls to add, remove, or otherwise manipulate populations soon became 
part of many British plans for seizing control of the continent. One early expression of 
weaponized settlement can be found in Scottish adventurer and imperialist Samuel 
Vetch’s 1709 pamphlet Canada Surveyed. Although barely a handful of European traders 
and missionaries lived in the North American interior at this time, Vetch claimed that 
French settlements on the Mississippi were "hemming in betwixt them and the sea all the 
 
Saunders Webb, 1676: The End of American Independence (New York: Knopf, 1985); 
Dora Mae Clark, The Rise of the British Treasury: Colonial Administration in the 
Eighteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960); William R. Miles, “The 
Newfoundland Convoy, 1711,” Northern Mariner / Le Marin Du Nord 18, no. 2 (April 
2008): 61–83; Douglas Bradburn, “The Visible Fist: The Chesapeake Tobacco Trade in 
War and the Purpose of Empire, 1690-1715,” The William and Mary Quarterly 68, no. 3 
(July 2011): 361–386; Jenny Hale Pulsipher, Subjects Unto the Same King: Indians, 
English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); Patricia U Bonomi, The Lord Cornbury 
Scandal: The Politics of Reputation in British America (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1998); Charles McLean Andrews, The Colonial Period of American 
History, vol.4, England’s Commercial and Colonial Policy (Yale University Press, 
1938); Daniel O’Connor and United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, Three 
Centuries of Mission: The United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 1701-2000 
(London: Continuum, 2000). There is comparatively less literature on an imperial turn in 
the French context, but see James Pritchard, In Search of Empire: The French in the 
Americas, 1670-1730 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), which, although 
arguing against a coherent French imperial plan, nevertheless demonstrates increased 
imperial involvement in the colonies post-1670. 
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British Empire on the Continent of America."10 Vetch argued that removing French 
people and power from the continent would transform the Indigenous inhabitants of the 
continent into “hundreds of nations of new subjects,” “intirely obedient” to British law.11 
Nova Scotia took on new and special meanings in this era of imperial wars. On 
the most basic level, it was the first French territory on the continent that the British were 
able to claim as theirs by right of conquest, and only the second region conquered by 
intra-European warfare after New Amsterdam a few decades before.12 What is now Nova 
Scotia and Maine had passed back and forth between the English and French several 
times by the beginning of the eighteenth century. However, the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 
made British possession of the colony permanent. In European eyes, the British crown 
now had de jure control of the entire eastern seaboard from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to 
South Carolina.  
The far northeast was also important to British planners because of where it was 
on the map. Marking the division between the Atlantic coast and the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence, ships headed to both New France and the northern British colonies had to pass 
close to peninsular Nova Scotia. Additionally, two of the three primary overland routes 
between New France and the British colonies—the Penobscot and St. Johns routes—
passed through the claim. Controlling the region, then, was seen as crucial for the safety 
 
10 “Canada Survey’d,” pp.46-53, Samuel Vetch Letterbook, Museum of the City of New 
York (hereafter Vetch Letterbook). 
11 Ibid, 50-58 
12 The British also claimed the region by virtue of right of discovery and royal patent; 
however, as will be discussed in later chapters, the claim of right by conquest had 
important repercussions for understandings of Native title in Nova Scotia. 
9 
 
of the already-established settler colonies and in order to check potential French 
expansion.  
In this context, British setters were also imagined as not just a way of securing 
British claims, but the means by which the French would be removed. Massachusetts 
governor Joseph Dudley expressed a variation of this idea, writing to the Board of Trade 
in March 1709 that the British colonies 
stand in need of nothing to make them such as your Lordships would have them, 
but a good [defense] against the incursions of the Indians and French by land 
which would be done at once by a Colony of tenn thousand North Britains, who 
might peaceably enter upon a better land than their [own] with all advantages of 
trade, fishing and lumber, and be in a readiness to assist the removal of the French 
from Québeck and Port Royal.13 
 
Dudley argued that this buffer colony of Scots located in Acadia would not only be 
cheaper than a full-scale military force, it would achieve the same ends simply by natural 
increase in a strategic location. The targeted settlement of British subjects was seen, 
therefore, as the long-term, peacetime equivalent of the repeated attempts to conquer 
French Canada which were the centerpiece of every imperial war from the 1690s to (in a 
modified form) the American Revolution.14 
In addition to its key geopolitical importance, the Dawnland was also a favored 
location for settlement schemes because of its coastal nature. Observing the exploding 
growth and high birth rates of their supposedly dependent colonies, as the eighteenth 
 
13 Joseph Dudley to the Board of Trade, 1 March 1709, fol. 22, CO 5/856, The National 
Archives, Kew [TNA]. 
14 For the evolution of this “glorious enterprise,” see W.D. Schuyler-Lighthall, The 
“Glorious Enterprise:” The Plan of Campaign for the Conquest of New France; Its 
Origin, History and Connection with the Invasions of Canada (Montreal: C.A. Marchand, 
For the Nuministic and Antiquarian Society of Montreal, 1902). 
10 
 
century wore on some officials in Great Britain began to fear that the colonies would 
threaten the preeminence of the British Isles or even become independent. In this context, 
attempting to keep settlement confined to the coasts where settlers could theoretically be 
better controlled by an Atlantic economy and political network became an increasingly 
popular proposal through the middle of the eighteenth century. In the late 1740s, for 
instance, one author expressed anxiety that  
The British Empire in America is of that large extent, already settled so many 
Leagues backwards from the Coast; daily encreasing and emproveing, by the 
Numbers yearly born there, and by new Settlers from Europe, that it is become of 
the utmost Consequences to regulate them, that they may be usefull to, & not rival 
in Power and Trade their Mother Kingdom.15 
 
Within this framework, the “empty” coastal lands in what is now northern New England 
and the Canadian Atlantic Provinces took on especial importance as an appropriate place 
to channel colonial growth and European emigration.  
 
The issue, from 1710 on, was that the British had no de facto control over the 
region. 
For most of the period covered in this dissertation, the far northeast had more in common 
with better-studied interior areas such as the Pays d’en Haut or the Ohio Country. The 
power players were, as they had been for centuries, Indigenous polities, and Europeans 
could only operate successfully by negotiating with them. As historian Jeffers Lennox 
has argued, to discuss Nova Scotia and Acadia in the eighteenth century – and, I would 
add, the Sagadahock Country and most of the Province of Maine – “is to engage in an act 
 
15 “Some Considerations relating to the present Condition of the Plantations,” n.d. [c. late 
1740s], fols. 313-317, CO 5/5, TNA. 
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of imagination.”16 In practice, deep into the eighteenth century, the region was much 
more accurately described as Mawooshen, Peskotomuhkatik, Wolastokuk, Mi’kma’ki, 
Panawahpskek, the land of Kluskap, and other Wabanaki names for their homelands that 
have since been lost.  
A few words, then, about the Indigenous political landscape in the far northeast. 
Following noted University of Pennsylvania anthropologist Frank Speck, many historians 
have understood the region south of the US-Canada border and north of the Piscataqua 
River to be home to a series of independent bands defined by, and named for, their 
residence in different river valleys, such as the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and 
Kennebec.17 Many historians also recognize a division between Eastern and Western 
Abenakis; however, just which groups are "eastern" and which "western" seems to 
change from scholar to scholar, as do the names and locations of nations. This in part 
reflects the fragmentary nature of the evidence, but the lack of consensus about tribal and 
ethnic divisions make the landscape difficult to understand.18 
 Although the division still appears in many monographs, specialist work since the 
late 1980s has rejected the Eastern/Western Abenaki division and instead sought to 
rehabilitate the early ethnographic writings of Samuel de Champlain. In the early 
 
16 Jeffers Lennox, Homelands and Empires: Indigenous Spaces, Imperial Fictions, And 
Competition for Territory in Northeastern North America, 1690-1763 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2017), 3. 
17 This is, for example, the approach taken in Bruce Trigger, ed., Handbook of North 
American Indians, vol. 15, Northeast (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978). 
18 Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, “Amerindian Power in the Early Modern 
Northeast: A Reappraisal,” William & Mary Quarterly 61, no. 1 (January 2004): 79 n9; 
Emerson W. Baker, “Finding the Almouchiquois: Native American Families, Territories, 
and Land Sales in Southern Maine,” Ethnohistory 51, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 73–74. 
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seventeenth century, Champlain described the inhabitants of the Wabanakiak as being 
part of three major ethnic groups: the horticultural Almouchiquois west of the Kennebec, 
the Etchemin between the Kennebec and the St. John, and the Souriquois east of the St. 
John and into modern Nova Scotia.19 While the Souriquois are generally assumed to be 
synonymous with the Mi'kmaq, the identity of the Etchemin and Almouchiquois has 
proved more contentious. Bruce Bourque argues that most of the river-based bands in 
Maine and New Brunswick described by Speck and others were Etchemins who had 
moved in response to European incursions, and that the term "Abenaki" originally 
referred to a distinct group of people who lived in the interior.20 Emerson Baker attempts 
to sort out the even more mysterious Almouchiquois, using land deeds to argue that they 
were indeed an ethnic group that lived between the Kennebec and Cape Anne through at 
least the late seventeenth century.21 While these approaches have great promise for 
reinterpreting ethnic formations and re-formations in the northeast, they have not made 
much headway in the more general literature, which tends to still describe northern New 
England's native people as either all Abenakis or autonomous residents of different river 
valleys.22  
 
19 Bruce J. Bourque, “Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759,” Ethnohistory 36, 
no. 3 (Summer 1989): 258; see also Baker, “Finding the Almouchiquois: Native 
American Families, Territories, and Land Sales in Southern Maine.” 
20 Bourque, “Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759,” 274. 
21 Baker, “Finding the Almouchiquois,” 74–76. 
22 See for example Ann M Little, Abraham in Arms: War and Gender in Colonial New 
England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Pulsipher, Subjects Unto 
the Same King. 
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 The ethnographic confusion evident in the literature on southern Wabanakiak 
stands in contrast to work focused on modern Atlantic Canada, where ethnic lines are 
perceived to be stable and clearly drawn. The communities living in the St. John River 
Valley are always described as Maliseet or Wolastoqiyik (the term preferred by the 
modern First Nations community and now widely used by Atlantic Canadian scholars).23 
The people to the Northeast are Mi'kmaq.24 Building on late nineteenth century 
ethnographic work among Mi’kmaq by missionaries Silas Tertius Rand and Father 
Pacifique, Mi'kma'ki, the land of the Mi'kmaq, is often described as constituting a series 
of autonomous districts united under a Grand Chief.25 This district organization is 
accepted by many specialists, and finds support in documents produced by Europeans 
from the seventeenth and eighteenth century.26 Recent work by Trudy Sable, Bernie 
Francis, and Roger Lewis suggests that the districts system which was effectively 
codified by the late nineteenth century reflected earlier divisions based on important 
 
23 On the political implications of using the term Wolastoqiyik, particularly in the context 
of the Tobique First Nation, see Bernard C. Perley, Defying Maliseet Language Death: 
Emergent Vitalities of Language, Culture, and Identity in Eastern Canada (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2011), 16. 
24 The name of the largest Native group in the Canadian far northeast is spelled 
“Mi’kmaq” when referring to multiple people or the nation as a whole, and the singular 
“Mi’kmaw” is used for individuals and as an adjective. 
25 Philip K. Bock, “Micmac,” in Trigger, ed., Handbook of North American Indians, 
15:109–110. 
26 See Daniel N Paul, First Nations History: We Were Not the Savages: Collision 
between European and Native American Civilizations (Halifax, N.S.: Fernwood, 2006); 
Thomas G.M. Peace, “Two Conquests: Aboriginal Experiences of the Fall of New France 
and Acadia” (PhD diss., York University, 2011); Janet E. Chute, “Frank G. Speck’s 
Contributions to the Understanding of Mi’kmaq Land Use, Leadership, and Land 
Management,” Ethnohistory 46, no. 3 (1999): 515; William Craig Wicken, Mi’kmaq 
Treaties on Trial: History, Land and Donald Marshall Junior (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001), 27. 
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drainage systems and resource extraction areas, much like what has been proposed for 
their cousins to the south in modern Maine. Despite this evidence that Mi’kmaw political 
life was, in normal times, much more centered on smaller geographic units, the use of the 
blanket term Mi’kmaq to describe all the region’s inhabitants has the effect of making the 
ethnic and political organization of northern Wabanakiak seem much more settled and 
orderly than in the south, further reifying the modern border.  
Figure 1. Map of traditional districts of Mi'kma'ki. (From Sable and Francis, The Language of 




Figure 2. Map of Wabanaki homelands. Map by Stephen Bicknell, Department of Anthropology, 
University of Maine. 
Taken as a whole, then, the evidence seems to suggest that the most immediately 
relevant community beyond the level of the family for most Wabanaki people was 
centered on a particular river or drainage system, and that these communities and, 
particularly, their leaders, were what interloping Anglo-Americans identified as “tribes,” 
“nations,” and “chiefs” on first encounter. Following literature on the Mi’kmaq, this 
dissertation will refer to these groupings as districts, a term meant to imply both a certain 
level of political cohesiveness and their potential to belong to much larger ethnic and 
political groupings. At one point, these smaller nations may have identified themselves 
with the three broader ethnic groupings identified by Champlain; in the case of the 
Mi’kmaq, this identification intensified, and continued on to the present day. While 
perhaps belonging to the early contact groups referred to by Champlain’s guides as the 
Almouchiquois and Etchemin, the Kennebec, Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and Maliseet/ 
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Wolastoqiyik have tended to either be addressed on a district level or lumped together 
under the heading of Eastern Abenakis or Wabanakis.  Re-drawing the map of 
Wabanakiak to highlight the districts on both sides of the modern border will help 
address some of the issues introduced by the modern historiography and provide a more 
accurate framework through which to understand the complexities of politics, geography, 
and community in Wabanakiak (see figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Unified map of Wabanakiak, c.1750. By author. 
 
The districts, shaped as they were by geography and resource availability, were 
not the only way Wabanaki people organized themselves, nor were they in any way 
static. Like many other Algonquian-speaking peoples, the Wabanaki communities of the 
far northeast in the early era of European interaction had elastic political traditions and 
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multiple sources of power which facilitated a great deal of mobility within and across 
districts. Individuals, families, and whole communities drew on carefully cultivated 
kinship connections and physical mobility to form (and dissolve) larger political 
confederacies as needed, cross ethnic and national boundaries, and claim multiple 
identities for themselves in ways which baffled and frustrated European observers. In 
1793, John Allan, who had been Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Americans 
during the Revolution, reported that  
you'll see families in the course of a year, go through the greater part of this extent 
[Wabanakiak].  This of course brings on a nearer connection by intermarriages, 
which has now become universal…so much that I well know, numbers whom I 
had in the war are now residing in Canada and other distant parts, and many from 
thence now living at St Johns, Passamaquoddy, and Penobscot: thus connected, 
there is no distinction in the right on the several hunting grounds, for all by some 
lye or other have an equal claim, are full domesticated as if natives of the 
district27 
 
As Allan suggests, the connections between the different communities of Wabanakiak 
were made closer by the shared experience of war and settler encroachment that 
characterized the eighteenth century. What Allan saw, however, drew on a much longer 
tradition of political mobility and strategies of incorporation evident from the earliest 
records we have for Wabanaki people.28   
The best example of larger-than-district confederacies in Wabanakiak comes from 
Mi’kma’ki, where modern Mi’kmaw communities continue to recognize both the 
autonomy of individual districts and the overall authority of the Grand Chief located in 
 
27 Report by John Allan, 1793, box 7, fol. 8, Samuel Adams Papers, NYPL. 
28 For similarly elastic political divisions among a different group of Algonquian-
speaking peoples, see Michael Witgen, An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New 
World Shaped Early America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
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Cape Breton. On an even larger scale, the period covered by this dissertation marks the 
rise of the illusive “Wabanaki Confederacy,” a broad umbrella under which the otherwise 
autonomous groups known to the English as Kennebecs, Penobscots, Passamaquoddies, 
Wolastoqiyik/Maliseet, and Mi’kmaq came together as a single unit. The confederacy is 
well documented in the nineteenth century; whether it existed in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century has been debated. However, at least by the 1760s, there is ample 
evidence that Wabanaki leaders and households were regularly meeting in the St. John 
River Valley and elsewhere, and Allan’s testimony in the 1780s and 1790s suggests that 
he saw the Native communities from Nova Scotia to Massachusetts as acting more or less 
in harmony, or at least in regular conversation. 
Evidence of many other Wabanaki confederacies, however, can also be found. 
Records from the early seventeenth century suggest that communities in the Saco, 
Kennebec, and Penobscot districts were united in a confederacy under a figure named or 
titled Bashabes, and that the land of the confederacy was known as Mawooshen or 
Maosson.29 Within a few generations, however, Mawooshen had collapsed. It was 
replaced by smaller political units, but dominated by the figure of Madockawando, who, 
although he appears to have been from Machias or Passamaquoddy, had his seat of power 
at Penobscot.30 Although his confederacy does not seem to have been as extensive as 
 
29 Harald E.L. Prins, “Children of Gluskap: Wabanaki Indians on the Eve of the European 
Invasion” in E.W. Baker, E.A. Churchill, R.S. D’Abate, K.L. Jones, V.A. Konrad, and 
H.E.L. Prins, eds. (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 110–111. 
30 For later Penobscot claims that Madockawando was from Machias, a district more 
commonly associated with the Passamaquoddy, see The Conference with the Eastern 
Indians (Boston, 1726), 10-11. 
19 
 
Mawooshen, he had strong ties in the Kennebec and Passamaquoddy districts and, at least 
for a time, commanded considerable respect. What can be reconstructed of 
Madockawando’s career is also illustrative of the limits of Wabanaki sachems. Like 
leaders in most North American Indigenous communities, Wabanaki sachems held power 
at the sufferance of their communities. In 1694, after he signed off on a massive land 
grant without the consent of his community, Madockawando swiftly fell from power and 
was forced to retire to Wulustuk, where he died four years later.31 Later in the eighteenth 
century, leaders in Penobscot continued to try to act as the speakers for other Wabanaki 
districts, particularly Kennebec, although the existence of a formal confederation is 
unsure.  
The modern US-Canada border has also made an outsized impression on the 
general historiography on the eighteenth-century far northeast. Indeed, the literatures on 
New England and the Canadian Maritimes are almost entirely separate from one another, 
and works tend to anachronistically confine themselves to one side of the border or the 
other. This is further complicated by the fact that the region as a whole has been 
neglected by the national historiographies of both Canada and the United States. Nova 
Scotia and Maine are often mere footnotes in larger synthetic works on eighteenth 
century history. 
Within the specialized literature on Nova Scotia, little attention has been paid to 
efforts to settle the province with white Protestants prior to 1780s. Most work on the 
 
31 Ian Saxine, Properties of Empire: Indians, Colonists, and Land Speculators on the 
Maine Frontier, 1713-1763 (New York: University of New York Press, 2019), 38. 
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eighteenth century has focused on two main topics. There is a robust literature on the 
French Acadians, their social history, and their tragic deportation. This literature, 
understandably, focuses on the pre-1755 era and emphasizes the isolated nature of 
Acadian life on the one hand and conflicts with the British government after 1710 on the 
other. 32 The second major body of work, much of it now fairly old, focuses on the arrival 
of the American loyalists, who dramatically changed the demographics of the province.33 
Recent work, particularly by Jeffers Lennox, has brought much-needed attention to 
 
32 See, for example, Naomi E.S. Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian: A North American 
Border People, 1604-1755 (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2005); John Mack Faragher, A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the 
Expulsion of the French Acadians from Their Homeland (New York & London: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 2005); Gregory M. W. Kennedy, Something of a Peasant 
Paradise? Comparing Rural Societies in Acadie and the Loudunais, 1605-1755 
(Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014); Geoffrey Plank, An 
Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign Against the Peoples of Acadia (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003).  
33 See, for example, D. G. Bell, Early Loyalist Saint John: The Origin of New Brunswick 
Politics, 1783-1786 (Fredericton, NB: New Ireland Press, 1983); Ann Gorman Condon, 
The Envy of the American States: The Loyalist Dream for New Brunswick (Fredericton, 
NB: New Ireland Press, 1984); Judith Fingard, The Anglican Design in Loyalist Nova 
Scotia, 1783-1816 (London: SPCK, 1972); Stephen Kimber, Loyalists and Layabouts: 
The Rapid Rise and Faster Fall of Shelburne, Nova Scotia 1783-1792 (Toronto: 
Doubleday Canada, 2008); Neil MacKinnon, This Unfriendly Soil: The Loyalist 
Experience in Nova Scotia, 1783-1791 (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1986); Esther Clark Wright, The Loyalists of New Brunswick 
(Fredericton, NB, 1955). More recent work has focused on the Black experience in the 
Maritimes and loyalism as a diaspora. See for example: Jerry Bannister and Liam 
Riordan, eds., The Loyal Atlantic: Remaking the British Atlantic in the Revolutionary Era 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012); Maya Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles: American 
Loyalists in the Revolutionary World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011); Ruth Holmes 
Whitehead, Black Loyalists: Southern Settlers of Nova Scotia’s first Free Black 
Communities (Halifax, NS: Nimbus Publishing, 2013); Harvey Amani Whitfield, North 
to Bondage: Loyalist Slavery in the Maritimes (Vancouver: University of British 
Colombia Press, 2016). 
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interactions between Indigenous peoples and European governments in Nova Scotia.34 
However, Lennox’s book ends just as efforts to settle the province with Protestants began 
in earnest. 
Other than studies of the loyalists, then, there has been surprisingly little detailed 
work on British expansion or settlement in the region, particularly in the middle part of 
the eighteenth century. Perhaps the most developed literature is that on the so-called 
“New England Planters” of Nova Scotia, roughly 8,000 migrants who arrived in the 
province between 1759 and 1761. This historiography, however, is largely limited to the 
proceedings of six conferences, published between 1988 and 2012 as edited volumes.35 
Unsurprisingly, given the genre, the studies are narrowly defined—if often very rich—
case studies focusing on specific townships and families. As a result, while much has 
been published on the social history of New England transplants in the 1760s, there are 
almost no modern monographs or attempts to place them more systematically into their 
broader imperial world. The two major books on the Planter era that are still often cited 
in synthetic works today, John Bartlett Brebner’s Neutral Yankees and Gordon Stewart 
 
34 Lennox, Homelands and Empires. 
35 See Margaret Conrad, ed., They Planted Well: New England Planters in Maritime 
Canada, Planter Studies Series 1 (Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 1988); Margaret 
Conrad, ed., Making Adjustments: Change and Continuity in Planter Nova Scotia, 1759-
1800, Planter Studies Series 2 (Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 1991); Margaret 
Conrad, ed., Intimate Relations: Family and Community in Planter Nova Scotia, 1759-
1800, Planter Studies Series 3 (Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 1995); Margaret 
Conrad and Barry Moody, eds., Planter Links: Community and Culture in Colonial Nova 
Scotia, Planter Studies Series 4 (Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 2001); T. Stephen 
Henderson and Wendy G Robicheau, eds., The Nova Scotia Planters in the Atlantic 
World, 1759-1830, Planter Studies Series 5 (Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 2012). 
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and George Rawlyk’s A People Highly Favored of God, are both significantly out of date 
and have been largely discredited by modern experts.36 
Settlement in Maine, on the other hand, is barely accounted for outside of town 
histories. While forthcoming works address settlement and expansion in what became 
Maine up to the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, and Alan Taylor’s Liberty Men and 
Great Proprietors remains the standard work for the post-Revolutionary period, almost 
no detailed work on the crucial middle period of the 1760s and early 1770s has been 
published.37 The greatest exception—as well as one of the only works to explicitly put 
Maine and Nova Scotia into conversation in these years—is Elizabeth Mancke’s Fault 
Lines of Empire.38 Mancke argues that structural elements in the founding of Nova Scotia 
and Massachusetts in some ways predestined Nova Scotia’s loyalty in the later eighteenth 
century. While her case studies are useful and her conclusions are provocative, Mancke’s 
 
36 John Bartlet Brebner, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia: A Marginal Colony during 
the Revolutionary Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937); Gordon Thomas 
Stewart and George A. Rawlyk, A People Highly Favoured of God: The Nova Scotia 
Yankees and the American Revolution (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1972). For a 
modern reflection on Brebner’s fall from grace, see Jerry Bannister, “Planter Studies and 
Atlantic Scholarship: The New History of 18th-Century Nova Scotia,” in The Nova 
Scotia Planters in the Atlantic World, 1759-1830, ed. T. Stephen Henderson and Wendy 
G Robicheau (Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 2012). 
37 Saxine, Properties of Empire; Alan Taylor, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The 
Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760-1820 (Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1990); see also Michael Blaakman, “Speculation Nation: Land 
and Mania in the Revolutionary American Republic, 1776-1803” (PhD diss., Yale 
University, 2016). 
38 Elizabeth Mancke, The Fault Lines of Empire: Political Differentiation in 
Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, Ca. 1760-1830, New World in the Atlantic World (New 
York: Routledge, 2005). 
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comparative approach obscures the many connections between the two regions and is 
generally uninterested in the role of Native people. 
 Those connections and the centrality of Native peoples provide the analytical 
framework for what follows.  Chapter One, “Inventing Nova Scotia,” discusses attempts 
to transform the rickety seventeenth-century European idea of a colony into robust 
reality. As historians such as John Reid and Emerson Baker have argued, the far northeast 
in the seventeenth century stands out as an example of European failure in what is 
otherwise understood as an era of relentless colonization.39 I argue, however, that these 
failures paradoxically made later European claims more potent and enabled the beginning 
of actual European political control. Charles I’s 1621 grant of “Nova Scotia” to William 
Alexander, for example, was almost immediately an abject failure and produced no 
lasting settlements or any meaningful Scottish/English presence in the region. However, 
the mere fact that the grant had been made allowed the English and, later, British to stake 
a claim to the region that was understood and accepted by other Europeans. The skeletons 
of failed projects were, as the eighteenth century progressed, re-imagined into a narrative 
of unbroken European control. 
 This narrative of failure masquerading as success continued in the decades 
immediately following the so-called British conquest of Acadia in 1710. Despite the 
theoretical removal of French power — which had long been blamed for the feeble state 
of the northern Massachusetts settlements in what is now Maine — European settlement 
 
39 John G. Reid, Acadia, Maine, and New Scotland: Marginal Colonies in the 
Seventeenth Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 184. 
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made few if any advancements into the Dawnland. Outside of the Acadian heartland, 
where French Catholic settlers made moderate gains in population and territory, no new 
land came into practical European control until perhaps the 1740s. Indeed, in Maine, 
settlers were unable to even reclaim old seventeenth century borders until the 1720s. As 
had been the case for centuries, actual on-the-ground power remained with Wabanaki 
people, who made clear the extent to which they would tolerate Euramerican settlement 
and effectively policed those boundaries. 
 Tensions between British pretentions to settler domination and the realities of 
Wabanaki power came to a head in 1722. The conflict known variously as “Dummer’s 
War,” “Father Rale’s War,” or simply “the Fourth Anglo-Abenaki War” engulfed the 
whole region from New Hampshire to Nova Scotia. This is commonly understood to 
mark the end of Wabanaki power in Massachusetts territory.40 While this argument holds 
some weight with the benefit of hindsight, at the time the peace treaty which ended the 
war was interpreted by Wabanaki nations throughout the region as a recognition of pre-
war boundaries and a promise that the British would not make new settlements in 
Wabanaki territory without their explicit consent. 
 Practical Wabanaki control of the boundaries of Euramerican settlement, then, 
continued to be the norm in the far northeast for decades following the British acquisition 
of the territory from the French. By the 1740s, it was clear to British officials that the 
process of “natural” expansion — a process akin to what we might now define as settler 
 
40 See, for example, Reid and Baker, “Amerindian Power in the Early Modern 
Northeast,” 77-106.  
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colonialism — was not working in the territories of Maine and Nova Scotia. If a 
significant European settler presence was desired, the state would need to take on a far 
more direct role. In Chapter Two, “The Halifax Plan,” I argue that this is precisely what 
happened. During the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), New England forces 
(raised largely by Maine landowners) captured the supposedly impregnable fortress town 
of Louisbourg. The peace treaty that ended the war, however, returned the fortress and 
the colony of Ile Royale (modern Cape Breton) to the French. The Nova Scotian 
peninsula had always been considered a strategic asset in the colonial wars between Great 
Britain and France, and the gain and loss of Louisbourg was a potent reminder of this 
fact. 
 Newly aware both of the importance of the far northeast and their practical 
inability to control it, members of the planning class — a hodgepodge of London-based 
officials, colonial government functionaries, and aspiring land barons — dramatically 
increased efforts to promote settlement. Unprecedented amounts of public money poured 
into schemes meant to bring settlers from Europe and the other North American colonies 
and place them in areas of strategic import. The most grandiose of these plans was that 
spearheaded by Board of Trade president George Montagu Dunk, the Second Earl of 
Halifax. Drawing on ideas that had been circulating through London and New England 
for some time, Halifax proposed transforming Nova Scotia by directly recruiting 2,000–
5,000 Germans and New Englanders and transporting them to the colony. In addition to 
founding a new capital town on the Atlantic coast, these settlers would also be 
strategically seeded among Acadian populations.  
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 Halifax and the other planners of this era operated under the assumption that once 
a critical mass of loyal settlers had been placed in a given territory, the “natural” 
settlement patterns of the southern colonies would be replicated. Through high birth rates 
and intermarriage, Protestant settlers would quickly overwhelm French and Native 
inhabitants, and transform the problematic regions of Nova Scotia and Maine into secure, 
governable colonies without the expense of war. This scheme of weaponized settlement 
met with fierce resistance from Wabanaki people, who saw it as an illegal violation of 
Dummer’s Treaty. Penobscots and their allies in Maine largely continued to use the 
containment strategies they had been using since the 1720s, targeting settler homes and 
livestock rather than people, and complaining directly to the General Court in Boston. In 
Nova Scotia, however, Mi’kmaw people took up arms almost immediately, preventing 
the full execution of Halifax’s plan and limiting new British settlement to the new capital 
at Halifax and the small German town of Lunenburg. 
 French-backed Wabanaki resistance to the Halifax plan, as well as parallel efforts 
by some French colonial officials to use the same logic of weaponized settlement against 
the British, fed directly into the massive conflagration that was the Seven Years’ War. 
The balance of power in the region was forever changed by the removal of the French 
political presence. The deportation of the French Acadian population beginning in 1755 
reflected British frustrations with their inability to fully enact the Halifax plan, turning to 
weaponized removal when settlement failed to work. These two factors upended 
Wabanaki politics and rendered many of their traditional strategies of settler management 
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untenable. What was worse, the near constant warfare from 1740-1760, combined with a 
catastrophic outbreak of smallpox, left them weaker than they had been in a century. 
 I explore the aftermath of the Seven Years’ war from the perspective of Wabanaki 
country in Chapter Three, “The Invasion of the Dawnland.”. Although now emphasizing 
government-subsidized land companies instead of direct settler recruitment, efforts to 
enact the Halifax plan continued after the final capture of Louisbourg in 1759. New 
waves of settlers poured into the Dawnland, largely recruited from New England but also 
from the middle colonies and England. These new incursions extended significantly 
beyond 1725 borders in both Maine and Nova Scotia. Wabanaki people, lacking the 
support they had once received from the French and badly weakened by warfare and 
disease, were forced into new treaties that did not protect old boundaries. Penobscot and 
Passamaquoddy people were subject to a direct “conquest,” which Massachusetts 
officials interpreted as a total forfeiture of their land rights. Faced with these challenges, 
Wabanaki nations engaged in new debates over political realignment in their efforts to 
find new ways to manage an old problem. 
 Chapters Four and Five examine these same crucial years from the perspective of 
colonial and imperial planners and officials. New questions about what a post-1763 North 
American empire should look like re-opened old fissures between the government in 
London on the one hand and colonial people on the other. Nova Scotia, as a strategically 
valuable region that the Board of Trade was actively promoting, became a flashpoint of 
opposing ideas about governance, settlement, and the balance of power. Chapter Four, 
“Contesting the Imperial Future in the Great Nova Scotian Land Boom,” explores these 
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dynamics. As the Board of Trade turned the project of settlement over to private 
companies, there soon emerged a split between companies who sought to develop Nova 
Scotian land along the lines of the southern settler colonies and those who instead looked 
to re-create a feudal hierarchy. As champions of an empire of small freeholders and one 
of baronial landlords clashed, Nova Scotia — with its history of direct imperial 
management and a government propped up entirely by parliamentary funds — became a 
stand-in for everything that now seemed corrupt and problematic in the era of the 
Imperial Crisis. Directly sponsored settlement, once a way to bring the colony in line 
with a settler colonial vision, was now seen as an unnatural intervention and even a threat 
to colonial liberties.  
 Clashes between imperial and colonial governments also manifested in a revived 
conflict over who controlled the region between the Penobscot and St. Croix rivers, 
explored in chapter five, “Crown v. Colony: Struggle in the Sagadahock.” This region 
was claimed by both Massachusetts and Nova Scotia.  A series of land surveys in the 
mid-1760s compounded the issue. Perhaps intentionally guided by Passamaquoddy 
leaders, Massachusetts and Nova Scotia developed opposing official opinions on the 
location of the St. Croix River, leaving a the 35-mile stretch of coastline and several large 
islands that were most actively used by both Passamaquoddy inhabitants and 
Euramerican fishers in an administrative gray zone. As tensions between the Crown and 
the province of Massachusetts increased, the Board of Trade and others explored ways to 
stymie Massachusetts settlement efforts and wrest control of the Sagadahock from the 
hands of the troublesome colony. These efforts culminated in the short-lived colony of 
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New Ireland, the first imagined loyalist colony, created and abandoned within the years 
of the American Revolution. 
 Chapter six, “Loyalist Colonies and Native Dispossession,” explores the 
aftermath of this conflict in terms of its effect on both Wabanaki sovereignty and the 
politics of weaponized settlement that had dominated the region for the proceeding seven 
decades. Taking advantage of the thousands of loyalist refugees who had been promised 
re-settlement, the Halifax plan — although no longer understood as such — was finally 
completed, as new settlements sprang up and the demographic balance of Nova Scotia 
finally tipped in favor of Euramerican settlers. Faced with both a lack of outside 
European allies and Euramerican monopolization of coastal resources, Mi’kmaw people 
were forced into a new position of dependence. This was compounded by an informal 
government policy of neglect, as the government at Halifax proceeded to almost entirely 
ignore the presence of Indigenous peoples until the outbreak of the Napoleonic wars. 
 Perhaps the most striking example of British manipulation of loyalist refugees to 
attain geopolitical ends occurred in the Sagadahock territory, where settler families were 
used to forcibly remove the confusion that had dominated the previous decades. Because 
no European powers could agree on where  the agreed border at the St. Croix river 
actually was, British officials were able to determine its location by building a large town 
on the east bank of the Schoodic river within three months of the Treaty of Paris. Once 
the settlement of St. Andrews was laid out and occupied, there was practically nothing 
that American or Passamaquoddy negotiators could do to move it without re-opening 
military action. This move was also possible by cynical British manipulation of a 
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leadership dispute within the Passamaquoddy nation, courting an exiled claimant to the 
sachemship to essentially dispossess the Passamaquoddy of their most important 
waterway and split their land between two different countries. The eighteenth century, 
then, ended with the fulfillment of the dreams British planners had begun the century 
with: settler dominance of the northeast, and a successful enactment of weaponized 
settlement for geopolitical ends. The cost had been the majority of their North American 
empire. For Wabanaki people, it had been far higher.  
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Chapter One: Inventing Nova Scotia  
 
Nova Scotia was invented in 1621. In that year, William Alexander, First Earl of 
Stirling, obtained a grant from King James covering all the land northeast of 
Passamaquoddy Bay, from the Atlantic coast to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In the formal 
Latin of early modern European power, the grant declared that the region “shall in all 
future time bear the name of New Scotland [Novae Scotiae] in America.” These vast 
lands, which held not a single individual or family that swore fealty to the Scottish or 
English crown, and that no one involved in the grant had ever laid eyes on, was erected 
into a barony and attached to the county of Edinburgh. Four years later, James’ son King 
Charles I granted the barony an official coat of arms: the red and yellow lion of the 
Scottish royal arms in the center of the blue and white cross of St. Andrew, supported by 
the Scottish unicorn and an equally fantastical representation of a Native American man. 
The name, the coat of arms, and the rough geographical outlines have persisted. New 
Scotland’s crest, unchanged since the early seventeenth century, now greets visitors to the 
modern Canadian province of Nova Scotia on the official flag and government buildings, 
not to mention all manner of souvenir merchandise from mugs to stuffed lobsters. The 
casual observer could be forgiven for interpreting this as an unbroken history of 
Hibernian-flavored European dominance over the region, stretching from the early 
seventeenth century to the modern era. 
Yet Alexander’s attempt at to actually make good on his grant by transporting 
settlers was an immediate and complete failure.41  Early English colonization attempts in 
 
41 Reid, Acadia, Maine, and New Scotland, 31–39. 
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the Dawnland met the same fate, transforming the Atlantic coastline into a graveyard of 
colonial ambition.42 Indeed, using the other North American colonies as a model, 
historian John G. Reid has described the far Northeast in the period before 1690 as “an 
example of European failure in America.”43  
This seventeenth century pre-history of European power in the Dawnland, 
however, had a surprisingly potent afterlife. The claims and counter-claims made by 
Europeans—many of whom never stepped foot in the region—had very little effect on 
life on the ground in Wabanakiak other than providing new, short term, opportunities for 
trade. But as Europeans gained more and more power through the following century, 
these old borders and assertions began to take on meanings they never had at the time 
they had been granted. The existence of these old and practically meaningless claims 
allowed European colonizers to give legitimacy to their actions, transmuting a legacy of 
failure and Native dominance into an unbroken history of European control.  
Nevertheless, the period immediately after the capitulation of Acadia in 1710 
must have looked, initially, like a repeat of recent history. Despite high hopes, plans, and 
significant financial outlay, Anglo-Americans were unable to successfully colonize any 
additional Wabanaki territory until perhaps the 1740s; indeed, in what is now Maine, 
settlers lost significant amounts of previously-claimed territory and were unable to re-
claim seventeenth-century borders until the late 1720s.44 But these failures masked an 
 
42 The best account of early colonization efforts in the far northeast remains Reid, Acadia, 
Maine, and New Scotland. 
43 Ibid., 184. 
44 Baker and Reid, “Amerindian Power in the Early Modern Northeast.” 
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unprecedented level of interest in transporting Protestant settlers to the far northeast. In 
parlors in Boston and London, groups of businessmen and politicians remained 
convinced that transforming greater Nova Scotia into a settler colony was both practical 
and beneficial. In Massachusetts, seventeenth century claims were revived and combined 
to create land companies laying claim to hundreds of acres of land, which would persist 
into the nineteenth century. In London, the Board of Trade wrote memorials and actively 
solicited plans for the settlement of Nova Scotia, presenting it as a cornerstone of 
imperial policy. Both these groups engaged with ideas about weaponized settlement, 
either as the reason to great new settlements of Protestants or as a justification. While 
they were by and large unsuccessful in the face of powerful Native coalitions and 
political intransigence, these efforts laid the material and ideological groundwork for the 
swell of projects beginning in the 1740s.  
 
The Dawnland was one of the earliest sites of European-Indigenous contact and 
negotiation. European fishers are well documented in the area by the sixteenth century, 
with some suggestion that the fishery could even predate Columbus’ voyages.45 As the 
age of European trade slowly transformed into an age of European colonization, the 
Dawnland remained a focus. Both the French and English attempted early colonies there, 
and a permanent—if feeble—French presence in the region was established by the second 
 
45 See, for example, David Beers Quinn, “The Argument for the English Discovery of 
America Between 1480 and 1494,” The Geographical Journal 127, 3 (Sept 1961): 277-
285; Annette Kolodny, In Search of First Contact: The Vikings of Vinland, the Peoples of 




decade of the seventeenth century. It remained a key region as warfare between European 
powers became endemic in the latter part of that century, and the European colonial 
construct variously known as Nova Scotia and Acadia changed hands on paper multiple 
times before the final paper conquest of 1710. Although types and frequency of contact 
varied from region to region, by the eighteenth century Wabanaki people in general 
should be thought of as savvy political actors, familiar with Europeans and their ways 
and already experienced with European forms of land transfer and trade. 
Wabanaki people were also well familiar with short-lived European settlements. 
Stirling’s abortive effort was simply one of many. An English settlement at the mouth of 
the Kennebec River known as the Sagadahock or Popham Colony barely lasted a year, 
from 1607-1608.46 Most early settlements, however, were French. For example, in 1604, 
Passamaquoddy Bay was the site of one of the first French overwintering settlements in 
the Americas under an expedition led by Pierre Dugua, Sieur de Mons and Samuel de 
Champlain, the founder of Québec. They named the island they camped on that first 
winter “St. Croix,” either as a reflection of the cross-shaped conjunction of the rivers 
around it or as a reflection on the party’s hopes of using the site as a base for converting 
the local population. The French quickly abandoned the island, however, after a 
disastrous winter the left nearly half the colonists dead.47  
 
46 See Christopher Bilodeau, “The Paradox of Sagadahoc: The Popham Colony, 1607-
1608,” Early American Studies 12, 1 (Winter 2014): 1-35. The modern Maine county and 
much modern writing spells the name as Sagahadoc; however, as the documents I have 
consulted in preparing this study overwhelmingly spell it with a final k, I have chosen to 
follow that example. 
47 Fischer and others claim that the name was a reference to the way in which the rivers 
“came together in the shape of a crucifix;” Champlain, however, does not make this 
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The longer-lived French effort at Port Royal on the Bay of Fundy was somewhat 
more successful, and laid the foundation for the French colony of Acadia. However, it 
was frequently abandoned during the seventeenth century, first in 1607, and then again in 
1613 after a raid from Virginia led by Samuel Argall.48  The site was still uninhabited by 
the time Alexander’s handful of settlers arrived there in 1628.49 The French reclaimed the 
site in 1632, but a short-sighted decision to divide the territory and install two new 
governors led quickly civil war. One of the two governors, Charles St-Étienne de La 
Tour, counterintuitively turned to the English for support. As a result, in 1643, Port Royal 
was attacked again, this time by a joint company of French and Massachusetts soldiers.50 
Much more successful than the creation of permanent settlements was the creation 
of trading zones. Thomas Temple, an Englishmen from a minor aristocratic family, took 
advantage of the fractured Acadian political situation in the 1650s to obtain a grant 
endorsed by both Oliver Cromwell and the geopolitically flexible de La Tour to the 
whole of Acadia in 1656.51 Interestingly, the grant defined Acadia as only the western 
part of the peninsula, from Meriligouche (modern Lunenburg) through to Penobscot Bay 
 
association explicitly, and inserts the passage on de Mons’ naming of the island 
immediately after a discussion of their hopes to gain benefits from their relationship to 
the locals and convert them (“tirer à l'avenir du service, et les reduite à la foi 
Chrestienne"). David Hackett Fischer, Champlain’s Dream (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2008), 166; Samuel de Champlain, Les Voyages de La Nouvelle-France 
Occidentale, Dicte Canada (Paris, 1632), 59–60. 
48 Reid, Acadia, Maine, and New Scotland, 19. 
49 Ibid., 31. 
50 Ibid., 96-97. 
51 La Tour, along with Englishman William Crowne, appear alongside Temple on the 
1656 grant; Crowne and Temple later bought out La Tour. Copy of 1656 Oliver 
Cromwell grant to Thomas Temple, William Crowne, and Charles St-Étienne de La Tour, 
Thomas Temple Correspondence Concerning Nova Scotia, Houghton Library. 
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and 100 leagues inland, leaving out the western half of the peninsula and Cape Breton 
entirely. Clearly written only with trade and military defense in mind, the grant did not 
mention settlers, and focused primarily on ensuring that Temple and his colleagues would 
be solely financially responsible for the territory and that any furs and other trade goods 
they acquired would be sent directly to England. 52   
Temple and his associate William Crowne attempted to make good on this grant. 
They divided Acadia into two broad spheres of influence, Temple theoretically 
controlling the Nova Scotian South Shore and Bay of Fundy to the St. George River, and 
Crowne taking the area around Penobscot Bay. Temple, however, secured the 
governorship of the colony from the Protectorate. Temple, already in financial disarray at 
the time of the grant, was unable to leverage this grant into any kind of monetary gain. In 
true seventeenth-century fashion, his claim was also not free from competitors, even 
coming from the same source. Boston merchant Thomas Breeden, who had acted as 
Temple’s agent in London during the Protectorate, acquired a commission for the 
governorship of the province from Charles II shortly after the restoration, much to 
Temple’s chagrin.53 Temple was able to have this decision reversed, but he faced 
additional competition from the Kirke and Alexander heirs of the New Scotland project 
 
52 Reid, Acadia, Maine, and New Scotland, 137. Reid identifies this as the moment when 
“Acadia” and “Nova Scotia” became separate geographical concepts in the English 
world. 
53 Commission to Thomas Breedon, 4 Dec 1661, no.92, CO 1/15, TNA. For Breedon as 
Temple’s agent, see for example Thomas Temple, “Instructions given unto Capt Thomas 
Breedon…” 27 Dec 1658, no.60, CO 1/13, TNA.  
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and others.54 Temple’s fortunes were permanently sunk when Acadia was turned back 
over to the French after the Treaty of Breda in 1667.55 
 Temple’s claim, however, continued on through his nephew John Nelson. 
Ignoring the stipulations of the treaty — or perhaps taking a gamble on the political 
fluidity of the northeast — Temple had appointed Nelson, aged only 16, as his Deputy 
Governor in 1670.56 Although he had lost a great deal of money in Nova Scotia, Temple 
had never been there, and had rather quickly settled into life as a Bostonian, content to 
make whatever money he was able to by the sale of trading and fishing rights to New 
Englanders. Nelson, on the other hand, grew up to be a decidedly more swashbuckling 
figure and seems to have had far more practical experience in the Dawnland. Born in 
London to Temple’s sister Mary and Robert Nelson, John Nelson immigrated to 
Massachusetts around the time he was made Temple’s deputy.  Just four years later, 
Temple died, leaving Nelson as his heir.57 
During these same years, New Englanders and other Europeans began to create 
new settlements in what is now New Hampshire and Southern Maine that had more 
 
54 Reid, Acadia, Maine, and New Scotland, 139. 
55 Directions to Thomas Breedon, 28 Feb 1662, p.189, SP 44/5, TNA; copy also in 
Thomas Temple Correspondence Concerning Nova Scotia. 
56 Thomas Temple to John Nelson, 17 March 1669/70, Thomas Temple Correspondence 
Concerning Nova Scotia. It is unclear where the information that Nelson was born in 
1654 originates; it seems much more likely he was at least 18 by the time he was made 
deputy governor, if not 21. 
57 Donald F. Chard, “Nelson, John,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol.2, 
(University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–), 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/nelson_john_2E.html. Nelson and Temple were close at 
least by 1667; see Thomas Temple to John Nelson, 9 Oct 1667, Thomas Temple 
Correspondence Concerning Nova Scotia. 
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staying power than the Popham Colony. Most of this settlement was concentrated in 
around the Piscataqua river, where Native populations had been decimated by the same 
epidemics that had transformed Wampanoag and Massachusett country into graveyards. 
Some isolated families and small fishing communities, however, could be found in the 
Kennebec district and as far north as Casco Bay. By 1691, Massachusetts had formally 
annexed the colony of Maine, a political situation that continued, with few disruptions, 
until Maine was granted statehood in 1820. Following the Treaty of Breda, there was also 
a significant expansion of French settlement in peninsular Nova Scotia. This period saw 
the arrival of the seed population that was, in time, to become the distinct cultural group, 
the Acadians. In the absence of strong control over their colonies from either England or 
France, New Englanders and Acadians quickly created deep, and lopsided, economic 
bonds as Boston, not Québec, emerged as their main commercial locus.58 
Nelson was keen to use his uncle’s grant to take full advantage of this emerging 
economic partnership. While his activities between 1670 and 1682 are obscure, it is clear 
he spent that period building strong financial and political connections in Acadia. In 
1682, Nelson was even given authority by Acadian governor Michel Leneuf de la 
Vallière to sell fishing licenses.59 Initially, officials in Boston saw his strong ties to the 
French in as an asset. Nelson, for example, was sent by Massachusetts to Québec in 1682 
to address complaints made by Canadian Governor-General Louis de Buade, comte de 
 
58 The best source on this trade remains Jean Daigle, “Nos amis les ennemis: relations 
commerciales de l’Acadie avec le Massachusetts, 1670-1711” (PhD diss,, University of 
Maine, 1975). 
59 Reid, Acadia, Maine, and New Scotland, 172. 
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Frontenac, over the activities of New England fishermen in theoretically French waters.60 
Nelson’s ability to navigate between New England and Acadia was ideally suited to the 
1670s and early 1680s. As Owen Stanwood has argued, however, the later 1680s were 
characterized by increasing anti-French and anti-Catholic feeling within the colonies, and 
this friendly, trade-based relationship among the European inhabitants of the Dawnland 
was eroding quickly.61 
Alongside the slow boil of anti-Catholic sentiment that presaged the age of 
imperial wars to come, the 1670s and 80s saw the beginnings of another theme that 
would characterize the political state of the Dawnland for the next century: conflict 
between colonial and imperial claims to control the northeast. In 1674, Charles II—either 
forgetting or not particularly caring about his previous confirmation of Temple’s right, 
not to mention the claims of the Alexander heirs—had granted the region between the 
Kennebec and St. Croix, a region known to the English as the Sagadahock Country, to his 
younger brother James, Duke of York. It was only the northeasternmost part of a massive 
grant to James, whose new proprietary also included the former Dutch colony of New 
Netherland, present-day Delaware, and the islands off the coast of Massachusetts. 
Following the revocation of Massachusetts’ charter, the tie between New York and the 
far northeast was further strengthened when, in 1686, the colonies of New England were 
merged with New York to form the ill-fated Dominion of New England. Edmund 
 
60 Chard, “Nelson.” 
61 Stanwood, The Empire Reformed; for the acceptance and even encouragement of trade 
between New England and Acadia, see Reid, Acadia, Maine, and New Scotland; Daigle, 
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Andros, the governor of the new Dominion and former governor of New York, was eager 
to extend control over the disputed region east of New Hampshire and enforce his vision 
of imperial management to a region that had effectively been self-governed for the 
proceeding half century. 62 
Tensions between the Duke of York and Nelson grant began even before the 
creation of the Dominion. In 1683, a rumor was floating around the northeast that, during 
his trip to Québec, Nelson had been given a commission by Frontenac not just to trade, 
but to settle the Sagadahock Country. Alarmed, New York governor Thomas Dongan 
wrote a sternly written letter to Nelson asserting his own jurisdiction as the leading 
official in the Duke’s proprietary lands. Claiming that he could “scarcely believe such a 
report,” he ordered Nelson to desist immediately. Dongan asserted that he had employed 
people already to address the issue of populating the far northeast with Englishmen. His 
obvious concern that a settlement at Sagadahock under Nelson would negatively affect 
his efforts speaks to the perception that, at least where the far northeast was concerned, 
settlers were a zero-sum game, and settlement needed to be tightly controlled to ensure 
that new families arrived—and stayed—in the proper places.63  
The capitulation of Port Royal in 1710, then, came at a time when the far 
northeast had begun integration into a British Atlantic market economy, but all efforts at 
settlement by Europeans had been either abject failures or only modest successes. Indeed, 
 
62 Stanwood, The Empire Reformed, 52-53. 
63 Thomas Dongan to John Nelson, 3 Dec 1683, Thomas Temple Correspondence 
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transforming the Dawnland into a Protestant bulwark was not the original reason for the 
war that ultimately brought Acadia under de jure British control. The men responsible for 
the North American theatre of the War of Spanish Succession had little interest in the far 
northeast at all. The expeditions planned by Samuel Vetch and Francis Nicolson were 
originally planned to conquer all of French Canada and extend to “the southern parts of 
the continent.”64 The 1709 plan didn’t even target Acadia; instead, a land force was to 
march north to Montreal from Albany, while a naval expedition from Boston was to sail 
at the same time for Québec.65  
The “glorious enterprises” against Canada and Acadia planned during Queen 
Anne’s War were pitched as a kind of colonial war to end all wars.66 In a letter to the 
governor of Connecticut, for example, Vetch and Nicholson wrote that “driv[ing] the 
French wholly out of the continent of America” would “deliver you for-ever from the 
calamity of war.”67 Although statements such as these are often interpreted in narrowly 
 
64 Samuel Vetch to the Duke of Sunderland, 9 March 1709, p.28, Vetch Letterbook. 
65 See, for example, Sunderland to Lovelace, 28 April 1709, in John Romeyn Brodhead 
and E. B O’Callaghan, eds., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of 
New-York, London Documents, vol. 5 (Albany: Weed Parsons Printers, 1855), 73 
(hereafter cited as NYCD). For the military history of this military maneuver, which 
likely had origin with New York’s Haudenosaunee allies, see Schuyler-Lighthall, The 
“Glorious Enterprise”  
66 Samuel Vetch to the Duke of Dover, 29 June 1709, p.32, Vetch Letterbook. Contrary to 
common citation, Vetch did not refer to his plan to invade Canada as the “Glorious 
Enterprise” in Canada Survey’d, although he does call it a “great enterprise.” The closest 
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the phrase in this way: Robert Hunter to St. John, 12 Sept 1711, NYCD, 5:254. The use of 
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67 Francis Nicholson and Samuel Vetch, Instructions to the Colonial Governors, April 
1709, folder 1081, Samuel Vetch Collection, New-York Historical Society. 
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political ways as a desire to remove the French imperial apparatus from power, 
contemporaries also clearly understood the removal of the French would require both 
military and settler power. In the early stages of planning what was hoped would be a 
general invasion of New France, for example, Massachusetts governor Joseph Dudley 
wrote to the Board of Trade that all the colonies north of Pennsylvania needed to thrive 
was “a good [defense] against the incursions of the Indians and French by land that 
would be done at once by a Colony of tenn thousand North Britains.”68 
 Dudley may have gotten this idea from Scottish transplant Vetch. In his Canada 
Surveyed, written to persuade the British government to support an expedition against the 
French, Vetch argued that the best way to hold on to conquered French territory would be 
to deport French settlers. In their place, Vetch suggested his own countrymen, arguing 
that Canada would be “a noble colony exactly calculate[sic] for the constitutions and 
genius of the most northern of the North Brittains.”69  1709 also saw one of the first 
actual experiments in the creation of the kind of buffer colony called for by Dudley and 
Vetch, when 600 largely German-speaking “Palatines” were resettled in the Hudson 
River Valley. In promoting this project, the Board of Trade expressed its hope that the 
new settlers would be  
a good barrier between Her Majesty’s subjects and the French & their Indians in 
those parts, and in process of time by intermarrying with the neighbouring Indians 
(as the French do) they may be capable of rendering very great service to Her 
Majesty’s subjects there70 
 
68 Joseph Dudley to the Board of Trade, 1 March 1709, no.22, CO 5/865, TNA. 
69 Vetch, “Canada Survey’d,” p.56, Vetch Letterbook. 
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This language of French displacement and Native amelioration through the importation 
of appropriate bodies, therefore, ran through the entire project of invading Canada and 
Acadia and was already deeply embedded in the minds of imperial planners. 
The grand plans of 1709, however, were not to be. The land forces did march 
from New York, but they became bogged down in the mud in the upper Hudson. Then, 
the fleet that had been promised for the naval attack on Québec was diverted to Portugal. 
Suddenly, Vetch and Nicholson found themselves downgraded to an attack on Acadia.71 
The loss of the troops in New York and the lateness of the season then postponed even 
this exploit  to the next year.72 The failure of the 1709 expedition was serious enough that 
not even the spectacle of the visit to London of the so-called “Four Indian Kings”—
actually three Mohawks and a Mahican sympathetic to Protestantism and the British—
could get the full expedition re-approved for 1710.73 
Chastened, downsized, and pushed dangerously late in the year, the Acadian 
expedition, began with a whimper in late September of 1710. Although it was 
significantly less glorious than Vetch had initially hoped, it was nevertheless one of the 
biggest examples of both direct imperial interventions in colonial warfare and pan-
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colonial cooperation in the pre-Seven Years’ War era. The expedition, for example, 
included troops from Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode Island, as 
well as four ships from the Royal Navy and a detachment of Marines.74  
There was also a heavy Indigenous presence on both sides of the conflict. The 
expeditions occurred at a moment of transition for Native peoples of the Northeast. After 
decades of being uneasy neighbors with the English colonists, the Native polities of New 
England had nearly been wiped in out in 1675-1676 by the bloody conflict of King 
Philip's War. Many had been forced from their homes, either as refugees or as slaves 
shipped to the West Indies.75 Some at the invitation of Andros,  settled in the Hudson 
River Valley at Schaghticoke, where they lived under the joint guardianship of the 
Iroquois and the New York government.76 Several of these so-called “Schaghticoke 
Indians” had been recruited for the 1709 and later 1711 expeditions. Other New England 
Natives went north, to join with the Wabanaki northeast of the Kennebec or in the 
mission villages of New France.77 Those who remained in New England lived in 
 
74 Francis Nicholson, “Journal of Colonel Nicholson at the Capture of Annapolis, 1710,” 
Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, 1 (1879), 64, 81. The Marine 
detachment consisted of 546 men including officers: “Copy of the Particulars of 
Subsistence for the Detachment of Marines Ordered upon the Expedition,” 7 April 1710, 
CO 5/9, TNA. 
75 Pulsipher, Subjects Unto the Same King, 241. 
76 Gordon M. Day, “Western Abenaki,” in Trigger, ed., Handbook of North American 
Indians, 15:150. 
77 Colin G. Calloway, “Introduction: Surviving the Dark Ages,” in After King Philip’s 
War: Presence and Persistence in Indian New England (Hanover: University Press of 
New England, 1997), 6-7. 
45 
 
confined towns with limited autonomy, faced with increasing debt and often forced into 
positions of indentured servitude.78  
Members of this Southern New England diaspora now found themselves on 
opposite sides of the conflict. The Massachusetts regiment in the 1710 siege of Port 
Royal included a significant component of Wampanoag men recruited from former 
Plymouth colony. Many of these men were whalers, and had been specifically sought out 
for their skill at sea. Whaling and fishing had become popular occupations for Native 
New England men in the years after King Philip’s War. Particularly before the growth of 
offshore whaling, shore whaling allowed Native men in coastal areas of Massachusetts to 
capitalize on traditional skills in a way that granted a fair amount of flexibility and 
allowed them to preserve greater spatial mobility.79 Military service offered a similar 
path for Native men in New England to maintain traditional patterns of life and work in 
an increasingly constricted world.80 It also allowed them to maintain traditional skills and 
gain prestige. For communities, it functioned as a bargaining chip with colonial officials 
that could be used to justify special favor, compensation for lost land, and add weight to 
attempts to keep what land they still had.81  
 
78 Ibid., 4-5. 
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At least in the minds of some recruiters, there was significant overlap between 
Native men who worked on the sea and men who would enlist on scouting expeditions.82 
They were specifically recruited for the expedition, as well as the earlier and later 
expeditions against Canada. In 1709, after a conference with Indian recruiter Charles 
Church, Vetch wrote London that the native whalers "were very dexterous and nimble 
upon the water" and that they and their boats would prove invaluable to the expedition.83  
In 1711, the Massachusetts Assembly ordered that Church attempt to locate 110 Native 
men in the whaling counties, “having no respect to the challenge of their being servants, 
or under other obligation, or on pretence of debt.”84  
Although many men enlisted, there are conflicting accounts of the readiness with 
which Native New Englanders signed up for service. Benjamin Church claimed that the 
infamous 1704 French and Native raid on Deerfield, which had left 56 colonists dead and 
an additional 112 carried to Canada, had radicalized New Englanders of all races. As a 
result, he claimed that his earlier expeditions “had not, nor needed, a pressed man.”85  On 
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the opposite end of the spectrum, Pennsylvania Quaker William Rakestraw recounted in 
his anti-expedition pamphlet Tribute to Caesar that Nantucket Indians were called before 
the Massachusetts Council and asked if they would participate in the expedition. They 
reportedly responded that  
if Canada Indians and French are premised to come down upon us, we will go out 
and meet them, and capitulate with them, and see if we can perswade them not to 
hurt us, for, and because, we are an innocent people, and ne'er intended to hurt 
them. …But whether they will hear or forbear, we know not, but will trust in our 
God; for he is able to deliver us.86 
 
Certainly, men were not recruited quite so easily as Benjamin Church suggested. Charles 
Church complained bitterly at the cost he incurred “raising and encouraging the Indians,” 
a task that required “the best of [his] cunning.”87 Even Benjamin Church had complained 
seven years earlier that the Indians “were a people that need much treating” before 
agreeing to participate in military expeditions.88 
On the other side of the conflict, Mi’kmaw people were heavily involved in the 
defense of Port Royal. Unlike the Indigenous inhabitants of Southern New England, the 
Mi’kmaq retained nearly all of their ancestral land and had a generally productive 
relationship with the French. It is difficult to tell how involved other Wabanaki districts 
were in the siege, and most historians have assumed—probably correctly—that the 
majority of Native defenders at Port Royal were Mi’kmaq. There was clearly some 
involvement, however, of other Wabanakis; Acadia, after all, was also understood to 
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include the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy districts, then home to many Southern New 
England refugees. The Franco-Wabanaki Baron Bernard-Anselme d’Abbadie de Saint-
Castin, whose mother was a daughter of famed Penobscot sachem Madockawando, was 
involved in the action to some degree. He was captured in a ketch supposedly sailing 
from Passamaquoddy to Port Royal, presumably alongside allied warriors, although how 
many and where they were from is not recorded other than they “fled into the woods” 
after driving the boat onshore.89 Further highlighting the Native dimensions of the 
conflict, Saint-Castin’s ketch was taken by a group that included at least one Indigenous 
Southern New Englander, explicitly identified as a “saylor,” who died during the ensuing 
skirmish.90 Saint-Castin later met with Nicholson, although what they discussed was not 
recorded.91 
The surviving records of the Port Royal siege, unsurprisingly, are framed in a way 
that obscures both Native actions and views of the event. There are, however, a few 
fleeting moments that emerge in the records. For example, during the initial British 
approach on the fort, “Major Livingston and his Indians” were singled out by the “French 
and Indians,” the former calling out to the latter to “come over.”92 The meaning of this 
action is difficult to discern, but highly evocative. What did the Mi’kmaq think about 
what had befallen the nations of Southern New England? Did they see them as worthy 
opponents, or a sad and conquered people? It is impossible to tell from this brief recorded 
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interaction. However, it may offer a glimpse into an alternative understanding of the 
siege as a Native-Native conflict, occurring alongside the imperial drama that dominates 
the surviving records. 
The siege lasted little more than a week and ended in a British victory. Although 
Nicholson, Vetch, and the other planners had no idea if the conquest would extend to the 
rest of Acadia or even survive the war,  they acted quickly to consolidate their power 
through attempts to manipulate the French settler population of Acadia. Although they 
did not call for their wholesale deportation, the articles provided passage to French 
territory in Canada and Newfoundland for any civilians, and made staying within cannon 
shot of the fort for the next two years contingent on signing a loyalty oath to the British 
Queen.93  
Echoing Vetch’s pre-expedition writings, the documents produced by the council 
of war immediately after the capitulation demonstrate a clear assumption that the British 
could only hold Acadia if there were British—or at least reliably loyal—inhabitants. 
Writing to the Queen to give their opinion on what should be done with the remaining 
French settlers, Nicholson, Vetch, and the rest of the council of war recommended that, 
unless they converted to Protestantism, they should be deported as soon as possible. In 
their place, they recommended Protestant families from Great Britain and Ireland. They 
also suggested giving encouragement to families from elsewhere in British North 
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America who wanted to move to the region to pursue the fur trade and fishery.94 As 
justification for uprooting thousands of residents or forcing them to convert, the council 
cited the necessity of “bringing the native Indians intirely[sic] under your Majesty’s 
subjection” and converting them to Protestantism.95 In the minds of Nicholson, Vetch, 
and their compatriots, then, there was a clear link between practical control of Indigenous 
subjects and the culture and religion of the non-Native settler population, and this was in 
turn linked to bigger questions of how the British could exert true control over this barely 
conquered territory.96 Acadia, its resources, and its Native population could only be 
controlled if the right kinds of settlers lived there. 
 In Massachusetts, the new geopolitical situation created by the French loss of 
Acadia, also signaled a change in the settlement of what is now Maine. The war, and, 
specifically, French and Native raiding during the war, had resulted in the abandonment 
of nearly all of Massachusetts’s frontier towns. Settlement contracted to the Piscataqua 
settlements, as it had done during King William’s War in 1688-1697. Following the end 
of the war in 1713, the General Court took the opportunity to attempt a full accounting of 
land claims in the Eastward. This was done in an attempt to resolve some of the 
confusion over titles that had been the legacy of the previous century. The practical result 
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of this effort was a temporary ban on new settlement east of York and the creation of the 
Eastern Land Claims Committee, which was meant to record all claims held to these 
lands. 97  
The Committee, however, was by no means a neutral body. Oliver Noyes, Edward 
Hutchinson, Adam Winthrop, and Samuel Phipps were powerful men who already had a 
strong interest in the Dawnland, and it seems likely that they used their position to 
identify dormant claims and parcels ripe for purchase.98 Indeed, between 1714 and 1716, 
the men of the lands committee and their associates bought up a considerable amount of 
eastern real estate.  According to surviving deeds registered in York County, the 
company of Oliver Noyes and Adam Winthrop, along with Thomas Hutchinson, New 
Hampshire governor John Wentworth, David Jeffries, John Watts, Stephen Minot, and 
John Ruck bought up eight tracts of land or rights to land at Small Point in Casco Bay.99 
These same men, along with Stephen Minot, bought several other parcels in the same 
area along the lower Kennebec. Alongside claims these men had already acquired, these 
purchases would make up the lands of the Pejepscot Company, one of the earliest 
proprietary companies of the type that would come to control the area between Casco and 
Penobscot Bays over the coming decades. 100 
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Historians have often treated the Pejepscot Proprietors as a private company, 
which of course it was. However, in the first years of its existence the proprietors worked 
so closely with the General Court as to be practically indistinguishable from a 
government project. Indeed, the creation of the company, and particularly its first major 
township project at Brunswick, were the direct result of the General Court’s creation of 
the Eastern Land Claims Committee, of which Noyes, Winthrop, and members of the 
Hutchinson family were members. In April and May of 1715, Winthrop, Minot, and 
Wentworth accompanied the land claims commission to view lands at Pejepscot and “see 
and report if they were proper places for new townships to be laid out and settled.”101 The 
result of this trip, as well as the culmination of the claims committee’s mandate to settle 
new towns on the eastern frontier, was a favorable vote on a settlement proposal written 
by the Pejepscot Proprietors to the General Court. The approved proposal paved the way 
for the townships of Brunswick and Topsham.102  
At least for the first few years following the end of the war, it is perhaps more 
accurate to think of the Pejepscot Proprietors as the active wing of the claims committee 
rather than its own entity. The committee’s report on the Pejepscot proposals is an 
especially clear example of the cozy partnership between them and the General Court. 
The report claimed that the Pejepscot Proprietor’s plans for Brunswick and Topsham 
were the only two serious settlement proposals to come out of the claims process – a 
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practically inevitable outcome considering the overlap between the two bodies.103 The 
report also recommended that the province fund the restoration of Andros’ old fort near 
the falls, and provide a garrison of fifteen men “for the protection and assistance of the 
new settlements.”104 The new townships were also given a tax abatement for five years to 
further encourage the growth of the towns. Within a month of the report, the 
proprietors—who, again, were themselves members of the government—proposed that if 
the province would provide fifteen men for the garrison and £500, they would foot the 
rest of the bill for the creation of a stone, rather than wooden, fort.105 Further 
underscoring the connection between military and civilian life on the frontier, the 
Pejepscot Proprietors attempted to combine garrison and settler recruitment by 
advertising that men who enlisted could obtain one hundred acres of land after six months 
of service.106  
 The authors of the report justified these settlements as a quasi-government project 
by drawing on the language of weaponized settlement. They focused especially on the 
potential for properly planned and located settlements to break or remove Wabanki 
people from their lands. “A strong settlement” at Pejepscot Falls, they wrote, “will 
greatly tend to dislodge the Indians from their principall fishery, keep them from chief 
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carrying places, and possibly be a means of removing them further from us, if another 
war should happen.”107  
A later petition by European inhabitants of the region described the area of 
Brunswick as having been for “time without mind . . . the place of the annual rendevouze 
of all the tribes,” further underlining the geographic importance of the site they had 
chosen to colonize.108 Both these documents and those produced by the council of war 
following the capitulation of Acadia share the same logic. Although the proprietors and 
General Court were more concerned with Indigenous people than a civilian French 
population, both groups of planners shared the same belief that self-reproducing 
settlements, intentionally placed and controlled, could be another front of the ongoing 
military struggle over the future of the region.109 Of course, as an often fractious 
representative body, the Massachusetts General Court cannot be said to have a single aim 
or understanding. Nevertheless, the repeated use of this kind of language suggests that it 
was a potent and well-understood line of argument. 
The Pejepscot Proprietors weren’t the only group with new interest in the 
Eastward following the “conquest” of Acadia. Starting in 1717, Nelson attempted to have 
his uncle’s claim, defunct since the Treaty of Breda in 1667, revived.110 Working with his 
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(distant) cousin Robert Temple, Viscount Cobham, Nelson attempted to have the grant 
confirmed so he could profit off the new push for settling the northeast. Reflecting the 
new flurry of interest in the eastward after the withdrawal of the French, Cobham wrote 
worryingly to William Tailor that the King in Council was entertaining several 
applications for land in Nova Scotia “in order to the planting and establishing collonys 
thereon.”111 The Temple-Nelson boosters had the support of none other than Francis 
Nicholson, still fresh from the conquest.112 
Despite the flurry of activity, these companies had little practical success. 
Between 1717 and 1719, the Pejepscot proprietors sold 25 of 50 available lots at 
Brunswick; only 20 settler families ultimately built on their lots, and of those, a mere 13 
stayed longer than three years.113 About 11 families moved to Topsham in the same 
period. After 1720, the proprietors made only two additional grants.114 Assuming an 
average family size of five, this suggests a total population of about 120 settlers by the 
early 1720s. Two decades later, in 1737, the proprietors wrote a petition to governor 
Jonathan Belcher on behalf of 20 families a Brunswick, 24 families at Topsham, and 15 
“circumjacent” families, suggesting a population just shy of 300, many of whom were 
outside the proprietors control. Summing up the general mood, about 1731 one of the 
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proprietors produced a document appropriately titled “a list of settlers to be at Topsham 
(some of whom came).”115  
The scant success of the Pejepscot projects was due in part to Native strength. 
Estimates from 1726 put the Indigenous population of the Kennebec district at 
approximately 200 people, with an additional 850 to the east in Penobscot, Machias, and 
Passamaquoddy districts, numbers that do not take into account the large mission 
populations at St. Francis that continued to make use of their traditional Maine 
homelands.116 The area was both a crucial fishing site for Kennebec people and a cross-
tribal gathering place. A 1737 petition from Euramerican inhabitants of the region 
complained that the local Indigenous population  
look upon us as unjust usurpers and intruders upon their rights and priviledges, 
and spoilers of their way of living. They claim not only the wild beasts of the 
forest, and fowls of the air, but also fishes of sea and rivers, and so with an ill eye 
looks upon our salmon fishery.117 
  
Wabanaki people understood control of land in terms of access to resources. By asserting 
these rights in the strongest possible terms, local Wabanaki leaders made it clear that the 
Pejepscot projects were unwelcome and illegitimate.  
Tensions in the northeast erupted into violence not long after Brunswick and 
Topsham were founded. The conflict variously known as “Dummer’s War,” “Father 
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Rale’s War,” or simply “the Fourth Anglo-Abenaki War,” began in 1722 and lasted 
another five years. The many names given to the conflict, however, fail to truly capture 
the nature of the war. It was, among other things, the first war with Native people to erupt 
outside the context of a European war since King Philip’s War nearly fifty years earlier. 
Much more than previous or future “imperial” wars, this was a direct conflict between 
New England and its Native neighbors over who would control the land of the far 
northeast.118 The theatre of war extended from southern Maine to Nova Scotia, 
embroiling the entire Dawnland in violent conflict against British settlers and 
representations of British power. Brunswick was burned to the ground, and the Maine 
frontier was abandoned yet again.119 
The war also provides an early glimpse of cooperation between the Native nations 
of northern New England and Nova Scotia. Although the Nova Scotian theatre of the war 
has been described as a “parallel war,” it, too, was a direct reaction against expanded 
British power after 1710.120 Even if examined as separate wars, both conflicts arose over 
British and Anglo-American refusal to ask permission for land use and participate in the 
Wabanaki culture of reciprocity.121  It is also clear that there was coordination and 
communication between the Mi’kmaq and their southern Wabanaki neighbors. Mi’kmaw 
delegates were able to accurately describe Wabanaki actions against British settlers to the 
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French that preceded the formal declaration of war.122 Maine Wabanakis also participated 
in Mi’kmaw raids against British forts in Nova Scotia, and coordinated their attacks to 
coincide with raids on Maine towns.123 Mi’kmaw warriors used their formidable skill as 
sailors to harass the New England fishery, temporarily destroying New England’s most 
profitable industry.124 Taken in tandem with accounts of Penobscot-Mi’kmaq cooperation 
during Queen Anne’s War, the Fourth Anglo-Abenaki War provides evidence of 
increasing pan-Wabanaki cooperation. 
The result of the war was, essentially, a draw. In Maine, Wabanaki warriors held 
the upper hand for most of the conflict, but lacked the numbers or French support to gain 
decisive victory.125 The successful British attack on the Kennebec village of 
Norridgewock in 1724, where Massachusetts militiamen killed as many as 60 villagers 
and burned their homes and cornfields, was devastating, though it did not end the war.126 
In Nova Scotia, Mi’kmaq held the advantage throughout the conflict, and as late as 1725 
British officials there were concerned that they would refuse peace overtures.127 
Nevertheless, a peace was negotiated at Boston in 1725, which included both Mi’kmaw 
delegates and representatives from the British foothold in Nova Scotia.128 The treaty was 
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finally ratified in a protracted process culminating in a treaty signed at Annapolis Royal 
in 1726 by Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, Wolastoqiyik, and Mi’kmaw delegates.129 
The question of boundaries, and specifically where Wabanaki people would 
tolerate British settlement, was the primary concern of the peace talks. Disagreements 
between Wabanaki and British negotiators as well as inter-Wabanaki negotiations meant 
that the peace process dragged out until 1727. Maine Wabanakis wanted the British to 
withdraw from the Kennebec. Penobscot sachem Loron (also known as Saugaaram) 
insisted that the Penobscots had not sold any land east of Pemaquid and that the British 
refusal to leave the area occupied after 1710 was the primary reason that peace had not 
been concluded.130 Eventually, the Penobscots agreed to a boundary at St. George’s 
River, fifty miles east of the Pejepscot settlements.131 As for the Mi’kmaq, legal historian 
William Wicken has persuasively argued that the 1726 treaty was interpreted as a 
recognition of a certain British, rather than French, jurisdiction in Mi’kma’ki, but not a 
submission and certainly not a land cession.132 Moving forward, Mi’kmaw leaders 
assumed, the British would enter into proper negotiations with them if they desired to 
expand beyond Annapolis Royal and Canso. How Passamaquoddy and Wolastoqiyik 
interpreted the treaty is unclear, but it was likely along similar lines. The peace was also 
never universal: in 1727, the perpetrators of a Mi’kmaq/Acadian raid on a New England 
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fishing vessel claimed that they did not know a treaty had been signed, and Mi’kmaw and 
“Abenaki” delegates met with the governor of the French colony of Ile-Royale and 
requested that they maintain their ties of friendship and alliance.133 
That the British did not interpret the treaty as a check on further settlement was 
made clear almost immediately. The King appointed David Dunbar, an obscure colonel, 
as Surveyor of the King’s Woods in 1728. This position was not new, and was intended 
to enforce the Crown’s claim to the northeastern forests, which had been declared a 
partial reserve for the use of the Navy in 1710. Although the Crown claimed all the white 
pine and oak northeast of New York, Dunbar’s orders from the King directed him to 
perform a survey of Nova Scotia and police illegal lumbering northeast of the Piscataqua 
settlements.134  
Other than this, however, Dunbar had been given very little direction. Indeed, just 
fourteen days out from his originally scheduled departure for North America, Dunbar still 
had not received any official instructions from either the King in Council or the Board of 
Trade.135 Nervously, he wrote requesting “any Acts of Parliament, or other papers” that 
would help him do his job.136 He was also not well supported in other ways;. he had paid 
out-of-pocket for all the “assistants and instruments” he was bringing.137 And his duties 
were as unclear as the geography to which he was about to travel. He had been given a 
commission for Nova Scotia, but it was unclear to him—as it was to many—what exactly 
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that meant. In particular, he singled out the murky European status of the Sagadahock. “I 
beg to be informed of the limits of Nova Scotia,” he wrote, “because there is a large 
country lying waste” between and New England. Dunbar had been told that the best 
available mast trees grew in this region, and needed clarification from the Board whether 
or not the Sagadahock was part of his Nova Scotian commission.138 
 These questions about jurisdiction and managing the current inhabitants soon 
transformed into a much broader discussion about settling the region. Dunbar himself 
was initially cool to the idea. As late as February of 1728, he suggested that the Board of 
Trade should issue a circular to colonial governors instructing them not to grant land in 
the area to British Protestant families—in particular, Irish families—“without 
lycence.”139 Following letters from his brother and deputy Jeremiah Dunbar, however, he 
grew concerned about an existing settlement of Irish families living near the Kennebec 
River. Initially, he wrote the Board of Trade simply for instructions on how to proceed 
and whether the Irish settlers were under the government of Nova Scotia or 
Massachusetts. This correspondence, however, soon gave birth to a much bolder option: 
creating an entirely new colony between Nova Scotia and New England, and actively 
seeking European Protestant families to settle it.140 
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 The plan was laid out in a report to the Privy Council in May 1729. In it, the 
Board claimed that Nova Scotia had jurisdiction over everything east of the Kennebec. 
Because of its distance from Annapolis Royal, however, the authors suggested that the 
land between the Kennebec and St. Croix Rivers be “erected into a new province by the 
name of Georgia, and a distinct government established there.”141 The first settlers would 
be the Irish families Dunbar had been concerned about, who were willing to move to the 
east side of the Kennebec River. The report also suggested recruiting large numbers of 
German families, and specifically mentions that 500 Palatine families had petitioned for 
township land in the same area.142 Dunbar would be made governor of this new 
colony.143  
The idea of a separate political or geographic subdivision corresponding to the 
proposed Georgia colony in fact pre-dates the conquest. The 1691 Massachusetts Charter, 
which re-defined the borders of that colony, contains a clear vision of the different 
jurisdictions between Cape Cod and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In addition to Plymouth, 
Massachusetts Bay proper, and New Hampshire, British observers also recognized a 
distinct “Province of Maine” that stretched from Piscataqua to the Kennebec, Nova 
Scotia, and a separate—although poorly defined—region that lay in-between the two that 
corresponds to Georgia. Representatives from Massachusetts had previously asked that 
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all of this territory, including New Hampshire, the Province of Maine, and Nova Scotia, 
be annexed to Massachusetts Bay.144 The Crown granted part of this wish. Through the 
charter, Plymouth and Province of Maine were annexed fully to Massachusetts. 
Massachusetts was also given dominion over the rest of the northeast with the exception 
of New Hampshire.145  
Massachusetts’ control over the area east of the Kennebec River, however, was 
restricted. The charter went on to specify that no grants of land “lying or extending from 
the River of Sagadehock [i.e. Kennebec] to the Gulph of St: Lawrence and Canada Rivers 
and to the main sea northward and eastward” would be legally recognized unless 
specifically approved by the crown.146 Historians such as Jane Burbank and Fred Cooper 
have argued that this kind of layered and ad-hoc delegation of power is entirely typical of 
how empires function, and the flexible approach built into the charter allowed England 
and Great Britain to be able to claim continuous control over the far northeast and its 
people without the trouble of attempting to govern it directly.147 However, particularly 
after Nova Scotia was erected into a distinct province and removed from Massachusetts’ 
control, the issue of who could claim the power to “settle” the land in the Country. 
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The Georgia project, however, was seemingly doomed from the start. Seven 
months after the Board’s report to the Privy Council, and months after Dunbar had sailed 
west, the Georgia proposal was still floating aimlessly around Whitehall with no official 
approval or financial support.148 Partially in response to worries about jurisdiction, the 
Privy Council vetoed Dunbar’s governorship, and along with it any serious chance for the 
creation of Georgia, in March of 1730.149 Dunbar was to proceed with the plans to settle 
the Irish families somewhere between the Penobscot and St. Croix rivers, but he would 
do so under the authority of Richard Philipps, the governor of Nova Scotia.150 
Dunbar, then, rather than arriving in North America as a royal governor backed 
by the power of a commission, was sent with only vague instructions and no way to 
enforce his authority. He was not even able to offer land grants to the Irish families who 
had agreed to settle in the Sagadahock. Instead, all he could offer was the promise of land 
grants from the Nova Scotian governor at some unknown future date.151 He was also 
unable to take further steps to settle the region because of a requirement that he first 
finish the survey of the Nova Scotian woods.152 Nevertheless, at least 44 Irish families 
contracted with Dunbar and agreed to settle at Pemaquid, modern Bristol, Maine.153 
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Dunbar’s real troubles began after this. The proprietors of the Maine land 
companies organized in the wake of the Acadian conquest were immediately alarmed by 
what they saw as a threat to their land claims. By absorbing everything east of the 
Kennebec into Nova Scotia, where land could be granted and organized by Royal decree, 
Dunbar’s settlement efforts threatened most of the land claimed by the new companies. 
Even more fundamentally, while some parts of the proprietary land claims were based on 
crown grants made in the early seventeenth century, many more relied on grants from 
Massachusetts and purchase from Wabanaki sachems and confirmed by the colonial 
legislature. In the eyes of Dunbar and the Board of Trade—and, indeed, according to the 
terms of the Massachusetts charter—such forms of title were invalid. British officials 
argued that only grants directly from the Crown could have any legal meaning, leaving 
the future and investments of the proprietary companies hanging in the balance.154  
This struggle over who had the right to develop the Eastward led to a formal 
petition in 1731 by Massachusetts to the King’s attorney and solicitor general in England, 
asking them to intervene in the activities of the Board of Trade.155 It was not good news 
for Dunbar. The King’s lawyers found the colonial petitioner’s grants to be in good 
standing, invalidating the Crown’s claim to the Pemaquid area and scuttling the already 
downgraded settlement efforts. It was not, however, a clear win for the proprietors either. 
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The lawyers found in favor of their claims not on the strength of their chain of title—as 
would be the case in England—but rather on “possession,” the fact that the petitioners 
could show they were actively attempting to settle their lands at the time of Dunbar’s 
arrival.156  Additionally, despite what the proprietors and some Massachusetts officials 
would claim later, the decision did not confirm Massachusetts’ rights to settle and govern 
the eastward. Instead, the lawyers emphasized the Royal confirmation provisio from the 
charter. The proprietary grants, they argued, stood only because they all claimed an origin 
predating the 1691 charter.157 In practice, this meant that no one British governmental 
body could claim ownership over the Sagadahock. 
As representatives from different British jurisdictions quarreled over their own 
boundaries, Wabanaki people remained very clear about theirs. In conversations with 
Dunbar shortly after his arrival, Penobscot district representatives reiterated their 
understanding of the 1725/6 treaty, stating that they would not tolerate any settlements 
east of St. George’s River.158 If Dunbar was merely “settling the old settlements… not to 
exceed the old boundaries of Pemaqud,” they would consent to the arrival of a new 
community of Irish families.159 However, if any of them settled beyond St. George’s 
River, they warned, “we shall not think them to be our frinds.”160  
But just a decade later, an ambitious and ruthless land baron named Samuel 
Waldo arrived, seemingly out of nowhere, at the very river in question. Waldo had 
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several dozen Scots-Irish families in tow, many of them poached from Dunbar’s abortive 
settlement. Waldo had plans to erect two towns where none had been before. Most 
concerning, his claim was based not on any forms of land transfer recognized by the 
Penobscot, but on a hundred-year-old Royal patent and an Indian deed that Penobscots 
had repeatedly denounced as fraudulent.161  Penobscots were unanimous in rejecting what 
they saw as a baseless land grab. While there was evidently division among the 
community about the appropriate way to respond, they eventually came to a compromise 
position: Penobscots would allow Waldo’s new towns so long as the settlers remained on 
the west side of the Wessaweskeeg River and below the falls of the St. George, a much 
smaller area than Waldo’s Scots-Irish settlers had been promised and that Waldo felt he 
was entitled to.162   
Once they had come to this decision, Penobscots went about enforcing the new 
border between settler and Indian country with precision. Much like colonial surveyors 
laying out townships or the limits or particular plots, Penobscots marked trees to indicate 
the geographic limits of their willingness to tolerate Waldo’s settlers. In addition to 
deploying a physical language of land ownership that the settlers would understand, 
Penobscot representatives also issued warnings and precise deadlines for settlers who 
were found outside the bounds. For example, within months of the arrival of the settlers, 
two Penobscot men arrived at the St. George blockhouse and informed the men there that 
“in case any of the Irish people who are setteled by Mr Waldo…should cut any hay on 
 




the eastern side of Wessaweskeeg River that the Indens would burn the same.”163 True to 
their word, in August of 1736 several younger Penobscot men burnt all the hay mown by 
settlers on the east side of the river, and continued to do so whenever new hay was found. 
Around the same time, Penobscots also gave all those Irish who had built houses above 
the falls a one month deadline to move themselves and their goods and pull down the 
structures they had built. At least three settler families were forced to dismantle their 
houses, but besides some threats to livestock no more was done, and the boundary was 
maintained peacefully for several more years.164 
 Pan-Wabanaki resistance to British attempts at expansion — which had been, in 
many cases, specifically intended to break Wabanaki power and undermine their 
sovereignty — successfully prevented British and Anglo-American attempts to colonize 
the Dawnland after 1710. These efforts bled into the next round of warfare in the 
northeast. In Europe, a disagreement over who should hold the throne of Austria became 
a general war between the British and French and provided the opportunity for the 
tensions in North America to once again explode into armed conflict. This was nothing 
new; in many ways, it was simply a repeat of the earlier King William’s War and Queen 
Anne’s War. However, the end of this war would signal a massive shift in the far 
northeast. Backed by an unprecedented amount of direct governmental support, the vague 
plans of the early 1700s would give birth to the most significant British experiments in 
 










Chapter Two: The Halifax Plan 
 
Against the light of the setting sun, a lone French officer navigated the churned 
earth between the French fortress town of Louisbourg and the batteries and trenches of 
the besieging New Englanders. The flag of truce he carried announced that what had once 
been unthinkable was now coming to pass: the French were surrendering. Two days later, 
the triumphant New England troops marched into the city, “colours…flying the drums 
beating trumpets sounding flutes and viols playing.”165  
This moment of jubilation, however, was not to last. William Pepperell’s New 
England troops met the new year in squalor and agony. Squeezed into the inadequate 
shelter of the Louisbourg fort without a reliable source of food or firewood, the 
assortment of smallholding farmers and fishermen that made up the garrison faced the 
cruel winters of Cape Breton with the bare minimum of supplies and comfort. Even more 
alarmingly, a camp fever raged through the ranks with no sign of slowing.  As early as 
June, illness struck, and by September soldiers wrote home that it was a “sickly and 
dying time.”166 In November, Pepperell and Warren reported that 300 to 400 men had 
been lost, at an alarming rate of eight to fourteen dead per day.167 By January of 1746, 
500 more men had died, and another 1,100—well over half the camp—were ill.168 
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Contemplating the sorry scene around him and the rough seas that effectively prevented 
any ships from coming or going, Warren commented that if the sickness did not end 
soon, “God only knows…who among us will survive ‘till next spring."169 Adding to a 
sense of defeat, Ile Royale was given back to the French at the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle 
in 1748, returning the northeast to status quo antebellum and effectively erasing the 
efforts of the New England troops.  
Nevertheless, the capture of Louisbourg was a watershed in the history of 
European settlement in the Dawnland. The return of the fortress, which raised the specter 
of an even stronger French military presence in the region, re-opened the question of 
settlement in Nova Scotia at a time when the British Board of Trade and imperial 
apparatus were keen to listen. The result was that for the first time, the idle talk and 
baseless dreams that had characterized the European history of the region for over a 
century crystalized into concrete action. In the immediate aftermath of the return of 
Louisbourg in 1748, British officials, led by the energetic new head of the Board of Trade 
George Montagu-Dunk, Second Earl of Halifax, developed a blueprint for Nova Scotian 
settlement that would be more or less followed for the next three decades. In a reversal of 
nearly 150 years of British policy, the Halifax plan called for direct state intervention into 
the process of settlement and colonization. Targeted settlement, sponsored by the 
government, became the primary means by which European powers pressed their claims 
to territorial ownership. The justifications and frameworks created in this era laid the 
groundwork for the creation of settler colonies in the Dawnland. 
 




 While links between larger loyal populations and sovereignty had been a key part 
of settlement schemes in the 1710-1740 era, by the middle of the 1740s—and especially 
from 1748 on—British and colonial officials became increasingly willing to directly 
recruit settlers for contested land in the Eastward. Indeed, many important British and 
colonial officials understood the process of Anglo-European settlement as not just a 
demographic phenomenon, but as the peacetime equivalent of battles and sieges. Planting 
strong settlements filled with reproducing family units deep into contested land would not 
only expand British territory, but even more importantly, would restrict or even eliminate 
enemy populations—in particular, French settler and Native communities. These 
weaponized settlements were state projects intended to change the balance of power in 
strategically important regions. 
While the rhetoric of weaponized settlement became more pronounced following 
the treaty of Aix-le-Chappelle, the years immediately before the outbreak of the War of 
Austrian Succession had already seen a spike in efforts to recruit new settlers for the 
Dawnland, laying the groundwork for the post-war boom. In 1742, for example, Samuel 
Waldo began efforts to add more settlers to his claims by recruiting them directly from 
the German States. A boat with 140 prospective settlers landed at Marblehead in October 
of that year.170 Massachusetts governor William Shirley directly recruited an interpreter 
for Waldo.171 The settlers were taken to the St. George River, a zone of particular 
 




bitterness for Penobscots who asserted that Waldo’s claim was based on a fraudulent 
deed.172 
 In the competitive environment of the German States, Waldo and his agent 
Sebastien Zouberbuhler had made big promises.  In addition to an already laid-out town, 
a minister, schoolmaster, and doctor, settlers had been promised generous provisions for 
the first year as well as a cow, calf, sow, and basic farming implements.173 As would 
often be the case, however, they were somewhat less than impressed with what was 
presented to them on their arrival at Broad Bay. A petition drafted by the settlers the 
following year recounted that they had sailed to the Eastward only to find “an 
inhospitable shore and a waste wilderness” that had “few necessities and none of the 
accommodations of life.”174 Without the shelter or supplies that had been promised them, 
many had died in the bitter winter. Appealing to the governor and council and evoking 
their special position as appropriate bodies, they pled in their petition that “the fathers of 
this land were Protestant strangers” much like themselves.175 They asked to be 
transported away from their wilderness hell to the more populated parts of the province, 
where “they may be employed in such business as they are capable of for the support of 
themselves and their wives and children.”176 The council, after consulting with Waldo, 
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ordered the petition dismissed, though the non-concurrence of the House insured that the 
settlers had a second hearing.177 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the committee appointed in this 
second hearing sided with Waldo, although it did requisition some government funds to 
pay for the settlers provisions for the following winter.178  
At the same time as Waldo’s experiments, the Board of Trade also entertained 
similar proposals to populate other areas of the Eastward. Just six days after the Palatine 
settlers of Broad Bay drafted their petition, the Board considered another scheme from 
foreign Protestants forwarded to them by the Privy Council. Likely unaware of the 
struggles of their countrymen in Penobscot Country, a group of 143 “Switzers, Germans, 
and others” petitioned the King for permission to settle a tract of “crown lands lying 
waste and uncultivated” between the 44th and 48th parallel—the so-called Sagadahock 
Country that lay between Nova Scotia and Massachusetts. These settlers promised to 
defend themselves from any enemy attacks, and somewhat vaguely suggested that 
increasing settlement in the region would be of benefit to the Crown by “increasing the 
trade and navigation of your kingdoms and of Your Majesty’s revenues; and 
otherwise.”179 
While Waldo’s project and the 1743 foreign Protestant petition were not 
undertaken explicitly for the purpose of strengthening the Empire, a second plan 
considered by the Board of Trade in May 1743 had much more political overtones. 
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Thomas Coram, a Georgia trustee and noted London philanthropist who had proposed 
several projects in Nova Scotia in the 1730s, put forward a proposal to use children taken 
in by his London Foundling Hospital for the service of the Empire. He first proposed that 
the “strongest and most robust male children” should be put to sea once they came of age, 
a plan he suggested would ensure that both merchants and the Royal Navy would have 
enough seamen—a perpetual worry in an empire increasingly invested in a maritime 
identity.180 Like the “Germans and Switzers” of the previous petition, whom he had also 
written to support, Coram had his eye on the Sagadahock lands. As a reward for good 
service in the Royal Navy, Coram proposed offering former foundlings grants of land 
between New England and Nova Scotia. To make his orphans even more useful, he 
further suggested giving grants there of half the size to any adult graduates of the 
hospital, male or female, “provided they behave[d] well and serve[d] faithfully” prior to 
coming of age.181 He also suggested extending the offer to foreign Protestant seamen, as 
a further way to expand Britain’s maritime presence.  
Coram’s belief that potentially idle persons should be made useful to the “benefit 
of the publick” was typical of the general attitudes towards settlement at the time. Coram, 
however, was also clearly interested in increasing the power of the Crown to control 
settlement in the contested Northeast. Nearly half of his petition is a recitation of the 
Crown’s right in the Sagadahock lands, and a strong recommendation that they be 
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removed from Massachusetts control, “as Nova Scotia hath long since been,” and erected 
into a new colony under the proprietorship of the Duke of Cumberland.182 Coram’s plan 
thus elegantly combined a remedy to the problem of London’s idle poor, a means of 
strengthening Britain’s naval power, and a way to bring the rich mast timber lands, deep 
harbors, and large fishery of the Sagadahock into the hands of the Royal Family.183 
Coram’s combination of private interest and a concern for strengthening the power of the 
Crown and empire through settlement makes his 1743 plan an ideal bridge between the 
concerns of an earlier generation of schemers and the high period of state intervention in 
settler recruitment in the years between the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven 
Years’ War. 
It was in this context of increased interest in the Eastward that the Louisbourg 
campaign took place. Indeed, to a significant extent, it can be thought of as an extension 
of New Englander’s renewed interest in eastern lands following the fall of Acadia. 
Samuel Waldo’s significant involvement in the recruiting and military control of the 
expedition, for example, is very telling. Waldo was a major force in both the planning 
and execution of the campaign. Historian George Rawlyk argues that Waldo’s 
involvement was primarily an attempt to force the British state to accept his decidedly 
dodgy claim to Nova Scotian land, which he had purchased from John Nelson in 1730.184 
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Waldo also drew heavily on his own tenants at the Eastward in attempting to man the 
mission. Thomas Henderson, a tenant in one of Waldo’s St. George settlements, declared 
that Waldo had “signified to them his Intention of going [to Louisbourg], and desired that 
such of them whose circumstances would admit of it should enter into the service.”185 A 
total of 34 men from the two St. George towns and the German settlement at Madomock 
joined the expedition. As the three settlements had at most 143 households, this meant 
that about one in four families sent someone to the siege. The number was significant 
enough that the absence of these men was blamed for the devastation of the Wabanaki 
attacks on the settlements in 1745-1747. Most of the surviving men from these attacks 
then joined their neighbors in the garrison at Louisbourg.186 
Even apart from Waldo’s tenants, the rank and file soldiers were to a significant 
extent residents of Massachusetts’ eastern province.187 News of the siege dominated the 
social lives of those who remained behind. For example, Mary Bulman of York, the wife 
of a regimental surgeon, wrote to her husband Alexander at Louisbourg thanking him not 
just for news of himself, but of “our friends and neighbors” who were also part of the 
ongoing siege. The Euramerican population east of Piscataqua, already small, also bore 
the brunt of the high death toll in the camps. Bulman, for example, on hearing that her 
brother had fallen ill, lamented that she did not “expect to se all the faces of my frinds 
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again.”188 Her letter paints a picture of a town and region intimately connected to the 
siege, where individual letters were passed around and became communal efforts to 
divine God’s hand in the events unfolding to the east. Like many of his neighbors and 
relatives, Alexander never made it home, succumbing to the sickness he had worked to 
combat.189 
These tight connections between northern New England and the siege, as well as a 
renewed emphasis on settlement, can be clearly seen in plans for what to do with 
Louisbourg after it was captured. In the same letter to the Secretary of State that 
Pepperell and Warren announced the capitulation of the fortress town, they insisted that 
the next course of action should be to do whatever was necessary to attract loyal 
Protestants come and settle. To that end, they proposed the immediate erection of a free 
port and civil government, including a governor with instructions to “grant lands upon the 
easiest terms.” Only these steps, they claimed, would ensure “the security of this 
important garrison and territory.”190 These plans emphasized New Englanders as the best 
potential settlers. Governor Shirley for example argued that steps should be taken to 
attract fisherman and other residents of Massachusetts, a course that he claimed was the 
“best prospect of effecting a speedy settlement.”191 Others suggested giving free passage 
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to the wives and families of married soldiers in the garrison, exchanging permanent 
settlement on the island in exchange for an exemption from “the severest fatigues of 
duty.”192 
In contrast to Coram’s call to re-annex the Sagadahock, the aftermath of 
Louisbourg reveals the extent to which many in Massachusetts took seriously the 
inclusion of everything between the Piscataqua and the Gulf of St. Lawrence in their 
charter. This was in part a matter of security: that New England—and the eastern 
settlements in modern Maine in particular—could never be safe so long as the French had 
a toehold in Atlantic Canada was by this point a truism, and was the basis on which 
Shirley justified the expedition.193 Shirley also foresaw Massachusetts having a crucial 
role in the administration of post-conquest Cape Breton, much as it did in Nova Scotia. 
Announcing the conquest to the Board of Trade, Shirley argued not only that New 
Englanders would be the best settlers for Cape Breton, but also that Massachusetts’ 
“affinity to the new planted colony might be of advantage to it in its growth, trade, and 
support.” He pointed to Massachusetts’ timely intervention in the attack on Annapolis 
Royal the previous year as well as “the reduction of this island itself by forces sent 
chiefly from this province” as proof of the special relationship between the two 
colonies.194 Elsewhere, he claimed that acting Nova Scotia governor Paul Mascarene and 
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the Council had “commit[ed] themselves to [his] care.”195 Warren went so far as to 
openly advocate for Shirley as the governor of Cape Breton.196 
The return of Louisbourg to the French was, therefore, in some ways a 
repudiation of New England’s special dominion over greater Nova Scotia. Indeed, 
bitterness over this seeming rejection of colonial efforts to directly contribute to the 
empire was to become a major sticking point in Revolutionary-era pamphlet literature a 
generation later. 197 However, the return of Louisbourg and Île Royale, interpreted by 
many colonists as a humiliation, in fact stoked interest in developing northeastern land in 
Great Britain. The unexpected capture of what had previously been believed to be an 
impregnable fortress, combined with the specter of increased French power after its 
return, popularized the idea of securing Nova Scotia through concentrated settlement 
efforts. For the first time, serious interest in developing and sponsoring settlement 
schemes spread far beyond New Englanders and a scant handful of military figures to 
become a general call.   
The generality of this interest was reflected in a flurry of published and 
unpublished plans for the settlement of Nova Scotia that emerged between 1746 and 
1748. The London-based periodical The Gentleman’s Magazine, for instance, serialized 
eight articles promoting the settlement of Nova Scotia between 1746 and 1748. Many of 
these publications articulated arguments that Thomas Coram would have heartily agreed 
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with. The rich fishing banks stretching northeast from St. George’s Bank in the Gulf of 
Maine to the Canso Bank near Cape Breton were at that point exploited primarily by 
migrant New Englanders and the Acadian fishing communities in southeastern Cape 
Breton. In the pages of the Gentleman’s Magazine, however, readers were presented with 
arguments positioning the banks as an important origin point for Britain’s naval might. 
By making Nova Scotia’s fishery more accessible, and thereby increasing the number of 
fishermen, Britain would also see “its finest nursery for seamen enlarged.”  Further, 
asserting British rights to Nova Scotian fishing grounds would greatly reduce the French 
ability to participate in the cod fishery, assuring British domination of the trade.  The 
authors favored by the Gentleman’s Magazine expanded on the imperial and especially 
naval benefits of Nova Scotia’s material resources in other areas. The abundant woods of 
Nova Scotia, for example, were re-imagined as timber for ships and ships’ masts that 
would extend the power of Britain’s naval fleet, consistent with the theoretical 
designation of the northeastern forests as “the King’s Woods.”   
Echoing Coram’s concerns about the idle poor, many authors immediately 
following the end of the War of Austrian Succession touted Nova Scotia as an ideal place 
to settle recently discharged and out of work military men. In the wake of the Treaty of 
Aix-le-Chappelle, many naval vessels were decommissioned, throwing thousands of 
unemployed men onto an already depressed job market.198 The elite readers of The 
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Gentleman’s Magazine clearly understood this as a potential destabilizing factor within 
British society. One anonymous serialized author wrote in 1748 that 
The approach of peace, amidst all the joy which it naturally produces, has raised 
not only compassion, but terror in many private gentlemen...who consider well 
the consequences of discharging so many men from their occupations in the army, 
the fleet, and the yards for building and repairing the navy. As one half of these 
poor men will not be able to get employment, there is great, and just 
apprehension, that necessity will compel them to seize by violence what they can 
see no method to attain by honest labour199 
 
The only solution, the author argued, was for the government to ameliorate these 
conditions was by providing relief or, especially, providing labor. Proposed “make-work” 
projects included establishing a new fishery in Scotland, populating the island of Rattan, 
building new harbors in England and, most importantly, settling Nova Scotia and 
establishing a large fishery there. The benefits of Nova Scotia were twofold: firstly, it 
would remove a source of potential discontent from England, preserving domestic 
harmony; secondly, it would keep navy men on the sea, ensuring that there would be a 
continued base for recruitment to the navy should war break out again, as it inevitably 
would.200 This scheme ensured British glory by keeping the domestic situation calm and 
maintaining a skilled body of seamen.  
While recognizing that New Englanders had long called for subduing Nova Scotia 
in the name of their own security, the authors in The Gentleman’s Magazine were much 
more interested in checking French ambition more generally. While recognizing that 
settlement was “earnestly wish'd by all the colonies on the New England continent,” the 
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authors of the magazine conceived of settlement in terms of how it would help further 
Great Britain’s anti-French aims rather than how it would aid colonists.201  
Like most British thinkers, the authors in the Gentleman’s Magazine assumed that 
the Acadian and Mi’kmaq populations were an automatic source of French strength in the 
region.202 By actively settling the area with loyal subjects, the British would be able to 
check French strength. One author even predicted that if gains in the region could be 
consolidated the French would simply wither away, “If we hold [Nova Scotia] in its 
antient extent, and preclude the French from Newfoundland and Cape-Breton,” he wrote, 
“Canada will of course come to nothing as it is so remote, its navigation at best very 
difficult, and half the year impracticable.” Nova Scotian settlement therefore served as a 
means for ensuring British dominance in European affairs: even without war, a secure 
hold on Nova Scotia and assertion of other British land claims would serve to slowly 
strangle the French from the continent.  
One of the authors excerpted by the Magazine was New Englander Otis Little, 
who penned a strident tract in 1748 laying out the argument for settling Nova Scotia. 
Lightly fortifying and heavily settling Nova Scotia, incentivized through promotion of the 
fishery and importation of Nova Scotia produce, he argued, would give Great Britain “all 
the advantages that could have arose from the possession of Louisbourg, at a less expence 
than would have been requisite for keeping so large a fortress in repair, and defending it 
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with a proper garrison.”203 Arguing somewhat dubiously that the French always paid for 
the passage and provisions of settlers immigrating to French colonies, Little proposed 
that Great Britain should do that same in order to settle Nova Scotia with Protestants.204 
Little proposed settlements in places he thought were most likely to isolate 
Acadians and Wabanakis from the French. For example, he proposed planting a British 
settlement at the mouth of the St. John River—more or less on the site of modern St. 
John, New Brunswick—in order to gain control of the choke point created by the high 
Bay of Fundy tides and to cut off communication between the region and Québec during 
times of war.205 He proposed further settlements at Canso, Chebucto, Tatamagouche, 
Chignecto, and within the dense Acadian settlement zone on the Bay of Fundy, all 
supported by military power.206 Indeed, Little did not shy away from advising open 
displays of force against Acadian and Native inhabitants. For example, he suggested 
destroying Acadian dykes as a means of controlling the population, and suggested that if 
Native people could not be kept under control by tactics such as hostage-keeping, “‘tis 
much better to continue the war till they are wholly extirpated.”207 
Perhaps the most influential plan, however, was drawn up by the ubiquitous 
Shirley, with assistance from future chief surveyor of Nova Scotia Charles Morris and 
 
203 Otis Little, A State of the Trade in the Northern Colonies Considered, with an Account 
of the Produce, and a particular Description of Nova Scotia (London: G. Woodfall, 
1748), viii. 
204 Little, A State of the Trade, 37. 
205 Ibid., 66. 
206 Ibid., 60-61, 68, 74. Tatamagouche was particularly crucial, as it was the main port for 
the cattle trade between mainland Acadians at the French at Ile Royale. 
207 Ibid., 74. 
85 
 
evidently at Newcastle’s direction. Shirley’s handiwork, “General heads of a Plan of a 
Civil Government propos’d for his Majesty’s Province of Nova Scotia,” was enclosed in 
Shirley’s letter to the Duke of Bedford in March of 1749.208 It proposed a more powerful 
governor and council than in Massachusetts and would delay the creation of a General 
Assembly until more Protestants had moved into the region or the Acadians had been 
converted. It was put into action almost in its entirety later that year, when the Crown 
organized a civil government under Edward Cornwallis.209 
Along with this plan for how the government of the province should be run, 
Shirley included a cost estimate for settling 2,000 families and providing them with one 
year’s worth of rations. He included three variations—Europeans, colonial families from 
Pennsylvania and New England, and discharged soldiers—so that the King could “form a 
judgement, which is the surest method of drawing a number of settlers together 
speedily.”210 Like Little, he recommended settlements be made in the Acadian heartland 
districts of Annapolis, Minas, and Chignecto, a task he predicted would be difficult but 
also “the most essential…for securing the possession” of the province (see figure 4).211 
He also repeated the claim made by Little that the French were in the habit of paying for 
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their settlers’ transport and rations. Throughout the document, Shirley emphasized what 
he saw as the critical importance of settling the province with Protestants as quickly as 
possible. “A very speedy settlement of these lands is of so great importance,” he wrote, 
that even a measure as symbolically loaded as lowering or even in some cases removing 
the quitrent on granted lands should be seriously considered.212  
 
Figure 4. Acadian settlements c.1755. (From Robert A. LeBlanc, “The Acadian Migrations,” 
Cahiers de Géographie de Québec 11, no.24 (1967): 526.) 
Shirley, like Little, was also concerned with the most efficient way settlers could 
be deployed to attain control over Nova Scotia. Much like Little, he argued that the best 
 
212 Little and Shirley’s plans constitute something of a chicken and egg riddle as to who 
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and most effective use of Protestant settlement would be to place families within existing 
Acadian villages, as well as an additional township in Canso meant to defend the fishery 
there.213 He placed the greatest emphasis on the plantations to be made within the 
Acadian heartland around the Minas Basin. These new settlers, he argued, would act as a 
means of de-Frenchifying the inhabitants. For example, in his letter to Bedford he 
recommended that a survey should be immediately undertaken to determine exactly what 
lands the Acadian inhabitants laid claim to, as much of it would likely be needed for “the 
English settlement proposed to be planted among ‘em,” and encouraged removing 
Acadians from good land if necessary.214 He also proposed various means of encouraging 
them to intermarry with Protestants and, ultimately, convert.  
Shirley’s concern about the Acadians and his proposed solution was explicitly 
military in nature. Indeed, manipulating the demographics of the frontier was the 
companion strategy to his better-known proposal to erect a string of forts and 
blockhouses through the interior. In another letter to Bedford written at the same time, for 
example, he proposed combatting French encroachments on British lands in the Ohio 
River Valley and Nova Scotia with a combination of strategic forts and settler 
deployment. “I think it impracticable,” he wrote, 
to make these French inhabitants good subjects to the Crown of Great Britain, 
without mingling English settlements among them, as contiguous to theirs as may 
be, whereby the English language, laws & customs may through a constant 
intercourse of trade & dealing, be gradually introduced, and their bigotry to their 
priests & the French government be in time won out, together with their affinity 
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to the French of Canada & Cape Breton, by Intermarriages with their English 
neighbours; who would in the mean while have a constant inspection into their 
behavior215 
 
Much as forts would make it possible for British soldiers to militarily overwhelm the 
French, moving British families into French settlements would allow them to culturally 
and religiously absorb them.  It is also telling that in his many written objections to 
French encroachment in the Ohio valley and elsewhere, he tended to imagine—often 
incorrectly—that these encroachments came not so much as forts, as civilian 
settlements.216 
The most explicit rendition of this effort at weaponized settlement came from 
future Nova Scotian chief surveyor Charles Morris. Morris had been a member of the 
Massachusetts militia and participated in military action against Acadian and Mi’kmaw 
forces in Grand Pré in 1747. Shirley had commissioned him to survey the area and 
suggest appropriate places for future settlements.217 Morris’ report, which Shirley 
enclosed in his packet to Bedford, outlined specifically how many Protestants families 
could be planted in Annapolis, Minas, and Chignecto, identifying a total of nineteen 
potential small settlements made up of 30-100 Protestant families, for a total of 1,420 
families.218 Morris enclosed a map that shows both the existing Acadian populations, and 
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suggestions for where Protestant families could be settled.219 Acadian settlements were 
rendered as small houses with peaked roofs, and projected Protestant settlements as neat 
grids, creating a powerful visual of the belief held by Shirley and others that the best way 
to reduce French power was to overwhelm Acadian populations with Protestant families 
(see figures 5 and 6). 
 
themselves against a party of Indians, and support themselves,” enclosed in Shirley to 
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Figure 5: Charles Morris' map of proposed Protestant settlements, showing current Acadian populations. 
(Charles Morris, “A Plan of Settlements Propos’d to be Made at Annapolis, Menis[sic], and 




Figure 6. Detail of above showing proposed settlements in the Chignecto region. Existing 
Acadian settlements are shown as houses with peaked roofs, and proposed Protestant settlements 
are shown as grids. 
Shirley, Morris, and Little’s proposals to deal with the Acadian problem by 
weaponized settlement, however, was only one approach considered by the British. 
Following on the successful expulsion of the French from Louisbourg, British officials 
increasingly began to toy with the notion of removing Nova Scotia’s Acadian inhabitants 
entirely as the companion policy to importing new Protestant settlers. Writing home after 
the conquest of Louisbourg and reporting a delay in plans to remove the Acadians of Isle 
St. Jean as part of the terms of capitulation, Warren hoped that  
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they will be sent away next spring, as we see the ill consequences in Nova Scotia, 
that attend keeping any of them  in our territorys, and indeed it would be a good 
thing if those now at Annapolis could be removed, and this I have mentioned to 
the Admiralty, and I believe now W. Shirley does to your Grace.220 
 
The Nova Scotian council put an even finer point on this issue. Its report to the Secretary 
of State concerning the state of the province in 1745 concluded that “upon the whole it is 
most humbly submitted whether the said French inhabitants may not be transported out of 
the Province of Nova Scotia and be replaced by good Protestant Subjects.”221 Although 
he doubted the practicality of removal, Mascarene wrote to Shirley that if  
these Inhabitants can be removed and good Protestant Subjects transplanted in 
their room; notthing can be of greater advantage to the Brittish interest in general, 
and to that of the Northern Colonies in particular and espcecially to that of this 
Province.222 
 
While a weaponized understanding of settlement had been a feature of thinking about the 
Dawnland at least since the 1710 conquest, after the treaty of Aix-le-Chappelle it became 
the single most influential line of thought and argument among those who concerned 
themselves with the project of settling the far northeast.  
Unlike the earlier schemes, this flurry of plans translated into action. Halifax 
became the First Lord of the Board of Trade and Plantations in the fall of 1748. He was 
an ambitious man, and he took to his new position with a zeal not before seen at the 
Board. His goal was no less than to enforce order and uniformity on the notably dis-
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ordered and politically heterogeneous British colonies, and he seized upon Nova Scotia 
as the perfect place to experiment with new forms of direct imperial rule. Drawing on the 
ideas of Warren, Shirley, Little, and others, the aggressive settlement of loyal Protestants 
was to be the cornerstone of this approach. Halifax and the Board moved quickly, and by 
April 1749—around the same time that Shirley’s proposals and Morris’ map were 
received—a plan for the settlement of the province, drawing on the many in circulation 
through the following year, had been drawn up. In a major departure from the initial 
plans, however, the first course of action would be to establish a new capital for the 
province on the Atlantic-facing coast.223 
 Plans moved forward at break-neck speed. By May, transport ships full of 
prospective settlers were docked at Portsmouth harbor. Perhaps in part because Halifax 
was attempting to move far faster than the sluggish British bureaucracy was accustomed 
to, the ships waited at port nearly a month longer than originally anticipated, introducing 
a series of new problems. The steward of the Merry Jack, for example, “forcibly [took] 
away” and had sex with one of the women on board, “said to belong to one of the 
settlers,” and refused to release her back to her family. This frightening case of sexual 
assault would have been magnified by the close confines of the ship, and it led to violent 
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brawl between the settlers and the ships’ crew. The only official response was to remove 
the passengers to another transport; the fate of the woman was left unmentioned. 224 
 Finally in late June, the ships, laden with nearly 2,000 settlers and Nova Scotia’s 
newly anointed governor Edward Cornwallis, arrived in the large harbor on the Atlantic 
shore known to the Mi’kmaq as K’jipuktuk, sometimes anglicized as Chebucto.225 The 
new settlement was, appropriately, named Halifax, and work was soon underway to lay 
out a town along lines already determined in London. Cornwallis, a man with no civilian 
experience and fresh from the suppression of the highland Scots following the 1745 
uprising, ran the new settlement like a military camp. Settlers were forbidden from 
leaving. One group of eight men, for example, “went off in canoes”—possibly with some 
Native people, or in an attempt to trade—and were promptly hauled back within the 
palisades, removed from the ration book, and kicked out of the province. Surveying the 
settlers who came with him like he would a camp of soldiers, Cornwallis dismissed the 
majority as “poor vagabonds that embraced the opportunity to get provisions for one year 
without labour.” Many had arrived without shoes, stockings, or shirts; others were 
“sailors that only wanted passage to New England.” He accused the majority of the latter 
of having incurable venereal diseases.226 Clearly disgusted by his encounter with the 
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lower sorts, Cornwallis employed some of the settlers of higher rank—who were not 
expected to perform manual labor—to manage the lower sorts as overseers. They were to 
direct these people to labor on public buildings in return for being provided with 
rudimentary clothing.227 
 Instead of what he saw as the dregs of English society, Cornwallis looked to a 
familiar source, increasingly thought of as the solution to all population woes: the 
German states. In the same letter in which he derided the English settlers, he praised the 
“few Swiss” who had arrived with them, finding them “easily governed” and good 
workers. He strongly suggested implementing a proposal he had been given while still in 
England, to extend the rights of subjects to German Protestants and offer a cash bounty to 
each German family who arrived in the colony.228 
 Indeed, “foreign Protestants” of various descriptions, rather than Britons or 
colonists, quickly emerged as the preferred option for settlers in the region. Several 
proposals for Nova Scotia involved French Huguenots, including several hundred 
refugees who arrived at the isle of Jersey in early 1750.229 When the Board received 
Cornwallis’s proposals, they agreed heartily, writing in response that the Nova Scotia 
project would be greatly forwarded by the “industrious and exemplary dispositions” of 
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possible beginning in the next year.230 The Halifax plan, after all, called not just for the 
development of a new capital at Halifax, but for extensive Protestant settlement 
throughout the province, and this would ultimately require more people than the seed 
population that had arrived with Cornwallis. 
 Within six months of Cornwallis’s arrival, George II had officially approved a 
plan to contract with a Rotterdam merchant, John Dick, to acquire new settlers for Nova 
Scotia. The Board of Trade received broad latitude to contract with him or any other 
merchant, and to “offer…reasonable encouragement to foreign Protestants in order to 
induce them to settle.”231 These “encouragements” were very generous. In addition to 
subsidized passage from Germany, prospective settlers were promised, gratis, fifty acres 
of land with an additional allowance of ten acres per family member plus a year’s 
provisions and any tools needed for husbandry, agriculture, and the fishery.232 The Board 
authored a declaration meant to be circulated throughout the German states, which 
painted a rosy picture of a growing province “as rich and fertile as any other of the 
British Colonies,” overseen by a “wise and judicious governor,” and welcoming new 
settlers every day.233 
 The declaration sent to Dick masked an unfolding catastrophe on the ground. 
Cornwallis had walked into an already precarious environment, where Native and 
Acadian hostility to the British regime had lain just below the surface since the 
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“conquest” of 1710 and had frequently erupted into open fighting. The combination of 
the sweeping new settlement plan—which made no provision for negotiating land 
cessions and violated the treaties signed by Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik in 1726—
combined with Cornwallis’s bellicose and arrogant nature was disastrous.  
Initially, relations between the new Nova Scotian establishment and the Mi’kmaw 
and Wolastoqiyik nations had been cautiously friendly. A number of Native people and 
some sachems visited the town site in the first month and were friendly enough to give 
Cornwallis the impression that they would readily renew the 1725/6 treaty.234 In August, 
Cornwallis’s party sent to remove the French from the mouth of the St. John returned 
with representatives from the Wolastoqiyik and Chignecto Mi’kmaq, probably from the 
Fundy shore area of the Siknikt district. These communities were at the front lines of the 
border dispute between the British and French, and well connected with their 
Passamaquoddy and Penobscot cousins who were increasingly oriented toward 
diplomacy with the British. Following normal protocol, the representatives met with the 
Provincial council several times—probably over the course of several days—and agreed 
to renew the treaty of 1725/6.235 Mascarene, who had been present at the original 
negotiations and several other meetings between Wabanakis and the Massachusetts 
Governor, was by now an old hand at Native diplomacy; he was still in Halifax at the 
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time of this meeting and it seems likely that he nudged Cornwallis—who had no 
grounding in this form of treaty making—into the proper forms. Things looked good.  
The Wolastoqiyik and Siknikt deputies, however, did not seem to have 
community power to renew the treaty, and this initial meeting was likely simply a display 
of their openness to begin negotiations for renewed friendship. The deputies returned to 
the north shore of the Fundy with Howe and a shipload of ceremonial gifts in order to 
“ratify” the treaty renewal closer to home. This two-step treaty process was followed in 
New England, with the full community meeting, feasting, and exchange of gifts with 
high-ranking men signifying the actual moment of renewal. Cornwallis, had mistaken the 
beginning of the treaty process with its conclusion.236  
Compounding his lack of knowledge of Native diplomacy, Cornwallis appears to 
have vastly underestimated the Mi’kmaq and Wabanaki in just about every way. In 
dismissing Acadian claims that they could not take up arms out of fear of Native 
retaliation, Cornwallis wrote derisively that “at present above ten thousand people are 
awed by two hundred Savages.”237 In fact, the Mi’kmaq population alone was something 
more like 3,000, including 600 or more fighting men. Cornwallis’s arrogance is nowhere 
more evident than in his claim to the Board of Trade that “with an addition of force by 
sea and land” he could “root [the Indians] out entirely.”238 At this point, the only actions 
taken by the Native nations of Nova Scotia were the capture of twenty Englishmen at 
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Cobequid bay. Indeed, Cornwallis’s immediate move from cultivating friendship to 
proposing the elimination of the entire Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik population before any 
major violence was committed is very telling of his personality and general approach to 
governing.239 
 Cornwallis’s opinions on the Native population of the northeast were shared by 
his fellow Englishmen who had come to Halifax. Hugh Davidson, for example, wrote to 
his friend Richard Nevil Aldsworth that the Mi’kmaq were nothing but “poor wretches” 
who would be entirely removed from the province within a few years.240 He also 
discounted their organization and military ability, claiming that Halifax’s rickety and 
hastily built wooden palisade meant that “ten thousand Indians could not destroy the 
settlement.”241 
This combination of arrogance and utter disregard for the Mi’kmaq and 
Wolastoqiyik as independent actors came to a head in the fall of 1749. After the incident 
at Canso, Mi’kmaq attempted—but evidently failed—to take another English ship at 
Chignecto. The key incident, however, took place on September 30, when some Mi’kmaq 
attacked a party cutting wood on the east side of the harbor, killing four men and taking 
one prisoner.242 Cornwallis and his council immediately switched to offensive mode. The 
resolutions passed on October 1st were almost shockingly harsh, implementing a scalp 
bounty and stating that  
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to declare war against them [the Mi’kmaq] would be in a manner to own them a 
free and independent people; whereas they ought to be treated as so many bandit 
ruffians or rebels to His Majesty's Government…. [I]n order to secure the 
province from further attempts from the Indians some effectual method should be 
taken to pursue them to their hunts and show them that after such actions they 
shall not be secure within the province.243 
 
From then on, friendship was impossible. 
Although certainly a reflection of Cornwallis’s personality, his and his council’s 
hardline approach to the Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik was informed by British 
understandings of sovereignty in the far northeast. Early in Cornwallis’s tenure, Halifax 
and the rest of the Board of Trade wrote to him, informing him that the French governor 
at Canada, Roland-Michel Barrin de La Galissonière, had demanded that the 
Wolastoqiyik be included in the general peace and treated as allies of the French. The 
Lords saw this as a French attempt to undermine British sovereignty in what is now New 
Brunswick, and indeed, this was Galissonière’s intention. However, the practical effect 
was to tie Wabanaki submission to the British to the problem of resolving the brewing 
border dispute in Great Britain’s favor. These concerns led the Board to inform 
Cornwallis that there was “an absolute necessity of compelling these Indians to renew 
their Submission to His Majesty,” and urged him “to take such measures for that purpose 
as shall appear to you most likely to prevail.”244 For a man like Cornwallis, those 
measures would inevitably involve a naked show of force. 
The Board of Trade was perfectly aware of this turn of events; indeed, it had 
received Cornwallis’s letters containing a full account of the situation and the Council’s 
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declaration of war a few days before contracting with Dick and penning the official 
invitation to German families.245 While the Board disapproved of Cornwallis’s genocidal 
desire to “root [the Indians] out entirely,” it generally approved of his conduct and must 
have understood the violent situation that the settlers they recruited would arrive to.246 
Yet, while the advertisement to potential German settlers touched on the Acadian 
population, it did not mention Native inhabitants at all, although it did note that settlers 
would be provided with guns.247 It seems likely that the Board was relying on the 
ignorance of peasant families from the German States, who had more than enough of 
their own troubles. 
The Board of Trade was not the only group considering the possibilities of 
German settlement in the far northeast in the years after 1748. Between the high death 
toll among the Louisbourg campaign troops—most of whom were from east of the 
Piscataqua—and several devastating Native raids, the war had been a demographic 
catastrophe for northern New England. Little estimated that over 7,000 men from the 
northern colonies—by which he mostly meant Massachusetts—had been lost.248 It was 
also a massive setback for the Maine speculative companies who had risen to the fore in 
the wake of Queen Anne’s War and hoped to make their fortunes in Kennebec Country. 
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The unscrupulous Waldo, who had been Pepperell’s second in command on the mission, 
was particularly hard hit. His settlements at St. George and Broad Bay were wiped off the 
map.249 In a memorial to the Duke of Bedford, Waldo claimed that his efforts to recruit 
soldiers from his estates in eastern Massachusetts had “so thinned that frontier” that it had 
been left vulnerable to the Wabanaki attacks that destroyed them. As usual, his concern 
was not his people but his pocket book: he complained that lands that had once brought 
him £1,000 sterling a year were now “almost entirely laid waste.” 250 
Following the war, Waldo did make efforts to make his purchase of the Temple-
Nelson land rights in Nova Scotia mean something. He teamed up with British merchant 
and diplomat Wyndam Beawes and circulated a plan to settle several thousand European 
families in Nova Scotia.251 Nothing, however, seems to have come from this scheme, and 
Waldo instead focused his efforts on re-populating his St. George lands. 
 Despite Waldo’s only patchy success earlier in the decade recruiting Germans to 
fulfill his speculative concerns, after the war the idea of using Germans to make up for 
the massive population losses sustained in the war gained steam almost immediately.252 
Just a month before the Lords of Trade made a contract with John Dick to bring Germans 
into Nova Scotia, Lieutenant Governor Spencer Phipps made a call to recruit “foreign 
Protestants” to replace wartime settler losses in a speech before the General Court. This 
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proposal immediately caught the attention of men throughout the colonies who made a 
living by the German trade, which, by then, was a booming industry in Pennsylvania and, 
to a lesser extent, South Carolina. Joseph Crellins, for example, who had been active in 
efforts to bring Germans to South Carolina, wrote to Phips from Philadelphia within a 
month of Phips’ speech to offer his services.253  
Massachusetts took unprecedented steps to encourage foreign Protestants to settle 
in the less densely settled parts of the province. A committee appointed to look into this 
possibility first selected the area of Fort Massachusetts, in the west of the province near 
modern North Adams, as the site for these government-recruited settlers. Fort 
Massachusetts, like the militarized settlements to the Eastward, had been decimated 
during the war; sixty settlers had been killed and another thirty had been taken captive 
and taken to Canada during an attack the same year as the one on Broad Bay.254 The 
committee proposed laying out two townships for Germans, and suggested that the 
government should grant them 100 acres per family, with an additional allowance of 25 
acres for sons nearing the age of majority and 50 acres for adult single men.255 The 
committee was also ordered to put together an act that would supersede all past acts that 
could in any way impede the importation of foreign Protestants.256 
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 By the time the committee’s recommendations were voted on, the two western 
townships had been joined by another two townships in the Eastward, to be laid out 
inland from Falmouth (modern Portland).257 The townships were the New England 
standard at six miles square, and to be peopled with 120 settlers each, either “distinct 
families” or single men over 21 whose grants were conditional on their staying in the 
township for at least seven years.258 The government planned to hire Crellins to recruit 
these foreign Protestants, with a promise of 200 acres of reserve land in each township if 
he fulfilled his obligations.259 
 As with the broader war effort, any difference between official Massachusetts 
policy and the interests of Maine’s great landholders was nearly impossible to discern. 
The General Court was far from the only body interested in recruiting Germans in the 
post-war era. Waldo also made a contract with Crellins for an additional 200 families to 
try and repopulate Broad Bay, making Crellins both the official provincial agent and 
directly responsible to Waldo.260 Another large proprietary group, the Kennebec 
Company, also became involved in the rush, setting aside in late 1751 a township 
opposite the Kennebec from Fort Richmond for German Protestants, somewhat 
uncreatively called Frankfort.261 The company hired Rotterdam merchant John Steadman 
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and Henry Ehrenfild Luther, a civil official from Frankfort who had taken it upon himself 
to act as an advisor to the province, to recruit for them in Germany.262 
 That both the British powers of the Eastward were trying to recruit Germans in 
1750-1751 was bound to cause issues. Massachusetts and Nova Scotian officials first of 
all had to deal with the familiar problem of Pennsylvania Newlanders and agents for 
South Carolina, both more established emigration pathways for German families. Even 
getting settlers aboard a ship was no guarantee they would end up where the recruiters 
wanted them. Crellins, for example, complained that a minister who had originally agreed 
to go to Maine jumped ship once he arrived in Amsterdam, changing his destination to 
South Carolina.263 Moreover, official government agents were not the only people trying 
to bring Germans to the far northeast in the early 1750s. Competition between official 
recruiters and the people who had been contracted by Waldo and the Kennebec Company 
caused significant tension.264 At one point, Crellins pointedly asked the secretary of 
Massachusetts to remind Luther that only one of them had the authority from the 
government to settle the four townships that had been set aside for foreign Protestants.265 
 Indeed, Luther had become a particularly enthusiastic booster for the 
Massachusetts cause. Luther was a jurist, councilor to the Duke of Württemberg, and 
owner of a successful type foundry that provided fonts for Philadelphia’s first German-
language publications. Concerned by what he saw as deeply unethical practices by those 
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who were recruiting settlers for Pennsylvania, Luther jumped on the New England 
project as a possible means of reforming the emigration system.266 He repeatedly warned 
Crellins, Waldo, and other representatives of Massachusetts to avoid the merchants of 
Rotterdam (including Steadman) who he accused of employing shady men called 
“enlisters,”  
men of ill fame and…desperate reputation who spread over all Germany… and 
woe to them who trust any thing with them, and who suffer themselves to be 
seduced by their promises.267  
 
The use of such men, Luther argued, would not only tarnish the reputation of the New 
England and Nova Scotia projects, but potentially lead to a ban on emigration.268 Luther 
wrote to the Massachusetts provincial secretary Josiah Willard with proposals on how to 
fix what he understood to be a badly broken system. The agents of Massachusetts and 
Nova Scotia should work together, he suggested, which would end up as a benefit to both 
parties. By receiving more official support from the Board of Trade and installing 
impartial on-the-ground agents, the two northern colonies would “entirely defeat the 
unlawful trade of the Newlanders of Pensilvania” and establish themselves as the most 
official of the many squalling British attempts at luring German families across the 
Atlantic.269  
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 Luther’s efforts to secure the confidence of Massachusetts officials tended toward 
the extreme. In 1751, for example, he wrote to Shirley that  
I can't well express the joy which I feel when I represent to myself your province's 
being one day sufficiently peopled; it will be able not only to defend the other 
provinces on your continent belonging to the Crown, but also powerfully to 
advance the just designs of the English Nation and make their flagg respected as 
far as the coasts of Africa and the East Indies. This honour which awaits you, and 
which I look upon as certain, gives me a most sensible pleasure, which nothing 
equals, but that of being so happy, as to contribute all in my power thereunto.270  
 
Luther then proceeded to promise his unborn child to the service of the province, 
planning to name the child George if male and Anne if female. When little Anne was 
born that November, she was duly baptized with Luther’s friend standing in for the 
child’s official godparents, the Governor, Council, and Representatives of the Province of 
Massachusetts.271 
 In a world where acceptable Protestant bodies were a limited commodity, the 
Massachusetts schemes—approved by the Province but not the Board of Trade—
threatened to obstruct the Parliamentary-funded efforts to settle Nova Scotia with the 
same families. Massachusetts officials gave Crellins specific instructions not to obstruct 
the work of the Nova Scotia agent, but his mere presence was seen by the Board of Trade 
as a potential affront and, perhaps, yet another example of Massachusetts exceeding its 
proper place in the Empire. Crellins arrived in Germany as the work of recruiting 
Germans for Nova Scotia was already under way. In February 1751, shortly after 
Crellins’s arrival, Luther arranged a meeting between Crellins and Dick’s deputy Kholler. 
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This meeting initially produced good results and both sides promised to work together in 
harmony, but the agreement collapsed in less than a month. According to Crellins and 
Luther, Dick and his deputy Kholler went on the offensive, publishing disparaging 
advertisements in German newspapers claiming that the Nova Scotian agents had a more 
legitimate commission and attempting to discredit the New England efforts with the 
Board of Trade. Crellins claimed that Kholler and Dick’s efforts cost him well over 250 
potential settler families, scared off by the rumors of impropriety. This behavior 
continued the next season, as Kholler took out advertisements in newspapers throughout 
the German States claiming that the New England project was intentionally trying to 
sabotage Nova Scotian efforts and that Crellins was not a man who could be trusted.272 
 Although Crellins swore that he had in fact gone out of his way to promote the 
Nova Scotian efforts, he also accused Dick and Kholler of recruiting Catholics, making 
promises that they were not authorized to make, and using shady practices—such as 
stealing transports bound for New England—that would harm the reputation of the 
British generally. Crellins, Waldo, and others in the Massachusetts interest insinuated the 
Nova Scotian slandering was putting the very frontier at risk, alleging that Nova Scotia 
would only benefit from a more densely settled Massachusetts and that the French King 
might use the confusion to begin recruiting Germans for his own efforts in Canada and 
Ile Royale.273 
 




 The New England recruiters, however, were far from a united front. Crellins 
complained that his efforts were being undermined by two men he had brought to assist 
him, Steadman and Peter Wild, who had since been hired by William Bowdoin and the 
Kennebec Company. Crellins alleged that while he lay sick in his cabin, Steadman and 
Wild took the poorest of the contacted settlers out to a tavern where they plied them with 
wine and wrote letters home on their behalf that slandered Crellins and promoted the 
efforts of Steadman and Wild—and, by extension, promoted the interests of the 
Kennebec Company above those of the Province and Waldo.274 Indeed, the Kennebec 
Company appears to have attempted to poach some of the settlers intended for the 
Provincial townships.275 For example, a boatload of settlers for the Provincial townships 
was turned over to Steadman by Crellins at Rotterdam. Once the transport arrived in 
Massachusetts, however, the Kennebec Company voted to try to persuade as many of the 
Germans aboard as possible to settle on their township by paying their passage and 
providing additional provisions.276 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the result was that Massachusetts received far fewer 
Germans than had been hoped for in the period immediately following the war. Nova 
Scotia, on the other hand, made a stronger showing, but only relatively: Dick was able to 
recruit enough Germans for one or two large townships. However, the state of continued 
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war with the Mi’kmaq made following the original plan of creating new settlements 
within Acadian lands—50 miles through dense woods or a treacherous two day sail from 
the British stronghold of Halifax—untenable. Even if the province had been at peace, 
many commenters considered the German-speaking settlers inappropriately foreign, and 
did not trust them too far beyond the reach of the government.277 Instead, most of the new 
settlers were sent a day’s sail up the coast from the capital to create the new settlement of 
Lunenburg. Retaining something of the flavor of the original settlement plans, the site 
was located nearly on top of the old métis village of Mirilegueche, one of the only areas 
of significant Francophone presence on the Atlantic shore at the time.278 
Lunenburg would prove to be the only township other than the capital settled as 
part of Halifax’s grand scheme. Like that settlement, it was frequently described in 
military terms, and the imperial officials overseeing its creation left little question that 
they understood it to be on heavily contested ground. Governor Peregrine Hopson, for 
example, wrote to the Board of Trade requesting 500 muskets “and accoutrements for the 
use of the foreign Protestants.”279 These guns were eventually acquired from 
Massachusetts, from the store on Castle William originally meant for an aborted invasion 
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of Canada. Instead, they would be used to support a different kind of conquest.280 
Lunenburg’s military nature extended to the ways in which settlers were cared for. They 
were provisioned by the military, which kept track of rations, expenditures, and names of 
settlers alongside provisioned soldiers and in the same manner.281 
 Rather than intermingling German families within French settlements, the new 
German settlers were ultimately deployed as a kind of living buffer between English-
speaking colonists and their enemies. The German settlers both at the Massachusetts 
Eastward and Nova Scotia still farther eastward lived with the consequences of being 
used as human shields, a goal made clear by both the Board of Trade and the Maine 
proprietors, who made frequently referred to them as a “barrier against both the French 
and Indians.”282 At the Kennebec German community of Frankfort in 1754, Wabanakis 
began killing livestock, a common precursor to attacks on human inhabitants. When 
Abraham Wyman went to confront some of the young men involved, “one of them 
discharged a gun at him and would have killed him, but one of them struck the gun aside 
and bid him qyick walk, or else he would be killed.”283 Two weeks later the Germans 
were told by Wabanakis that a party of French and mission Indians would attack the 
settlement within two weeks “and that all the old people were to be killed and the young 
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carried to Canada.”284 Terrified, the German settlers fled to the nearest garrison house 
and wrote to the governor for protection.285 
Violence against settlers and their property, however, was not the only Native 
response to British attempts at expansion. In 1754, representatives of the Mi'kmaw 
districts and some Wolastoqiyik from the St. John River Valley approached the 
provincial council and proposed peace and recognition of British rights to the southwest 
of the peninsula and parts of the mainland in exchange for the recognition of the 
northeast half of the peninsula as their exclusive territory. While the Mi’kmaq had always 
pushed for protection for their lands during peace negotiations, this plan was remarkable 
for its specificity, laying out precise boundaries for the land in question. The document 
presented to the Government at Halifax made it clear, moreover, that while the amount of 
land specified may have seemed large to British eyes, the Mi’kmaq saw it as a significant 
concession, “very limited in view of the immensity of the land they did possess, and of 
the amount at present in their possession.”286 Within this space, no British or French 
forts—let alone settlements—would be tolerated, and while they promised to allow the 
British passage through the region on the highways, they made it clear that any British 
detachments found “going into the woods” would be considered enemies. In return, the 
English would be free to develop the Bay of Fundy, the south shore, Halifax, and perhaps 
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even the St. John River Valley as European settler spaces, regions that were, not 
incidentally, the best agricultural land the province had to offer.287 
 The lands that would have made up this reduced but potentially more secure 
Mi’kma’ki are interesting in a number of ways. Although the plan was delivered to the 
Nova Scotian government by Father Le Loutre, a priest known for his pro-French 
activism, the Mi’kmaw proclamation, by banning all forts and proposing withdrawal 
from the Acadian heartland and moving further east rather than joining the French on the 
Acadian mainland, in fact suggested a break from French as well as British plans for the 
region. In this sense the plan represents a pragmatic evolution of a pan-Indian approach 
to land and diplomacy that had been increasingly evident in the region since 1749, when 
several Mi’kmaq leaders made arguments that the Nova Scotian peninsula should belong 
exclusively to “les sauvages” and made statements linking their struggle over land with 
other indigenous people throughout North America.288 Furthermore, while this reduced 
Mi’kma’ki would have entailed the abandonment of communities on the southwest shore 
and Bay of Fundy region, the emphasis on the importance of Canso in particular as a 
Native space represented a continuation of a long-standing policy while also attempting 
to secure claims to the parts of the region that had been least influenced by either the 
British or the French. 
 The Mi’kmaw proclamation, however, was not taken well by the Nova Scotian 
government, which seems to have considered it laughable at best and a nefarious French 
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plot at worst.289  Nova Scotia in the 1750s was run by people who were invested in a 
vision of land ownership that reduced the importance of so-called “Indian title” in favor 
of grants directly from the Crown, which either ignored the presence of Natives or 
considered them conquered people who occupied the land only at the Crown’s 
sufferance. Cornwallis’s successor Charles Lawrence dismissed the proposals as 
“insolent and absurd” and wrote to his superiors that the Council did not even see fit to 
answer them, “or to take the least notice of them.”290 Reflecting a paternalistic idea of 
Wabanakis as subjects without rights to the land, when the plan was proposed again the 
following year by Mi’kmaw delegates, Lawrence claimed that while the Council was 
“perfectly disposed” to grant the Mi’kmaq an “allowance” of land, he made it clear that 
such “allowances” would be much smaller than what had been proposed, and that any 
such grants would be made on British, not Native, terms.291 
The British establishment at Nova Scotia had reason to fear a French settlement 
scheme. The return of Ile Royale in 1748 presented an opportunity for French officials to 
reimagine what their holdings on the Gulf of St. Lawrence looked like, and what they 
were supposed to achieve. The most notable accomplishment of the post-return era was a 
set of ambitious plans for the refurbishment of the largely destroyed fortress. Protecting 
the fishing outports also became a much more prominent consideration post-1745, 
although that is only relative to the neglect they received before. Louis Franquet, hired to 
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evaluate the defenses of the fort and recommend improvements, originally included 
eleven redoubts located at villages throughout the colony.292  
French officials, on the whole, appear to have shared many assumptions with 
British planners about the power of population to tip geopolitical contests. At least some 
French officials in France were pushing for a more direct role in settlement during these 
years. Compared to their British competitors, however, and contrary to Shirley’s paranoid 
beliefs, the French made barely any attempts to either attract new colonists or rework the 
demography of their holdings. Instead of drawing new settlers from France or Germany, 
the primary hope was to convince Acadians to move from British territory to lands still 
held or claimed by the French. At the same time as officials in Massachusetts and Nova 
Scotia were importing German families, officials at Versailles earmarked 100,000 livres 
for the transportation and provisioning of Acadian families.293  
The violent high point of efforts to move Acadians into French claims took place 
around the Isthmus of Chignecto in 1750. Following the return of Louisbourg, the French 
had increasingly attempted to enforce their claim to mainland Nova Scotia—modern New 
Brunswick—with a border at the Missaguash River. Nestled in the tidelands on the south 
side of the river, the residents of Beaubassin Village, a major Acadian settlement, were 
subject to pressure from both British and French demographic schemes. Morris’ map had 
called for five clusters of Protestant settlement in the immediate area, including one in the 
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middle of the village itself.294 The French, meanwhile, had increased efforts to bring the 
population north into their claimed territory. Finally, after a Cornwallis sent a military 
detachment to secure the Isthmus, the French burned the village to the ground to force the 
inhabitants across the river, displacing up to 1,000 people.295  
Beyond this violent and forced population movement, the efforts to move Acadians 
saw few results. Support from within Acadia from both Acadians themselves and 
government officials was tepid. Jacques Prévost, the financial comptroller for the colony, 
was pessimistic about the transplanted Acadian settlements that had been made, and after 
the outlay in 1750-1751 there appears to have been little support from the establishment 
in France for settlement experiments. 
Although official support dried up, further experiments in demography came in 
the next two years under the brief but memorable tenure of Governor Jean-Louis de 
Raymond, comte de Raymond. Raymond made pushing into the land beyond Louisbourg 
a priority during his two-year tenure as governor. While his plans were mocked by 
contemporaries and even some historians as being overly grand or even delusional, they 
differ very little from what the British establishments in Halifax and Boston were 
discussing and implementing at the same time.296 In one of his most lampooned acts, in 
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late 1752 he allowed between fifteen and twenty-two soldiers to marry in one day and 
then settled them in a village on the Mira River named after their superior, Minister of the 
Marine Antoine-Louis Rouillé, comte de Jouy. While married soldiers were relatively 
uncommon and certainly frowned upon in the French military, it is easy to imagine 
Cornwallis or Lawrence approving of something similar. Raymond founded several more 
inland agricultural villages in an attempt to move Louisbourg beyond the fortress and 
make it self-supporting, a major acknowledged weakness and one not unknown to the 
founders of Halifax further down the Atlantic coastline. Late in his tenure, Raymond 
even appears to have been planning a German settlement of his own, near the soldier 
village of Rouillé on the Mira River.297 
Raymond, however, found little support for these plans among other officials in 
Louisbourg. Prévost, who had quickly positioned himself as Raymond’s rival, strongly 
objected. He wrote to Rouillé that the village that bore his name was doomed to fail, and 
the wives and children of the soldiers would quickly become a liability.298 Indeed, despite 
Raymond’s efforts and the halting attempts to lure Acadians to the area around Port 
Toulouse, the overall number of French settlers in Ile Royale living beyond the walls of 
Louisbourg decreased dramatically in the colony’s post-1748 re-founding. Although the 
overall number of civilians in the colony greatly increased, in 1752 there were only 1,671 
settlers living outside of Louisbourg, compared to 2,518 in 1737.299 The biggest factor in 
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this shift was no doubt the material and psychological effect of the English attacks in 
1745, which had not only taken over the city but also destroyed most of the major outport 
communities. Better success was found on Ile Saint-Jean, the modern Canadian province 
of Prince Edward Island. By the time of Louisbourg’s second fall in 1759, British 
officials sent to round up and deport the Acadian inhabitants living on the island found 
nearly 5,000 residents. Nevertheless, the bulk of the Acadian population remained in 
British Nova Scotia on the rich agricultural lands of the Bay of Fundy and Minas Basin. 
Some Acadian emigres to French lands even returned. In the attempted villages around 
modern Sydney, Cape Breton, for example, residents were given permission to return to 
British Nova Scotia in the fall of 1754.300  
The official declaration of war between the British and French crowns in 1756 
disrupted both British settlement efforts and Wabanaki attempts to create a peaceful and 
sustainable new order. Most dramatically, the deportation of the Acadian population 
beginning that same year permanently and dramatically altered the demographics of the 
Dawnland. Within five years, the French had been permanently removed from North 
America. Settlement efforts generally in conformation with the Halifax plan continued 
after the peace; but both the meaning and the target of weaponized settlement had been 
altered in ways that would have dramatic repercussions for all of the Dawnland’s people. 
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Chapter Three: The Invasion of the Dawnland 
 
 
On an unseasonably cold day in May 1759, Massachusetts Governor Thomas 
Pownall sailed toward Penobscot Bay. Accompanying him in a small entourage of sloops 
were many of the men who had defined the Bay Colony’s relationship with the Eastward 
since the early decades of the century, including landowner Samuel Waldo. Sharing the 
tight quarters of the Governor’s vessel were four young Wabanakis, Laurent, Joseph-
Marie, Joseph, and Zacharie. None had been empowered to act as diplomats or speak for 
their communities. Instead, six days earlier, they had been swept up in a dragnet after 
Pownall’s arrival at Fort St. George. Surrounded by thirteen Anglo-American military 
men and government officials, the young Wabanaki men had been subjected to a hostile 
“examination” by the governor before being bundled into the boat.301 
As the ship approached the site of a proposed English fort at the mouth of the 
Penobscot River, Pownall finally consented to allow the men to return home to their 
communities. In an ominous speech, he told them to “tell your people that I am come to 
build a fort…and will make the land English, I am able to do it, and will do it. If they say 
I shall not; let them come and defend their land now in time of war.” The only way they 
could expect peace, he said further, was for them to “become English, they and their 
wives and families,” by accepting British law and dominion, renouncing all their land 
rights and claims, and moving their communities to within sight of the fort. He then had 
the Wabanaki men followed in order to determine the location of the river’s primary 
 
301 This account is based on Thomas Pownall, “Penobscot Journal,” enclosed in Thomas 
Pownall to the Board of Trade, 14 June 1759, CO 5/889, TNA. 
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carrying place, which he planned to fortify in order to, as he later put it, close “the last 
and only door which the enemy had left to the Atlantic.”302 
Pownall capped off his trip to the Eastward by marching up the river as far as the 
falls—roughly the site of modern-day Bangor, Maine—and dramatizing his possession of 
the Penobscot Country on behalf of the empire by burying a lead plate engraved with the 
date, an affirmation of Britain’s and Massachusetts’s possession of the region, and, of 
course, his name. In perhaps a fitting symbol of the end of an era, during the march 
Waldo dropped dead of a stroke, dramatically closing a period of speculation and 
settlement schemes in the Eastward that he had dominated. Pownall ended his sojourn—
which both he and the General Court announced was a complete success—by visiting the 
ruins of the French and Penobscot settlement of Pentagoet. Near sunset, he hoisted the 
King’s Colors over the barren skeleton of the fort. Standing within it, he and his men 
drank heartily to the British King’s health.303 
Less than a year before Pownall’s expedition, France had surrendered the fortress 
town of Louisbourg on the island colony of Ile Royale for the second time. Unlike in the 
previous war, however, it would never be returned. A few months after Pownall’s return 
to Boston, Québec—the political center of France’s vast North American claims—also 
fell after the dramatic battle on the Plains of Abraham. The rest collapsed quickly. By the 
time Montréal surrendered in 1760, French power had been broken. Suddenly, the 
 
302 Pownall to the Board of Trade, 14 June 1759, CO 5/889, TNA. 
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imperial struggles that had defined North American politics east of the Mississippi for 
close to a hundred years had changed forever.304 
The fall of Louisbourg did not end the war, or even fighting in the Northeast, 
which would drag on for six more years. But it brought about a sea change in the region. 
Civil and military leaders in Nova Scotia and Massachusetts switched from a defensive 
posture to one that was much more aggressive and confident, and old dreams of settling 
the region with loyal Protestants revived with startling speed.305 In both provinces, the 
government acted to clear the way for settlement in areas that had been far outside 
European control before the war broke out. These projects went beyond simply providing 
land for ambitious British colonists. In Nova Scotia, the government, with prodding from 
the Board of Trade, hoped to deploy settlers to confirm possession of the province in the 
face of continuing French and, especially, Native resistance. In Massachusetts, the 
governor and General Court also saw settlement as a way to end Indigenous power in the 
region, but the schemes that emerged immediately after Louisbourg were also designed to 
secure Massachusetts’ claim to the Sagadahock Country, the conflicted region between 
the Kennebec and St. Croix Rivers claimed by both Massachusetts and Nova Scotia. 
Wabanaki people, exhausted by the long war and destabilized by the rapid 
departure of the French, scrambled to respond. The newly emboldened provinces of 
Massachusetts and Nova Scotia pressed strongly worded treaties and frequently acted as 
 
304 For a general account of the American theatre of the Seven Years’ War, see Fred 
Anderson, The Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British 
North America, 1754-1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001). 
305 See for example Lawrence’s response to the fall of Louisbourg, Charles Lawrence to 
the Board of Trade, 26 Sept 1758, CO 217, LAC. 
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though the question of Native title had been solved by French defeat in the war. Rather 
than simply reclaiming or expanding lands that had previously been occupied by 
Europeans—which had been one of the main preoccupations of the previous decades—
the settlement projects of the late 1750s and early 1760s pushed increasingly into lands 
that Wabanakis had made strong and specific ownership claims to for many years.  
Eighteenth-century British observers believed that the fate of the far northeast 
represented one of the most important issues of the post-war world.306 Indeed, the British 
case for aggressive Protestant settlement in the Dawnland was perhaps even clearer 
following the war than before it. In Nova Scotia, the pre-war deportation of the French 
Acadian settlers, who had been living in the region for nearly a hundred years, had left 
almost all the province’s productive agricultural land empty. As fruit rotted in orchards 
and the elaborate dyke systems that had been carefully built and maintained over the 
previous hundred years decayed and overflowed, the extent to which the British province 
had relied on Acadian labor became painfully clear.307 While rounding up and deporting 
as many Acadians as possible had perhaps made the province less French, it had done 
little to make it more British, and the reward for inflicting such mass human suffering 
appeared to be little more than a crippled economy.  
 
306 This claim is based on my reading of the minutes of the Board of Trade and their 
general ledger books during the period, which show disproportionate attention to Nova 
Scotian affairs even during the worst years of the Imperial Crisis and Pontiac’s Rebellion. 
307 For the continued use of Acadian labor even after the Deportation, see Jonathan 
Belcher to the Board of Trade, 12 Dec 1760, CO 217, LAC; “Halifax December 20,” 20 
Dec 1764, Halifax Gazette, 4. 
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Acting on explicit instructions from the Board of Trade, the Nova Scotia 
government had tried to recruit settlers to fill Acadian lands even before Louisbourg had 
surrendered.308 Without an immediate promise of British victory in the war, however, 
settlers were understandably reluctant to move to what they considered an exposed 
frontier. One group of potentially interested settlers, for instance, told Nova Scotia 
governor Charles Lawrence that they “had…too much reason to fear the enemy would 
have it in their power very much to molest if not totally extirpate them.”309 Optimistically 
predicting success later that year at Cape Breton, in February of 1758 the Board of 
Trade—still led by the Earl of Halifax—instructed Lawrence to publish a proclamation 
intended to continue “that inclination which the New England people seem at present to 
have for obtaining settlements in Nova Scotia” as well as to “excite the like inclination in 
other parts of America.”310 
 Lawrence took this injunction seriously, and moved quickly after the French 
defeat at Louisbourg in July 1758.311 With the assistance of the Provincial Council, he 
published two proclamations, the first in October 1758 and a more detailed missive in 
early January 1759.312 Sticking mostly to his official instructions, Lawrence offered up to 
 
308 Charles Lawrence to the Board of Trade, 9 Nov 1757, CO 217, LAC. 
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310 Board of Trade to Charles Lawrence, 7 Feb 1758, CO 217, LAC; For the Earl of 
Halifax and Nova Scotia, see Beaumont, Colonial America and the Earl of Halifax, 51–
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311 For the direct connection between the fall of Louisbourg and Lawrence’s settlement 
promotion efforts, see Charles Lawrence to the Board of Trade, 26 Sept 1758, CO 217, 
LAC. 
312 “A Proclamation,” 12 Oct 1758, enclosed in Lawrence to the Board of Trade, 26 Dec 
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500 acres of land per family free of office fees, with a one shilling per 50 acre quit rent 
that did not come due for ten years—an offer that was especially appealing to poorer 
New Englanders in the increasingly cramped colonies of Connecticut and Rhode Island. 
To sweeten the pot even further, Lawrence offered free transportation and a year’s worth 
of provisions for the first settlers of the first three granted townships. These townships—
Horton, Granville, and Falmouth—comprised the old Acadian districts of Grand Pré and 
Piziquid, which had been the densest region of Acadian settlement prior to the 
Deportation. These were also the lands that had been targeted for British infiltration in 
the 1740s and 1750s and were still defined by Acadian-cleared land and established 
orchards.313 Now, instead of seeding British settlers within Acadian villages, the British 
Parliament would subsidize New Englanders to take their place entirely. 
 Just how much Parliament should be paying for, however, was a contentious 
topic. Lawrence had not in fact been authorized by the Board of Trade to provide 
transportation or provisions and had acted on his own, a situation that echoed his 
insistence on continuing to provision the Lunenburg settlers long after the Board no 
longer considered it a good idea.314 Preemptively defending his decision, Lawrence wrote 
to the Board that he had been pressured into it by the Connecticut and Rhode Island 
delegates. As Lawrence told it, they had responded to Lawrence and the council’s initial 
unwillingness to grant transportation and provisions by asking  
who were the people (as they expressed themselves) that broke the ice. I have 
good reason to apprehend as they were the first that they would have been the last 
 
313  Faragher, A Great and Noble Scheme, 76–77. 
314 The planned German settlement of Lunenburg and its Parliamentary-funded 
provisioning is discussed in the previous chapter. 
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and the only ones we should have seen on that errand, they would have returned 
disgusted and have given such discriptions of the Country as must have 
discouraged others from even thinking of it.315 
 
Indeed, Lawrence was convinced that powerful forces in the older colonies were lining 
up to oppose Nova Scotia’s new settlements.316 This initial outlay, he argued, was 
necessary to get the ball rolling. With just a little more help, he believed, the province 
would “repay with interest the heavy expence of nursing it whist in its infancy.”317 
Although initially skeptical, the Board echoed this argument in their official report to the 
King in December 1759. It cautioned that “two[sic] strict an attention to oeconomy” 
would potentially risk the success of a plan “productive of the most essential advantage 
not only to the colony of Nova Scotia, but to Your Majesty's other colonies on the 
continent of North America, and finally to this Kingdom.”318 
 Indeed, the plan seemed to work. By September 1759, Lawrence had contracted 
for thirteen townships, lining the coast from the Isthmus of Chignecto to the German 
settlement of Lunenburg—the entire southwest coastline closest to the Gulf of Maine and 
the New England colonies (see figure 7). Writing excitedly to the Board of Trade, 
Lawrence stated that he had “not the least doubt but that every acre of cleared land in the 
province as well as the whole coast from hence to Cape Sable will be well peopled sooner 
than heretofore has been conceived to be possible.”319 These grants went far beyond re-
peopling land left empty by the exile of the Acadians. The Board of Trade noted with 
 
315 Lawrence to the Board of Trade, 20 Sept 1759, CO 217, LAC. 
316 See also Charles Lawrence to the Board of Trade, 12 Dec 1760, CO 217, LAC. 
317 Lawrence to the Board of Trade, 20 Sept 1759, CO 217, LAC. 
318 Board of Trade to George II, 20 Dec 1759, CO 217, LAC. 
319 Lawrence to the Board of Trade, 20 Sept 1759, CO 217, LAC. 
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approval that Lawrence’s plan would “not merely to people the cultivated lands 
heretofore possessed by the French Inhabitants,” but also “grant out with them a very 
large proportion of wild and uncultivated country.”320  
 
Figure 7. “Planter” Nova Scotia showing the extent of townships in Nova Scotia by 1767. The 13 
townships granted by 1759 were, beginning at the Isthmus of Chignecto and moving west, 
Sackville, Cumberland, Amherst, Onslow, Falmouth, Horton, Cornwallis, Granville, Annapolis, 
Yarmouth, Barrington,  Liverpool, and Tinmouth; Tinmouth was a failure but eventually 
resurrected in 1762 as New Dublin. Annapolis and Granville were only lightly settled. The 
townships on the Petitcodiac and St. Johns other that Maugerville and, to a lesser extent, 
Hopewell, never manifested until after the American Revolution, although they were granted as 
part of the Philadelphia land boom. (From Margaret Conrad, ed., They Planted Well: New 
England Planters in Maritime Canada (Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 1988), 8.) 
 
320 Board of Trade to George II, 20 Dec 1759, CO 217, LAC; see also Lawrence to the 
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Granting land that had never been occupied by Europeans and was still very much 
home to Mi’kmaw and Wolastoqiyik people violated the Wabanaki understanding that 
the treaties of 1725/6 banned new British settlements without their explicit consent. Both 
Lawrence and the Board of Trade, however, never so much as considered consulting 
Native leaders, even as Indigenous warriors took action. As he granted out hundreds of 
thousands of acres of land and new settlers began to trickle into the province, Mi’kmaw 
and Wolastoqiyik, warriors—sometimes alongside Acadians who had escaped the British 
dragnets—hounded the inhabitants of what they understood to be illegal settlements and 
attacked the still significant British military presence. A few months after issuing his first 
proclamation and little more than two weeks before issuing his second, Lawrence 
complained to the Board that “the Indians, notwithstanding the success of his Majesty's 
arms in the reduction of Louisbourg, still infest and harrass the promising settlement of 
Lunenbourg.”321 In April of 1759, shortly before issuing the first township grants, he 
wrote that “the Indians have again opened the spring with fresh murders amongst the 
settlers,” that five soldiers had been killed at Fort Cumberland, and that a provision vessel 
had been seized by Native pirates.322 In the same letter in which he wrote about the 
thirteen townships in September, Lawrence wrote that “sixteen or seventeen” vessels had 
been taken, and that Native people and remaining Acadians “have infested us more than 
ever, and indeed in a manner too which they never attempted before.”323 Yet both 
Lawrence and the members of the Board of Trade discussed the grants on the 
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southwestern shore and future plans for lands in the interior of what is now New 
Brunswick and the eastern parts of the peninsula as though Native title—and, indeed, 
actual possession—did not matter. 
As Lawrence issued proclamations and granted townships, Governor Pownall in 
Massachusetts tackled the issue of Native title directly with his “conquest” of Penobscot. 
A few months after returning, Pownall claimed in a speech to the General Court that “a 
great many families stand ready to go down to Penobscot” and urged the court to do what 
they could to clear the way for large land grants.324 Lt. Governor Thomas Hutchinson 
reported to the Board of Trade in June of 1760 that the General Court was preparing to 
divide York County—which had previously covered all of Massachusetts’ claimed 
territory from the Piscataqua to the St. Croix—into three. Hutchinson complained that the 
sheer size of York County had been “a great discouragement to the settlement of the 
eastern part of it.”325 The division had also been strongly encouraged by the Kennebec 
Company, a newly ascendant speculation company whose membership included several 
members of the General Court.326 As thanks for Pownall’s attempt to “open up” the 
Eastward, in May 1760 the Company granted him 501 acres in Frankfort—which they 
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subtly renamed “Pownallborough”—and presented him with an elaborate signed map of 
the town.327 
Major settlement efforts in the Penobscot country, however, proceeded much 
more slowly than in Mi’kma’ki. This was perhaps in part because of Pownall’s departure 
to take up the governorship of South Carolina a few months after his “conquest.” It may 
have also, however, been in part a result of Nova Scotia’s new policies, which siphoned 
off land-poor families who may have otherwise migrated to Penobscot. Indeed, 
Lawrence’s proclamation had been, it seemed to him at least, a wild success. Settlers 
began to arrive before the end of 1759, chiefly to the subsidized townships of Horton, 
Cornwallis, and Falmouth. Although Lawrence had arranged for an agent in New York 
and news that Nova Scotian lands were open for white settlement reached as far as the 
British Isles, the vast majority of early settlers were New Englanders, particularly from 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts fishing communities in Essex County and 
Cape Cod.328  
The arrival of these New Englanders overlapped with continued deportations of 
Acadians. While Lawrence was issuing proclamations, hosting agents, and sending 
surveyors to lay out townships, squads of rangers were combing through the westernmost 
 
327 Meeting Minutes, 14 May 1760, p.247, vol.6, vol.2, KPP. Pownallborough was made 
the shire town of the newly-created Lincoln County, and the company turned over a 
significant amount of company infrastructure—including much of Fort Shirley—to the 
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The origins of the Kennebec Company and their ties to government are discussed in the 
previous chapter; see also Saxine, Properties of Empire. 
328 For the demographics of these “New England Planters,” see in particular the essays in 
Conrad, ed., They Planted Well. 
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part of the peninsula and the St. John River Valley rounding up Acadians who had as yet 
managed to avoid deportation by fleeing into the interior and sheltering with Mi’kmaw 
families.329 In November 1759, just as New England settlers began arriving en masse, 
Governor Lawrence deported 151 Acadians from the Cape Sable area to Great Britain—
56 men, 46 women, and 59 children.330 Some observers connected the expulsions directly 
with the ongoing settlement efforts. An article in the Boston Evening-Post recorded the 
departure of two sloops and a schooner filled with settlement agents and bound for Cape 
Sable “to view the lands…with an intention of settling there,” and concluded that “the 
[Acadian] Inhabitants  were removed from thence in good time.”331 
The Planter grants were designed to discourage speculation and were meant to be 
given only to people who would actually settle the province.332 In this sense, New 
Englanders were ideally suited to take them up. Beginning with what Virginia DeJohn 
Anderson terms “the Great Reshuffling” that began shortly after their arrival in North 
America, New Englanders had refined a communitarian method of township expansion 
that created ideal grantees for Lawrence’s scheme.333 Once access to new lands in a given 
town became limited, a group of householders would form a corporate body and petition 
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for new township grant. These early settlers became the town proprietors, with control 
over town governance and land granting. Common lands were divided and passed on to 
approved newcomers and younger generations, eventually creating a new group of land 
poor settlers who repeated the process. The small groups of would-be proprietors who 
responded to Lawrence’s proclamation acted in just this manner and represented 
relatively close-knit groups of householders generally coming from one New England 
town or small region.334  
New Englanders, however, were not the only people the Nova Scotian 
government or Parliament had in mind. Indeed, the Board of Trade was in fact somewhat 
concerned that Lawrence had already granted all the fertile lands, and commanded him to 
lay aside some Acadian lands for British officers and soldiers who had served in the 
Seven Years’ War.335 This reservation was not meant simply to reward discharged 
military men and their families for their service and keep them from falling idle and 
problematic. The Board saw their military experience as a powerful asset, arguing that 
they were thereby the “properest settlers for a frontier colony.”336  
Lawrence, for his part, did not fully agree with the Board’s assessment of the 
usefulness of veterans. A military man himself, Lawrence suggested that officers and 
soldiers were in fact “the least qualified from their occupation as soldiers of any men 
living to establish new countrys,” asserting that what was needed was farmers and 
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fishermen like the New Englanders he had recruited. Reflecting a view that Nova Scotia 
was a particularly difficult and isolated type of frontier, he argued if ex-military families 
were to be granted lands at all that they should be sent to the “valuable lands to the 
westward, in the neighbourhood of the old established colonys” where they could move 
to more settled regions if life became too difficult.337 Lawrence nevertheless proposed 
settling the soldiers along the north side of the Bay of Fundy in modern New Brunswick 
from Passamaquoddy Bay to the Petitcodiac River, and on the Gulf of St. Lawrence at 
Miramichi and Tatamagouche—all regions that not only had scant histories of Acadian or 
other European settlement, but were also among the chief power centers of Wabanaki 
people.338 They were also regions that had been previously singled out as potential spaces 
for British expansion.339 In this, Lawrence was attempting to fill the shapes of an imperial 
map that had for many years been pure fantasy. 
As with Massachusetts, all this settlement activity went hand-in-hand with Native 
diplomacy of various sorts. In January 1760 the Nova Scotian government sent an 
expeditionary force to the St. John’s River Valley to root out fugitive Acadian families. 
The men returned with 300 prisoners but also seven Wolastoqiyik and Passamaquoddy 
delegates interested in negotiating a formal peace.340 They were no doubt inspired by the 
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fall of Québec. Indeed, they had opened their peace negotiations with British officers at 
Fort Frederick in mid-November, almost exactly two months after the battle at the Plains 
of Abraham.341 They may also have had in mind Pownall’s harsh “examination” at 
Penobscot the previous spring, which had included a young Passamaquoddy man, and 
were seeking better terms from their other colonial neighbor.342  
Mi’kmaq also began to make formal overtures. Michel Augustine of Richibucto, 
Paul Laurant of La Hève, and Claude Renée of Shubanacadie, arrived at Halifax in late 
February to make peace terms. The agreement they signed was essentially a slight re-
wording of the 1725/6 treaties.343 Historian William Wicken speculates that Augustine 
represented the western Mi’kma’ki and the other two men the eastern.344 However, it is 
also possible that they acted as delegates for the three westernmost Mi’kmaw districts of 
Siknikt, Kespukwitk and Sipenkn’katik, which would suggest these initial overtures 
spoke primarily to the interests of western Mi’kma’ki rather than the eastern communities 
that were more closely associated with the French establishment at Île-Royale.345 
 
Passamaquoddy sachem Neptune Bahgulwet and an important man in his own right, 
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The limited geographic scope of this initial round of treaty making helps explain 
why it was not until 1761—after most settlers had already arrived—that a major public 
treaty signing between Mi’kmaq generally and the Province of Nova Scotia occurred at 
Halifax. On June 25 1761, a group of Mi’kmaq including at least four sachems met with 
representatives of the Nova Scotian government and the “principal inhabitants” of the 
town to participate in a ritualistic burying of a hatchet on the Governor’s farm.346 The 
leaders who signed the treaty on that day—the same re-worded agreement signed by the 
western representatives over a year before—represented communities and districts in 
eastern Mi’kma’ki. They chose as their speaker Jeannot Peguidalouet from Cape Breton, 
perhaps reflecting the tradition that Unama’kik/Cape Breton was the head district of 
Mi’kma’ki. Treaties continued to be signed with individual villages after the hatchet 
burying, but the ceremony appears to have been the major public celebration of the 
renewal of peace and friendship that represented a broad national Mi’kmaw consensus.347     
Formal treaty making was clearly on the agenda throughout the region. A little 
less than a year after the Penobscot expedition and about a month after the initial peace 
agreements signed by Wolastoqiyik/Passamaquoddy and western Mi’kmaw delegates at 
Halifax, four Penobscot delegates arrived at Boston. They stayed there for roughly three 
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weeks, meeting with the Governor and Council and eventually coming to peace terms.348 
According to the documents produced by Pownall, Massachusetts promised to protect 
“all such Indians of the Penobscot Tribe or their allies” and accord them “all the rights 
benefits priviledges and advantages which British subjects do or ought to enjoy.”349 In 
exchange, the Penobscot signatories agreed that they were subjects of the British King, 
had forfeited all their lands, would denounce the French, and would arbitrate any 
problems between Penobscot and British settlers in the courts of Massachusetts, not their 
own justice system.350 Significantly for the future of the fort and the proposed Penobscot 
settlements, the Native men agreed that they would hunt and fish only in areas delegated 
to them by the Bay Colony, “but not to the exclusion of any other His Majesty's 
Subjects,” and would live and farm on lands that would be assigned to them within sight 
of Fort Pownall.351 As in his description of his actions at Penobscot the previous year, 
Pownall made it clear both in the text of this document and to the Board of Trade that he, 
at least, saw his interactions with the Native people of the Eastward as constituting a 
conquest, not a negotiation. Enclosing the minutes of the meeting to the Board of Trade, 
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he wrote that he “would not suffer it to be called a peace” and instead referred to the 
outcome of the conference as “terms of accommodation.”352  
It is difficult to say how Penobscots interpreted this agreement. Certainly, the 
terms were much harsher than those Wabanaki districts agreed to in Nova Scotia. Wicken 
has convincingly argued that the 1760/1 Nova Scotian treaties were essentially a 
reconfirmation of the 1725/6 agreements, which Wabanaki people interpreted as a 
protection of Native land rights.353 In contrast, Pownall’s “terms of accommodation” 
explicitly demanded that Native nations cede their lands. It is unclear what the 
relationship between the signatories—Kehouret, Joseph Marie, Zachetien, and 
Zachebesen—was to the larger Penobscot nation. Kehouret may have been the author of a 
letter to Governor Shirley in 1754 giving him intelligence on the French and assuring him 
of their desire for peace, and a known conciliatory leader within the district.354 Joseph 
Marie may have been the same Joseph Marie that Pownall had interrogated at the 
building of the Fort, and perhaps the Joseph (or Jo) Mary who later accompanied the 
Massachusetts survey of the Penobscot River.355 But, in general, the signatories are 
obscure, and major sachems and negotiators of the era such as Tomah, Odohando, John 
Neptune, French Michel, and Espegueunt are conspicuously absent—perhaps because the 
 
352 Pownall to the Board of Trade, 23 May 1760. 
353 Wicken, Treaties on Trial. 
354 James Phinney Baxter, ed., Documentary History of the State of Maine, vol. 24 
(Portland, ME: Maine Historical Society, 1916), 21; Saxine, “Properties of Empire,” 378. 
355 The journal is reproduced in Fannie Hardy Eckstorm, “History of the Chadwick 
Survey from Fort Pownall in the District of Maine to the Province of Québec in Canada 
in 1764,” Sprague’s Journal of Maine History 14, no. 2 (June 1926): 76. 
137 
 
nation was undergoing a leadership crisis at the time.356 The previous winter had been 
unusually mild, which would have likely meant a poor hunt and a possible food crisis 
among a people who had just narrowly survived many years of warfare.357 Penobscots in 
1760 were under greater pressure than their more populous Mi’kmaq neighbors, and even 
then, the men who came to Boston may have represented a non-majority faction. 
The presence of someone who may or may not have been a Passamaquoddy, 
rather than a Penobscot, also raises the issue of who exactly Pownall believed he was 
dispossessing, and, indeed, if he even cared. The population estimates Pownall or one of 
his clerks appended to the conference minutes—“5 Sachems and 73 Warriors,” which 
would translate to a population of around or slightly less than 400 people—suggests that 
they represented factions from the Passamaquoddy district as well as the Machias district 
of the Penobscots. Other population estimates from the same years indicate a population 
of 400 or more only when Passamaquoddies were lumped in with Penobscots. For 
example, the anonymous author of a journal of the Penobscot Expedition published in 
newspapers in 1759 claimed that there were only 54 Penobscot and Machias warriors, 
and an additional 20 or 30 at Passamaquoddy, a combined figure—74 or 84—very close 
to that in the terms of agreement. The journal’s author furthermore argued that the 
Machias and Passamaquoddy “are all united under the Penobscots, and may really be 
 
356 After a series of strong and identifiable leaders in the 1750s, Penobscot leadership is 
difficult to discern and in regular flux until emergence of Orono as sachem in the 
Revolutionary years.  
357 “Boston March 17,” 17 March 1760, Boston Post-Boy, 3. For the negative impact of 
light snow and mild winters on Wabanaki winter hunts, see Thomas Wickman, “‘Winters 
Embittered with Hardships’: Severe Cold, Wabanaki Power, and English Adjustments, 
1690–1710,” The William and Mary Quarterly 72, no. 1 (2015): 72. 
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considered as one tribe.”358 This, along with Zacharie and Joseph’s presence at Fort 
Pownall, suggests that Pownall, at least, believed that his terms covered all Native people 
living between the Penobscot and St. Croix Rivers. Perhaps he was simply uninterested in 
engaging with Native politics beyond finding someone to sign his documents. Most likely 
it was a combination of both, leading to an imperfect treaty signed by imperfect delegates 
agreeing to harsh and unusual terms.359  
Either way, the effect of the agreement appears to have only lasted for a few 
months at best. Newspaper reports claimed that when the delegates arrived in Boston in 
April, 28 Penobscots had taken up residence in and around Fort Pownall.360 This would 
have coincided with the traditional Wabanaki seasonal round, in which spring and 
summer were spent closer to the coasts. Yet by mid-June, newspapers reported that “the 
Penobscot Indians have withdrawn and gone off with their squaws and children.”361 This 
may have been in part the result of an altercation between the Penobscot and some 
English hunters. Newspapers reported that in May, two Anglo-Americans had been killed 
by Native men in the vicinity of Fort Pownall, and the Penobscot near the fort had 
seemingly blamed it on some passing “Canada Indians” causing an alarm. After 
investigation, however, British officials at the fort decided that rather than an act of war, 
the incident had been “owning wholly to disputes arising between the Indians and our 
hunters,” and that “it is also reported that some of the latter plundered some of the 
 
358 Penobscot Journal, 15 June 1759, New-Hampshire Gazette, 1. 
359 Nevertheless, this treaty and Pownall’s “conquest” continue to define Penobscot rights 
today. 
360 “Boston, Aripl[sic] 14,” 21 April 1760. 
361 16 June 1760, Boston Evening-Post, 3. 
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former.”362 These vague reports suggest that tensions at the Fort were rising between 
Penobscots and European migrants, which, combined with their reported departure less 
than a month later, is highly suggestive. 
The roaming hunters whom Penobscots clashed with were not the only Europeans 
entering their lands. Massachusetts’ efforts to settle the Penobscot country finally began 
to bear fruit in 1762. On two days in March of that year, the General Court granted 
twelve townships on the east side of the Penobscot River.363 When completed, the 
townships promised to settle over 3,000 people in the Penobscot country, which would 
add significant weight to Pownall’s abstract claims of dominion and tip the demographic 
balance dramatically out the hands of Native people. Appreciating the importance of 
settler density, the Court instructed surveyor Samuel Livermore to lay all twelve 
townships out contiguously, “which method…is most likely to be beneficial as well to the 
province as to the petitioners.”364 As in Nova Scotia, these grants were applied for by 
groups of families who intended to actually settle in the new townships, bringing the self-
reproducing logic of New England towns deep into new territory. If successful, the New 
England settlement projects in Mi’kma’ki and Penobscot Country would squeeze 
Wabanakiak on both ends while monopolizing valuable coastal space. They would also 
have the effect of expanding not just British America, but the specific cultural and 
 
362 26 May 1760, Boston Gazette, 2. 
363 The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, 
vol. 17, (Boston: Wright & Potter Printing Co., 1910), 169–174. 
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political traditions of New England, turning the Dawnland into a new outpost of 
Yankeedom. 
Just as the future of the Eastward as a new appendage of New England seemed 
sure, the arrival of a formal peace upended dynamics in the region. The Treaty of Paris, 
signed in February 1763, confirmed France’s loss of power in North America. 
Unbeknownst to most historical actors, it was also the end of the flurry of state-sponsored 
settlement in the northeast. The spendthrift days of the pre-war and post-Louisbourg era 
were replaced by an increasing awareness of the massive national debt, and the empire 
that emerged after the war was above all else one jealous of its prerogatives and 
protective of its pocketbook. Soon, conflicts over sovereignty between the Crown and 
Massachusetts would complicate settlement programs east of the Penobscot just as 
Parliamentary money dried up in Nova Scotia.365 At the time, however, the signing of the 
peace seemed to promise continued efforts in the region as the collapse of the French 
North American Empire was confirmed and the pre-peace efforts to settle territory 
protected. 
This ultimate financial withdrawal, however, was preceded by massive 
expenditure. One of the first effects of the peace was a flurry of surveying activity across 
North America designed to reinforce the British Empire’s power over its new and newly 
uncontested territories.366 In the Dawnland, these surveys were done with the specific 
 
365 See chapter 5. 
366 For the use of maps and surveying during this period, see S. Max Edelson, The New 
Map of Empire: How Britain Imagined America before Independence (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2017). 
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goal of facilitating new Anglo-American settlements in areas that had not previously been 
settled by Europeans. Even more than the efforts of the previous four years, these new 
incursions into the Dawnland caused uneasiness throughout Wabanakiak. Indigenous 
communities from the Kennebec to the Gulf of St. Lawrence scrambled to find ways to 
protect their land in the face of unprecedented intrusions and the crushing news that the 
French, their main ally, had left for good. 
The most dramatic attempt to draw new borders following the peace was the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763, an effort at both rationalizing the Empire and coming to 
terms with its newly multi-national character. The Proclamation was issued with the 
stated aim of ensuring that British subjects could “avail themselves with all convenient 
Speed, of the great Benefits and Advantages” of the “extensive and valuable 
acquisitions” made during the war. By prohibiting grants of land west of the Appalachian 
mountain range, the authors of the Proclamation not only sought to quell Native-settler 
conflicts in the continental interior but also to direct settlement into the northern and 
southern coastal peripheries.367 Many officials were explicit about the implications of the 
act for guiding Anglo-Americans into Nova Scotia, Maine, and the far southern colonies. 
A memo written before the Proclamation was finalized—likely by Henry Ellis, sometime 
governor of both Georgia and Nova Scotia—argued that a line would force Anglo-British 
subjects to  
 
367 “By the King, a Proclamation” (London, 1763). For the effects of the 1763 peace in 
general, see Colin G Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of 
North America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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emigrate to Nova Scotia, or to the provinces on the southern frontier, where they 
would be usefull, to their mother country, instead of planting themselves in the 
heart of America, out of the reach of government.368  
 
Similarly, a memo written by the Board of Trade to the King in 1768 suggested that the 
reservation of western lands in 1763 was almost entirely meant to encourage and 
continue “the policy of this kingdom to confine her settlements, as much as possible, to 
the sea coast,” arguing that preventing emigration to the interior was necessary to ensure 
that settlers would move into Nova Scotia.369 Without such a ban, the authors suggested 
that, “tempted by a moderate climate,” settlers would leave Nova Scotia and Florida for 
the interior, thereby “abandon[ing] latitudes peculiarly adapted to the production of those 
things, which are by nature denyed to us.”370 
Surveys and new borders, however, also proliferated at the local level. In 
Massachusetts, Governor Francis Bernard commissioned a series of surveys of the 
Eastward following the peace that were linked to his own settlement schemes as well as 
the townships granted by the General Court in 1762. Bernard was well aware that the 
success of these surveys relied on Native knowledge and cooperation, and that they 
would be viewed with suspicion and even violence by those same Native communities.371 
 
368 “Hints relative to the Division and Government of the Conquered and Newly Acquired 
Countries in America,” n.d., CO 323/16, TNA; for the attribution to Ellis, who never took 
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369 Board of Trade to the King, 7 March 1768, CO 324/18, TNA. 
370 Ibid. 
371 Francis Bernard to John Pownall, 10 Feb 1764, vol.3, pp.128-130, Francis Bernard 
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Because of this, Bernard went to some lengths to convince the Wabanakis whom his 
surveyors relied on that their intentions were wholly innocent and concerned only with 
opening new roads and clarifying borders. Wabanaki people, however, were not fooled. 
The Penobscot portion of the survey, for example, was theoretically meant to investigate 
the feasibility of running a road from Fort Pownall to Québec. However, it was also tied 
to Bernard’s land interests at Mount Desert Island, and lead surveyor Joseph Chadwick’s 
journal made frequent references to locations that could be developed into townships.372  
Wabanakis understood the survey as a threat to their sovereignty.  Just weeks 
before the survey was set to begin, Penobscots and some Wolastoqiyik/Passamaquoddies 
debated renewing war against the English in their midst.373 Although rejected, this was 
not a fringe proposal. It had been put forward by no less a figure than Tomah, described 
as the Penobscot “governor” in the immediate post-war years.374 Tomah had acted as the 
speaker in the meeting with Bernard the previous fall.375 Oso, a Penobscot woman who 
lived near Fort Pownall and who became a chief informant of commander Thomas 
Goldthwaite, described the argument that took place at the council as one over the nature 
 
March 1764, vol.3, pp.32-34, FBP; Francis Bernard to Richard Jackson, 24 April 1764, 
vol.3, pp.232-233, FBP. 
372 Eckstorm, “History of the Chadwick Survey.” 
373 When interviewed by Capt. Thomas Goldthwaite, Tomah denied the allegations. 
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374 Goldthwaite identified Tomah, Odohando (possibly the sachem elsewhere called 
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of Penobscot sovereignty. Tomah, she reported, had declared the lands belonged to the 
Penobscot and that the English had no right to treat them as “slaves.”376 Others, however, 
argued—as had Pownall—that the English now held their land by right of conquest. Oso 
may have simply been flattering Goldthwaite by framing the issue in these terms. 
However, the proposal clearly divided Penobscot leaders. Tomah was supported by 
Espegueunt, an important diplomatic chief, but other crucial leaders like John Neptune 
and French Michel argued that improving the British alliance was the best strategy.377  
Despite the specter of war raised by Tomah’s proposal, the survey went on. 
Several high-ranking Penobscots who had been involved the earlier debate accompanied 
the survey, including John Neptune, Espegueunt, and French Michel. Bernard 
optimistically assured his superiors that the Penobscots were in “good humor” and would 
willingly assist the survey.378 He also repeatedly dismissed any threat, insisting that 
Tomah was now in exile and that the vast majority of Penobscots had rejected his ideas in 
favor of friendship with Massachusetts.379  
Things went well until the party reached the Penobscot village at Panawahpskek, 
the site of the modern Penobscot Reservation in Old Town. Chadwick had been 
instructed to lay out a line at the nearby falls, beyond which Governor Bernard had 
 
376 Tomah, like many other Native leaders in the 1760s, was perhaps influenced by the 
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promised English people would not settle. Perhaps this sensitive issue brought the still 
simmering tensions in the group back to the fore. Three Wabanaki members of the 
party—perhaps including Espegueunt—refused to continue to assist Chadwick and his 
surveyors. A heated debate broke out. As Chadwick described it, “the desput between our 
party and the other Indeins was so graet as to com to a fray,” and for two days the future 
of the survey was uncertain. Finally, the two sides reached a compromise. Chadwick and 
his men could continue and would receive assistance from Wabanaki guides. However, in 
response to Penobscot concerns that the surveyors would leave “their countrey exposed,” 
none of the British would be allowed to make any sketches or drawings of the land. In an 
opening memorandum to his journal, Chadwick noted bitterly that this restriction “made 
it impractable for ous to preform the work with acquric [accuracy].” 380  
Chadwick’s reference to an altercation between the Penobscot men who had 
agreed to guide the survey suggests that disagreements over whether to cultivate the 
Anglo alliance remained very bitter; the presence of Neptune, Michel, and Espeguent 
suggests that this division fell on the same lines as the recent debate over the war 
proposal. Not just Penobscot land, but Penobscot sovereignty was under threat, 
something that both sides were keen to protect. Delivering their ultimatum, the 
Penobscots pointedly reminded Chadwick that “when thay waer amongst English men 
thay obayed their commands”; now that he was in their country, it was time for him to 
“obay Indeins orders.”381  The Wabanakis made sure to drive this point home. On their 
 




arrival at Passadumkeag, Chadwick and his party were quickly ushered into a darkened 
room. Rumors that Tomah had been exiled and discredited were evidently greatly 
exaggerated. The surveyors now came face to face with him, along with Odohando and 
Joseph Orono, all of whom were “richly dressed,” and sat on “three packs of bevier,” a 
clear reference to the material wealth of the nation.382 Additional packs of beaver skins 
were brought out for the English surveyors to sit on. If the Massachusetts men were in 
any doubt that Tomah still held authority among the Penobscots, this display must have 
removed it.  
Bernard’s other survey also met with trouble, although of a somewhat different 
kind. The issue of the Nova Scotian border had been hotly contested since the British 
“conquest” of 1710, and would remain fuzzy and unclear until well after the American 
Revolution.383 After suffering much epistolary abuse from his superiors and the Nova 
Scotia governor, in 1764 Bernard had finally managed to get all the British officials 
involved to agree that the border between the two colonies would be the St. Croix River. 
This river bounded the original grant to the Earl of Stirling in the 1630s and was the site 
of France’s first overwinter encampment.384 All that was left to do, it was thought, was to 
survey the river itself. 
 
382 Ibid., 77. 
383 These ongoing issues are discussed at length in both previous and subsequent 
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384 The Board of Trade referred to Bernard’s first effort to have the St. Croix recognized 
as the border as “such an aggravation of your misconduct as our duty to His Majesty will 
not permit us to pass over without animadversion.” Board of Trade to Francis Bernard, 24 
Dec 1762, CO 5/920, TNA. 
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But the men sent to document the course and location of the River St. Croix 
quickly discovered a crucial issue: by the late eighteenth century, there was no river 
commonly called the St. Croix. The location of Samuel de Champlain’s 1604 camp and 
the river that surrounded it was by this time unknown to Anglo-Americans (although 
perhaps not to Wabanakis), and all three major rivers that emptied into the bay had from 
time to time been called the St. Croix.385 These rivers were known to both Europeans and 
Native people by their Wabanaki names: they were, from west to east, the Cobscook, the 
Schoodic, and the Magaguadavic. With only a scant handful of New England migratory 
fishermen representing the entire European population of the Bay, the surveyors turned to 
the people who knew the area best: Passamaquoddies.386 
Centered on the St. Croix River drainage system, Peskotomuhkatik, the 
Passamaquoddy homeland, stretches from roughly the edge of Penobscot Bay in the west 
to the Lepreau River in modern New Brunswick on the east, and inland as far as the head 
of that river. The main Passamaquoddy settlements in the eighteenth century were 
clustered around both sides of the Schoodic River where it flows into Passamaquoddy 
Bay. These included an important seasonal village at Sipayik/Pleasant Point on the west 
side of the mouth of the river and a summer agricultural village several miles up the 
Schoodic at the head of the tide near modern Calais and St. Stephan, where porpoises 
 
385 Deposition of John Curry, 19 July 1797, Northeast Boundary Papers, Massachusetts 
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were also brought after the hunt.387 The Passamaquoddies also had a burial ground and 
gathering place at Qonasqamkuk, modern St. Andrews, on the east side of the Schoodic, 
where one or more large wooden crosses marked places of worship and important 
burials.388 The prominence of the Schoodic is reflected in the meaning of its name, which 
refers to the process of burning fields to make way for human habitation and 
agriculture.389 
The majority of English-speaking Europeans who spent time in Passamaquoddy 
Bay before 1783 were not permanent settlers, but migratory New England fishermen. The 
relationship between Indigenous nations and roving fishermen sometimes led to violence 
elsewhere in the region.390 The scant evidence for Passamaquoddy Bay, however, 
suggests that Passamaquoddies successfully managed the fishery, playing an important 
role in directing where and when these New Englanders took fish in their territory. In the 
 
387 Deposition of Hibbard Hunt, 12 Oct 1796, Winslow Papers, University of New 
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1790s, Alexander Hodges, a former Indian trader, recalled a story he had heard about 
what he believed to be the first New England fishing expedition into the Schoodic River 
in 1760. On arriving in the Bay, the fishermen were greeted by Louis Neptune, the son of 
then-sachem Bahgulwet.391 When asked where the best fish could be found, Neptune was 
at first reluctant to help. Only after a two-day negotiation during which Neptune was 
offered alcohol and hospitality did he finally agreed to take them to the Schoodic.392 
This episode, though remembered many years later and at second hand, might be 
interpreted as a negotiation over fishing rights in the Passamaquoddy’s main river.393 
Alexander Nichols, who had been on the fishing trip in question, stated that their usual 
fishing grounds at that time were at the falls of the Schoodic—in other words, near the 
Passamaquoddy summer village. Nichols also built a camp on the shores of the river and 
opened some small roads, going so far as to contemplate moving his family there, while 
also recalling that he and his colleagues had “confided much” in John Baptiste Neptune, 
Bahgulwet’s elder son who inherited the sachemship on his death.394 It seems highly 
unlikely that any of this would have been possible without formal or informal consent 
from Passamaquoddies.  Certainly, Passamaquoddies believed they had the right to 
 
391 Buhgalwet, likely a grandson of Madockawando, may have been the first Wabanaki to 
bear the name Neptune, which is now a common surname among modern 
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dictate land use. They stated as much during a 1783 meeting with American 
representatives.395 In 1770, they complained to Nova Scotia Governor William Campbell 
that some English people were encroaching on their land rights by hunting without 
permission and taking up land at Qonasqamkuk.396 
Rather than Massachusetts or Nova Scotia, then, the leading political authority in 
Passamaquoddy Bay as late as the early 1770s was the Passamaquoddies, and they were 
entirely uninterested in ceding their land or sovereignty to the British Empire. Much as 
with the Penobscot survey, Bernard attempted to reassure Passamaquoddies that the 
surveying teams had nothing to do with settlement.397 Bernard explained to his friend and 
business partner Richard Jackson that Passamaquoddies would “take umbrage at any 
appearances of preparing to settle in that bay and river.”398 Therefore, despite the fact that 
he was at that very moment involved in a land scheme with Jackson and others that 
would have imported several hundred settlers to the bay, Bernard presented the survey to 
Wabanaki people as being concerned only with settling the border dispute between his 
colony and Nova Scotia.399 Despite this awkward attempt at subterfuge, however, 
 
395 Conference between the St. Johns and Passamaquoddy Indians and John Allan, 6 Nov 
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Passamaquoddies fully understood the implications of the surveys and found ways to 
continue to assert their sovereignty despite the emboldened colonies that threatened to 
crush Passamaquoddy country between them. 
There are no sources that cast direct light on the internal politics of 
Passamaquoddy country at this time, but Passamaquoddy behavior during the surveys 
may offer a clue. An examination of the Massachusetts and Nova Scotia surveys reveals 
that Passamaquoddies gave wildly conflicting answers to these surveyors when asked 
which of the three rivers entering the bay was the “ancient” St. Croix.  In 1764, John 
Mitchel, hired by Massachusetts, arrived in Passamaquoddy. Following his instructions, 
he met with “forty of the principal Indians,” including the Bahgulwet. According to 
several accounts, these men were unanimous in their opinion that the true St. Croix was 
the Magaguadavic on the eastern side of the bay, swearing a formal oath that it “was the 
ancient and only river known amongst them” as the St. Croix.400 To further back up their 
claims, Louis Neptune and two others then took Mitchel to the Maguagadavic itself to 
dramatize their claims. There, Louis Neptune stood “on a point of land on the north 
side…in concurrence with two other Indians,” and “declare[d] the Magaquadavie, to be 
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the same river known among the Indians by the name of St Croix.”401 Yet the next year, 
Native informants from the same community told Charles Morris, Surveyor General of 
Nova Scotia, that the St. Croix was in fact the Cobscook, sixteen miles to the west, on the 
opposite side of Passamaquoddy Bay.402 Morris’ Native informants even told him that the 
name St. Croix had come from how Cobscook Bay “run[s] a cross the mouth of” the 
river.403  
The Passamaquoddy responses to these surveys may be an example of Wabanaki 
attempts to adapt the old imperial “play off” system to a changed reality of multiple 
British jurisdictions. They might also be evidence of a growing split within the 
community over how to respond to the changed reality of life in the Northeast, as was the 
case in nearby Penobscot district. Certainly, later Passamaquoddy accounts of the 
location of the St. Croix were inflected with political considerations as a dispute over 
leadership succession became tied to the looming question of whether Passamaquoddy 
country should ally with the British Empire or the emergent American state.404 Whatever 
the cause, Passamaquoddy people had arranged it so that their heartland, centered on the 
Schoodic River and Passamaquoddy Bay, remained both undivided by an imperial 
boundary and within two different colonial jurisdictions (see figure 8). The two colonies 
 
401 Deposition of James Boyd, 10 Aug 1798, WP. Boyd claimed to be quoting directly 
from his 1760s journal. 
402 Morris, “Report.”  
403 Charles Morris, “Observations upon Governor Barnards remarks on the Plans of 
Passamaquoddy,” 1765, WP; Morris, “Report.”  
404 Louis Neptune sided with the British during the war and, after his brother Jean-
Baptiste’s death in 1778, attempted to wrest control of the sachemship from his nephew 
Francis Joseph Neptune. See also epilogue. 
153 
 
were aware of these conflicting claims, but for reasons that remain unclear, no further 




Figure 8. A map of the traditional Passamaquoddy homeland showing the importance of the St 
Croix/Schoodic watershed, prepared by the modern Passamaquoddy nation. Red lines 
representing the Magaguadavic and Cobscook “rivers” have been added by the author to show 
how the jurisdictional overlap created by Passamaquoddy testimony preserved the Schoodic 
watershed area and access to the carrying places connecting Passamaquoddy country to the 
Penobscot and St. John Rivers. (Original map can be found on the website of the Passamaquoddy 
Pleasant Point Tribal Government: 
http://www.wabanaki.com/wabanaki_new/Data_Homeland.html.) 
Efforts to document the land for settlement also threatened Native sovereignty in 
Nova Scotia. In addition to many smaller surveys commissioned by land speculators, the 
province was a key subject of Samuel Holland’s monumental survey of the northern part 
of British America, a project funded and organized by the Board of Trade and Parliament 
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as a necessary post-war action. In his official instructions to Holland, Board of Trade 
secretary John Pownall (the brother of Governor Thomas Pownall) wrote that the first 
order of duty was to survey the Gulf of St. Lawrence and islands, including Cape Breton 
and St. John’s Island. This region was, he wrote, “of the most pressing excpediency, in 
order to accelerate the different establishments which have been proposed to be made.” 
After he had completed his work there, Holland was to survey the northern and eastern 
coasts of the peninsula, “where it is proposed to make establishments for carrying on the 
fishery, the coaleries, and other purposes of immediate settlement.”405  
 This new attention to the northeast of the Nova Scotian peninsula was an 
important shift. Lying closest to the now-former French colony of Ile Royale and at the 
entrance to the St. Lawrence River, most of this region had been under actual or 
perceived control of the French until the defeat of Louisbourg and had been outside of the 
government at Halifax’s control. The Gulf shore and islands were also a Mi’kmaw 
stronghold. Outside Louisbourg and the southeastern corner of Cape Breton, there was 
practically no European settlement either imaginary or real, nor had there ever been. 
Unsurprisingly, it was also where most Mi’kmaw people lived at this time. In 1764 
Governor Montague Wilmot—a nephew of the Earl of Halifax—estimated that 400 of 
500 total Mi’kmaw “fighting men” lived in the region east of Halifax, on Cape Breton 
Island, and along the Gulf of St. Lawrence.406 Cape Breton was also considered to be the 
 
405 John Pownall to Samuel Holland, 17 April 1764, CO 324/17, TNA.  
406 In June 1764, Wilmot estimated that the Mi'kmaq and Wolastoqiyik had approximately 
600 “fighting men.” Of these, 200 lived on the St. John River, and 400 lived in the 
northeast of the province, including Cape Breton. He also included 100 living in the more 
densely European southwest between Annapolis Royal and Halifax, making Wilmot's 
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head district of the Mi’kmaw nation, and therefore of deep symbolic import.407 Many of 
these new post-treaty settlement efforts therefore effected Mi’kma’ki in ways far more 
profound than the New England resettlement of Acadia had been earlier in the decade. 
Perhaps as part of the general post-war move toward treaty-making, Mi’kmaw 
people had in fact rekindled their pre-war attempts to have the northeast officially 
recognized as Indian country only a few months before the Treaty of Paris.408 In 1762, 
acting Nova Scotia governor Jonathan Belcher issued a proclamation setting aside the 
coastal areas of this same region “as the claims and possessions of the said Indians” and 
forbid “all molestations of the said Indians in their said claims.”409 Belcher believed he 
was following official orders to identify Native land claims in the wake of increasing 
tensions in the interior. He made it clear in a letter sent to the Board of Trade justifying 
his actions that he interpreted this proclamation to grant only use rights, not full Native 
ownership.410 Nevertheless, had his plan been carried through, Mi'kmaw communities 
would have retained nearly half of the modern province of Nova Scotia.  
While this proclamation was doubtless met with deep satisfaction in Indian 
country, it was bitterly opposed by both the European settlers of Nova Scotia and the 
Board of Trade. Speaking on behalf of his constituents, assemblyman Joshua Maugher 
wrote to the Board of Trade to express his disgust, particularly at the fact that Native 
 
math skills somewhat suspect—nevertheless this gives a clear impression of the general 
distribution of Native people throughout the province. Wilmot to the Board of Trade, 24 
June 1764. 
407 See Sable and Francis, Language of This Land. 
408 Detailed in previous chapters. 
409 Full text of this proclamation is printed in Paul, We Were Not the Savages, 171. 
410 Belcher to the Board of Trade, 2 July 1762. 
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people had been given exclusive access to the coasts.411 The Board of Trade agreed with 
his judgment, and Belcher lost his job in no small part because of the proclamation.412 
Despite their own Royal Proclamation delimiting Native and Anglo-American lands in 
the continental interior, the Lords of Trade took great exception to the “very 
extraordinary claim…so inconsistent with His Majesty's rights, and so injurous to the 
commercial interests of his subjects” that Belcher had “unaccountably admitted” in the 
Dawnland413 Belcher quickly rescinded his proclamation. Yet fearing that angering 
Native people would lead to a replay of the war then raging in the Ohio country, he chose 
not to tell Mi’kmaw leaders that their claims had been thrown out once again.414 News of 
imperial and provincial intentions to settle the region in the mid-1760s must therefore 
have been met with surprise and perhaps a sense of betrayal from Mi’kma’ki.  
When they came, the grants came quickly. The Nova Scotia government made 
several large grants in the “newly opened” areas of Nova Scotia just as Holland was 
receiving his instructions. In April 1764, the government approved two proposals, one 
made by a group of disbanded officers in Montreal and another by a group of Albany 
merchants. The council voted to “give each memorialist 1,000 acres …at [Shediac] & 
 
411 Joshua Maugher to the Board of Trade, 28 September 1763, CO 217/72, TNA. 
412 Belcher also caused ire by attempting to repeal an act that had made Nova Scotia a 
haven for debtors Paul, We Were Not the Savages, 172. 
413 Board of Trade to Montagu Wilmot, 20 March 1764, CO 217, LAC. 
414 Board of Trade to Montagu Wilmot, 20 March 1764, CO 217, LAC; Montagu Wilmot 
to the Board of Trade, 24 June 1764, CO 217, LAC. The Board asked Wilmot to give the 
Mi’kmaq the news “in the mildest manner;” instead, the Nova Scotian government chose 
to “forbear any formal disapprobation.” 
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Tatmagush, east side of Pictou, & on the sea coast between Canso and Halifax.”415 
Grants were also made on the eastern coast of New Brunswick, previously untouched by 
any Europeans aside from a handful of French missionaries and, more recently, a squalid 
Acadian refugee camp.416 A group of Scottish merchants who had received a grant in 
Miramichi clearly recognized that their new claim was far outside the British pale. 
Through the intervention of Francis Bernard, they successfully petitioned the Nova Scotia 
government for provincial protection to prevent “interruption” of their new fishery from 
Mi’kmaw inhabitants.417 
The most significant threat to Mi’kmaw power in the region, however, was a 
series of township grants made to Alexander McNutt and several companies formed 
under his influence. Organized primarily by mid-Atlantic merchants, these grants 
reflected a nearly forgotten land craze that swept Philadelphia in 1764 and 1765.418 The 
Crown and provincial government granted between 1.5 and 2 million acres of land to 
Philadelphians.419  In the mind of the Nova Scotian government, the Philadelphia 
 
415 Minutes of the Legislative Council, 24 April 1764, RG 1 vol 188, NSA. The military 
grant, organized under Thomas Falconer, was later known as the “Canada Company” and 
took up lands on the St. Johns River. 
416 For the refugee camp, see Ronnie-Gilles LeBlanc, “Les réfugiés acadiens au camp 
d'Espérance de la Miramichi en 1756-1761: un épisode méconnu du Grand 
Dérangement,” Acadiensis 41, 1 (Winter/Spring-Hiver/Printemps, 2012): 128-168. 
417 Francis Bernard to Monatgu Wilmot, 8 May 1765, FBP vol 4 p.45. The men were 
granted a township and “possession of the salmon fishery” during the grant rush in 
October 1765, however “reserving to the Indians their rights to said fishery”: Minutes of 
the Legislative Council, 29 October 1765, RG 1 vol 188, NSA. 
418 These projects are explored in much greater depth in chapter 4. 
419 Sixteen 100,000 acre townships were granted to McNutt’s Philadelphian associates in 
1765; this number does not include the many additional private grants of up to 20,000 
acres made to Philadelphians or an additional township project launched in 1766. 
Minutes of the Legislative Council, 2 July 1765, RG 1 vol. 188, NSA. 
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townships were directly linked to the project of Native dispossession. In fall of 1765, for 
example, then-governor Wilmot wrote to the Board of Trade that the settlers to be 
brought by the Philadelphia jobbers were "a step necessary for keeping the Indians in 
awe."420 The number of new settlers the plan would have brought in would have reduced 
the relative Native population of the province from roughly third to less than a fifth.421  
More important, nearly all of the land granted to Philadelphians lay within the 
Wolastoqiyik and Mi’kmaw heartlands along the St. Johns River and northeastern coast 
of Nova Scotia. Many of the towns were to be laid out on top of major Wabanaki 
population centers. Two of the reserved townships, for example, were on the sites of 
Mi'kmaw summer villages.422 In Wolastoqiyik country, where most of the grants were 
made, the situation promised to be even worse. Most Wolastoqiyik in the 1760s were 
living on and around Aukpaque Island near modern day Fredericton. After 1765, the 
island was completely surrounded by township grants (see figure 9).423 Had the 
Philadelphia scheme been successful, the results would have been devastating for 
Mi'kmaw and Wolastoqiyik autonomy and forced them to alter long-standing patterns of 
 
420 Montague Wilmot to the Board of Trade, 9 Oct 1765, CO 217, LAC. 
421 Based on  Wicken's population figures for 1761 and assuming a figure of roughly 
8,000 new settlers had the terms of the grants on the 16 townships been fulfilled; based 
on some of the hopeful writings of the time, this number could have been much higher: 
Wicken, Treaties on Trial, 8. 
422 For the locations of Mi'kmaq summer villages in the early eighteenth century, see 
Wicken, Treaties on Trial, 38. 
423 Vincent O. Erikson, “Maliseet-Passamaquoddy,” in Trigger, ed., Handbook of North 
American Indians,15:124; "A Map of the River St. Johns in the Province of Nova Scotia,” 
May 1765, Jasper Yeates Brinton Papers, William Smith Land Papers, Historical Society 
of Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as JYB). Isaac Caton records surveying the river "about 
twenty miles above Opak": Isaac Caton to Anthony Wayne and Benjamin Jacobs, 15 
August 1765, Anthony Wayne Papers, HSP. 
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hunting, fishing, and village location. Heavy settlement on the St. Johns would also have 
a major effect on Wabanaki cross-tribal diplomacy, as the valley had become an 
important location for conferences between Abenaki, Penobscot, 
Wolastoqiyik/Passamaquoddy and Mi’kmaw leaders over the past decades. 
 
Figure 9.  Detail from Benjamin Jacob’s 1765 map of proposed land grants along the St. John 
River. Aukpaque Island, a principal Wolastoqiyik village, is one of the small islands crudely 
depicted in the river at the bottom of the sketch. ("A Map of the River St. Johns in the Province of 




Like their western Wabanaki cousins, Mi’kmaw people debated what to do in the 
aftermath of the treaty and the new incursions into their land it has caused. In summer of 
1765, just as the speculators were descending on Halifax, Native people from throughout 
Nova Scotia gathered on Isle Madame off the coast of Cape Breton in the Potlotek region 
of Unama’kik. Like an earlier meeting held at Potlotek in 1749 to discuss the founding of 
Halifax, the 1765 meeting was a cross-district meeting gathering leaders from many 
communities in Mi’kma’ki; it was perhaps even a formal Grand Council.424 In a letter to 
the Board of Trade, acting governor Michael Francklin claimed that Indians had 
terrorized the settlements they passed through on the way to the meeting, and "declared 
they were to meet French Forces, and threatened to destroy the out settlements when they 
should return."425 It is not too far of a stretch to suggest that the meeting was at least in 
part a direct response to the imperially-sponsored land fever then engulfing the province, 
 
424 Potlotek, derived from the French “Port Toulouse,” was used by Mi’kmaw people to 
describe the entire southeastern corner of Cape Breton centered on modern St. Peters. For 
the role of the Potlotek region as a site of Grand Council meetings and other pan-district 
meetings in the eighteenth century, see McMillan, “Mi’kmawey Mawio’mi,” 77; A. J. B. 
Johnston, Storied Shores: St. Peter’s, Isle Madame, and Chapel Island in the 17th and 
18th Centuries (Sydney, NS: University College of Cape Breton Press, 2004), 73, 113-
114. Potlotek, and Chapel Island specifically, continues to hold this significance as a 
gathering place and spiritual heartland for modern Mi’kmaw people. Chapel Island is the 
capital of modern Mi’kma’ki and the site of Grand Council meetings and the annual 
festival of St. Ann. 
425 Francklin to the Board of Trade, 3 Sept 1766; this may have been one of the incidents 
recalled by Henry Alline. Henry Alline, The Life and Journal of the Rev. Mr. Henry 
Alline (Boston, 1806), 7. 
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and that a military response was hotly debated.426  Native groups met on Isle Madame 
again in summer of 1766, "in the same disposition."  This time, they tied their concerns 
directly to the settlement projects of the Philadelphia jobbers.427 Francklin reported to the 
Lords of Trade that some of them had informed the government that "they will not allow 
any Settlement to be made at Pictou, and that part of the Coast of this Continent that lay 
nearest to St. Peters [St. Pierre]"—in other words, the same region that had been subject 
to the 1754 and 1762 proposals and that had just been granted to Philadelphians.428  
 
426 See for example Noah Miller, “Surveying Journal of Noah Miller,” 30 Aug 1765, 
Woodruff Family Papers, Kislak Center for Rare Books and Manuscripts, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
427 Francklin to Board of Trade, 3 Sept 1766. 
428 Ibid. It is unclear here whether Francklin meant St. Peters, Cape Breton or St. Pierre. 
In either case, as both are oriented in roughly the same direction, the region discussed 
would be Nova Scotia’s North Shore and the region around Canso. I have not found other 
references from Nova Scotian officials writing to Whitehall in these years which use the 
term St. Peters when discussing Cape Breton, and the settlement that had gone by that 
name had been destroyed during the siege of Louisbourg and not yet resettled. 
Conversely, St. Pierre and Miquelon were regularly referred to by Francklin and his 
cohort singularly as “St Peters.” St. Pierre is an island off the coast of Newfoundland, 
which, along with the nearby island of Miquelon, was the only territory retained by the 
French in North America. If St. Pierre, this reflects Francklin's fear of a renewed French-
Mi'kmaq alliance, a possibility which then seemed very real—Wilmot, for example, 
wrote several letters to the Board of Trade concerning Mi'kmaq visits to the islands, and 
Francklin wrote to Governor Palliser of Newfoundland a few days after writing this letter 
to request that he prevent Mi’kmaw people from going to St. Pierre in reference to the 
Isle Madame gatherings. Additionally, Francklin’s careful description of Isle Madam as 
being “to the North East of Canso, and not far from the head of the La Brador,” and later 
use in the same letter of the term “St. Peters” to refer specifically to the French island and 
his fears of French communication with Mi’kmaw people, suggests that he would have 
not been likely to use the term “St. Peters” to refer to Cape Breton without some further 
specification. For contemporary references to St. Pierre and Miquelon as “St. Peters,” see 
Francis Bernard to the Board of Trade, 24 Aug 1763, pp.179-180, CO 5/891, TNA; 
Minutes of the Legislative Council, 31 Oct 1767, RG 1 vol 188, NSA. 
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Similar large conferences that reached across district boundaries were held 
throughout Wabanakiak in the middle 1760s. Just months after the 1766 Isle Madame 
meeting described by Francklin, a major conference took place at St. Johns—probably at 
Aukpaque—that was attended by almost the entire Penobscot Nation.429 The largest and 
most geographically expansive conference took place in 1767. Delegates and families 
from across Wabanakiak, including Mi’kma’ki and the Québec mission villages, met at 
Panawahpskek at the falls of the Penobscot where Chadwick’s guides had nearly deserted 
him three years before. The major topic of the meeting was English encroachment on 
their lands, lands that they were “determined to maintain their right” to.430 As in 1764, 
violent action against the English was openly discussed, although ultimately rejected.431  
Events of the following years made working with, rather than against, the British 
system more attractive to Wabanaki leaders. McNutt’s schemes fell apart within five 
years, and European immigration to Nova Scotia and modern New Brunswick after the 
planter migrations amounted to a trickle rather than a torrent.432 While the impact on 
Mi’kmaw and Wolastoqiyik communities was very real, European population numbers in 
Nova Scotia did not regain their pre-Acadian deportation levels before the American 
Revolution, hovering around 12,000 people for most of the period. The locations of these 
 
429 Minutes of the Legislative Council, 23 Sept 1766, RG 1 vol 188; Francis Bernard to 
Thomas Pownall, 28 Aug 1767, vol.6, p.37, FBP. 
430 Baxter, Documentary History of the State of Maine, 24:149. 
431 Ibid., 24:141–153. 
432 The best current account of post-Planter migration to Nova Scotia remains, despite 
many errors, Bernard Bailyn and Barbara DeWolfe, Voyagers to the West: A Passage in 




settlers also remained constant from before the war, as most efforts to extend deeper into 
Mi’kma’ki amounted to nothing.433 European settlers were confined largely to the old 
Acadian heartland in the Annapolis Valley as Isthmus of Chignecto, complemented by a 
smattering of fishing villages clinging to the southwest Atlantic Coast. As historian John 
Reid has convincingly argued, Native people in Nova Scotia were able to retain a 
significant amount of leverage throughout the 1760s and early 1770s, even as the 
government remained committed to “overawing” them.434 
Likely because of the mediocre results of the settlement schemes, the sense of 
urgency from Wabanakiak appears to have lessened in the latter have of the 1760s and 
into the 1770s. There are no more records of major Wabanaki conferences after 1767. 
Between that period and the outbreak of the American Revolution, Penobscot, 
Passamaquoddy, Wolastoqiyik and Mi’kmaw diplomacy centered on attempts to work 
within the British colonial apparatus to obtain provisions, formal land grants, and, 
especially, Catholic priests. Considering the crucial role played by Jesuits and other 
priests in Wabanaki diplomacy over the previous 150 years, the intention of these 
 
433 The exception to this is in the southwestern coastal area of Kespuktwitk (i.e. the Nova 
Scotian south shore). While this had long been an area of Acadian and French activity, 
the Planter settlements here were much denser (and much less interested in integrating 
with their Mi’kmaw neighbors) than the late Acadian establishment. It is therefore 
unsurprising that references to the “Cape Sable Indians,” as the residents of this region 
were generally referred to, drop off significantly after the war. 
434 John G. Reid, “Pax Britannica or Pax Indigena? Planter Nova Scotia (1760-1782) and 
Competing Strategies of Pacification,” in Essays on Northeastern North America, 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008). 
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requests was likely as much political as it was religious.435 The quest for new priests also 
reveals Wabanaki efforts to play different British jurisdictions off one another, an 
approach similar to the “modern Indian politics” of the era of the imperial wars where 
Native nations would use promises of exclusive loyalty to gain concessions from multiple 
empires.436 For example, during his meeting with Tomah and the other Penobscot 
sachems, Chadwick agreed to carry a message on their behalf to Governor James Murray 
of Québec requesting a priest that Massachusetts had denied them.437 Wolastoqiyiks filed 
a similar petition.438 British resistance to providing them with their traditional middlemen 
placed them at a disadvantage and led to experimentation with new strategies. Penobscots 
and Wolastoqiyik/Passamaquoddies who were close to the Fort Pownall establishment, 
for example, went so far as to make a show of throwing away their old Catholic religious 
books and inviting the Protestant Chaplain of the fort into their villages to perform 
services.439 
Just as Wabanaki people were beginning to find their footing in the new British 
Empire, problems unrelated to settlement took center stage in the minds of British 
imperial officials and colonial administrators. Colonial resistance to efforts at imperial 
reform rocked the mainland port towns of the North American British Empire. Suspicious 
 
435 For the importance of Catholicism to Wabanaki diplomacy prior to 1724, see Kenneth 
M. Morrison, The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki-
Euramerican Relations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 
436 Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country a Native History of Early 
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 168–169. 
437 Eckstorm, “History of the Chadwick Survey,” 78–79. 
438 Minutes of the Legislative Council, 23 Sept 1766, RG 1 vol 188, NSA. 
439 Baxter, Documentary History of the State of Maine, 24:153. 
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of attempts by Parliament to directly tax the colonies, civic leaders in towns such as 
Boston led r violent protests in opposition to what they understood as imperial overreach. 
As colonial subjects began to look around them with fresh eyes, the weighty 
subsidization of settlement and heavy-handed royal meddling in the Eastward began to 
take on a sinister cast. What kind of a future was promised by a government that would 
spend millions of pounds erecting a city in the middle of nowhere, and then ask the 
established colonies to pay for it? What right did people across the sea have to tell hard-
working laborers where they could and could not cut wood? The future of the far 
Northeast in the face of a contested empire would look very different than the one that 
had been imagined just a few years before, when Thomas Pownall confidently drank to 




Chapter Four: Contesting the Imperial Future in the Great Nova Scotian Land 
Boom 
 
In late May 1765, a very young Anthony Wayne sat hunched over pen and paper 
on the deck of a ship. For three weeks, he had been surveying the southwest coast of 
Nova Scotia. What he found exceeded all his expectations. He wrote to his employers in 
Philadelphia—a group of well-connected men that included Benjamin Franklin—the land 
in Nova Scotia was "equal to any [in] Pennsylvania," even "equal to any [he had] ever 
seen."440 Anticipating that what was at that moment undeveloped coastal and riverine 
meadowland would “be a place of great importance in a very short time,” he instructed 
his employers to apply for lots in the city he was about to help survey. Modestly, it was to 
be called Jerusalem.441 “I do assure you the land exceeds any idea I ever could have 
formed of it before I saw it,” Wayne wrote.442  
Wayne was not alone in Nova Scotia that summer. The warm months of 1765 
unleashed a mob of so-called "land jobbers" onto the province's shores, culminating in a 
frenzy timed to avoid the implementation of the Stamp Act, which would have imposed 
new taxes on the required paperwork.443 In a little over two weeks, the Nova Scotian 
government acting on instructions from the Board of Trade granted more than 2.5 million 
acres of land to companies and individuals from both sides of the Atlantic. Wayne and 
 
440 Anthony Wayne to John Hughes, 30 May 1765, vol. 1, p.4, Anthony Wayne Papers. 
Just how much Wayne had seen at this point in his life is, of course, open to question. 
441 Minutes of the Legislative Council, 30 April 1765, RG 1 vol.188, NSA; Wayne to 
Hughes, 30 May 1765. 
442 Wayne to Hughes, 30 May 1765. 
443 Bailyn and DeWolfe, Voyagers to the West, 364; Michael Francklin to the Lords of 
Trade, 2 Sept 1766, CO 217/78, TNA. 
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others like him were key players in the attempt by British imperial officials to transform 
Nova Scotia from a place of Native and French dominance—which in many ways shared 
much in common with the trans-Appalachian west—into a profitable Protestant settler 
colony like its neighbors to the south. Philadelphia's plantations, if successful, would 
have led to the arrival of an unprecedented number of new Protestant settlers and 
drastically undermined the land base and power of the Mi'kmaq and Wolastoqiyik who 
still dominated the province. The enthusiastic response to the project of developing Nova 
Scotia was a rare moment during the 1760s when colonial elites and British imperial 
planners could agree on a common goal widely seen as beneficial—both socially and 
financially—to both sides: the dispossession of Native people in the name of commercial 
and imperial development in the coastal periphery. 
Yet just three years later, another Philadelphian took direct aim at the attempts to 
develop Nova Scotia in Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania.444 John Dickinson 
dismissed Nova Scotia and the new gains of the post-1763 empire as, at best, drains on 
the public pocketbook and, at worst, actively detrimental to the development of the older 
settler colonies by threatening to siphon off populations that would be put to better use in 
the near colonial west. "The icy rocks of Canada and Nova-Scotia," Dickinson finally 
declared, "never will return to us one farthing that we send to them."445 Dickinson’s harsh 
words reflected the fact that the Nova Scotian land boom was, for the vast majority of 
speculators, a complete failure. It ultimately resulted in barely a handful of new settlers 
 
444 Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires, 311–2. 
445 John Dickinson, “Letter VIII,” Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania. Quoted 
version was printed 8 February 1768, The Boston Evening-Post. 
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and only one successful new town, Pictou, originally named Philadelphia Plantation. 
Indeed, the boom’s primary legacy was to create a temporary legal roadblock to Loyalist 
resettlement: in the 1780s, the majority of the land granted in the middle 1760s was 
escheated and re-granted to refugees.446  
Because it did not result in a significant settler migration, this period in Nova 
Scotia’s history has often been glossed over in larger histories of the region. It is 
generally characterized as a time of wanton land speculation in which government 
corruption led to the transfer of thousands of acres of land to insiders with little interest in 
development or settlement.447 Marcus Hansen memorably referred to the period as “a 
veritable carnival of land-grabbing.448 Fred Anderson describes it as “a decade of feverish 
speculation” characterized by “wild schemes, conflicting claims, and unfulfillable 
promises that actually hindered the colony's recovery from the devastations of war and 
depopulation.”449 Bernard Bailyn has given the period its most thorough modern account, 
writing of the era as a “wild land boom” during which “speculation in Nova Scotia lands 
swept like an epidemic throughout the British world.”450 Although dismissive, these 
 
446 Margaret Ells, “Clearing the Decks for the Loyalists,” Report of the Annual Meeting of 
the Canadian Historical Association / Rapports Annuels de La Société Historique Du 
Canada 12, no. 1 (1933): 43–58. 
447 As with most things concerning 1760s Nova Scotia, the tone was set by John Brebner, 
who argues that “from 1764 onward settlement and speculation were sadly allied”   
Brebner, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia, 94. 
448 Marcus Lee Hansen, The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples., vol. 1 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940); quoted for example in Anderson, The 
Crucible of War, 523; Jaffee, People of the Wachusett, 179; Bailyn and DeWolfe, 
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449 Anderson, The Crucible of War, 523. 
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assessments nevertheless point to the unprecedented amount of attention directed at Nova 
Scotia during these years, as monied gentlemen from across the empire jockeyed for the 
chance to stake a claim in an expanded imperial world. 
Fascination with Nova Scotian land was hardly new. What had changed as a result 
of the Treaty of Paris was a movement from a policy in which the government sought 
direct control over the project of settlement to one in which the work of settlement was 
contracted out to companies and individuals. The end goals of Halifax’s great plan — a 
settled, loyal, Nova Scotia and a more centralized imperial government —remained 
popular, but turnover in the London administration and strict instructions to cut costs in 
the wake of an expensive war made the experiments in direct government funding 
politically and financially untenable. Nova Scotia still received a stipend from Parliament 
in order to keep the province running, but Whitehall would no longer pay for experiments 
in directly sponsored settlement. Instead, between 1761 and the end of large private land 
grants in the early 1770s, the Nova Scotian government turned to private individuals to 
settle the province for them.451 Individuals and companies were given tracts of land up to 
100,000 acres and given a brief timeline to fill them with a given number of Protestant 
families obligated to pay a royal quitrent, but other than that the new proprietors were 
free to manage their lands however they saw fit. The result was an explosion of 
settlement schemes that reflected a multitude of different perspectives on land tenure, 
economics, and political organization, all circulating within the same period and the same 
130,000 square kilometers. 
 
451 See for example Jonathan Belcher to the Board of Trade, 3 Nov 1761, CO 217, LAC. 
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Nova Scotia attracted so much attention in these years in part due to its particular 
geographic position as an Atlantic colony that was also perceived to be an open 
“frontier.” On the one hand, developing Nova Scotia buttressed a notion of empire 
centered on the ocean, the navy, and trans-Atlantic trade. This model of empire, which 
David Armitage memorably summed up as “Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free,” 
carried with it a political and economic logic that favored developing European 
settlements on coastlines and securing important sea-lanes.452 On the other hand, a mass 
migration of white Protestant settlers into Nova Scotia land also fit nicely with visions of 
a land-based, settler-run empire. The post-war years saw a general boom in colonial 
expansion into previously Native and French territory. While the most famous and best-
studied of these migrations was that into the so-called Ohio country, British settlers also 
moved east and north into French Canada, Maine, and Nova Scotia. 
While settler-led migrations away from old colonial power bases and the creation 
of new Atlantic control points could both be entertained within the speculative world of 
Nova Scotia, elsewhere these two positions were coming into increasing conflict. Many 
in the planning class found settlement in the American interior by white British subjects 
deeply disturbing. Henry Ellis, sometime absentee governor of Georgia and Nova Scotia, 
expressed a common concern when he argued that by “planting themselves in the Heart 
of America” Anglo-Americans would lose their ties to the mother country and be more 
 
452 Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire, 173. 
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prone to such sins as domestic manufactures, smuggling, and not engaging in trade with 
Britain.453  
As the Board of Trade grew increasingly hostile toward the creation of interior 
colonies, Nova Scotia—as well as Georgia and the Floridas to the south—were proposed 
as the alternative, new colonies waiting to be developed which still fit seamlessly into a 
bluewater notion of empire. In particular, adding new Protestant bodies to Nova Scotia 
would mean better access to the fisheries and a host of spin off benefits that would 
promote and sustain the British naval apparatus. The fishery, for example, was often 
understood through the ancient trope of the “nursery for seamen,” where valuable sailors 
could be trained up and drawn upon in times of war.454 This understanding of the nature 
of the English-speaking part of the British Empire translated into policy. The Royal 
Proclamation of 1763, for example, was passed as much to keep Anglo-American settlers 
from disappearing into the interior and out of imperial control as it was to prevent war 
with the powerful Native coalitions of the Ohio country.455  
Philadelphian speculators do not appear to have shared this vision. However, at 
least for a time, they were just as interested in the economic and political opportunities 
Nova Scotia could provide. Benjamin Franklin, for example, who was heavily involved 
in the Nova Scotian boom, certainly disagreed that the Anglo-American population 
 
453 “Hints relative to the Division and Government of the Conquered and Newly Acquired 
Countries in America,” n.d., CO 323/16, TNA. 
454 In the British context, this trope dates from at least the late medieval/Tudor era. 
Maryanne Kowaleski, “The Expansion of the South-Western Fisheries in Late Medieval 
England,” Economic History Review 53, no. 3 (August 2000): 452. 
455 See chapter three. 
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should be kept within access to the sea. Rejecting the notion of checks on Anglo-
American settlement to the west, Franklin argued in the 1750s and early 1760s that 
through the process of territorial expansion across the North American continent, wealth 
based on colonial consumption would become practically limitless. Settler expansion into 
the west should therefore be encouraged as much as possible.456  The many ties that he 
and his fellow Philadelphian speculators had to other land projects in the west and 
beyond the Appalachian Mountains suggests that a great many of them also shared 
Franklin’s opinions. To these men, an increase in the colonial consumption of British 
manufactures, rather than the production of naval stores, was the primary economic 
justification for settling Nova Scotia. Specifically, they argued that access to Nova 
Scotia's plentiful raw materials would facilitate Philadelphia's ever-increasing 
consumption of British-made goods.457  As the battles of the Imperial Crisis would show, 
these men also tended to favour much less direct imperial intervention in questions of 
land and economy than the Board of Trade and many in the British government hoped 
for. 
 
456 See especially Benjamin Franklin, Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind 
(Boston, 1751); Franklin, The Interest of Great Britain Considered (London, 1760); 
Franklin also repeated this belief in direct relation to his involvement in Nova Scotia in a 
letter to Jonathan Shipley: Benjamin Franklin to Jonathan Shipley, 10 March 1774, in 
Willcox, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Vol. 21 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1978), 138. 
457 See Montagu Wilmot to the Board of Trade, 30 April 1765, CO 217, LAC; Alexander 
McNutt, “Memorial Against the Reservation of Trees,” 16 May 1766, CO 217, LAC. For 
the middle colonies' and New England's struggles to find things to export in exchange for 
British manufactures, see T. H. Breen, “An Empire of Goods: The Anglicization of 
Colonial America, 1690-1776,” Journal of British Studies 25, no. 4 (1986): 487. 
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At the heart of debates over where “British” settlers should be living was a more 
general disagreement over who should run the post-war empire and who should benefit 
from it. Would it be an empire by and for white Britons generally, with rights tied to 
ethnicity and untethered from geographic space? Or would it be based on a stricter model 
of centers and peripheries, with colonial subjects—both colonial Britons and ethnic or 
racial others—unequal in various ways to those who remained at “home”?  
These debates, which intensified following the loss of a unifying French enemy, 
bled into Nova Scotian settlement schemes in the years between the Seven Years’ War 
and the outbreak of the American Revolution. Many colonial-based speculators 
understood Nova Scotian land as simply an expansion of an older colonial order based on 
small-holding farm families and a relatively horizontal political structure, and created 
townships and other settlements that reflected these assumptions. Other interested 
parties—including speculators as well as government officials—saw it as an opportunity 
to make actual a vision of empire based on hierarchy, deference, and centralized control. 
Unlike, for example, the Philadelphian speculators, many in Nova Scotia’s government as 
well as connected British insiders planned manors instead of townships, and assumed 
their settlers would rent, not own, their lands. 458 
 
458 This argument is indebted to Elizabeth Mancke’s work on Nova Scotia as a post-1713 
colony beholden to both the crown and parliament and thus subject to greater imperial 
control, as well as John Murrin and Rowland Berthoff’s work on the 1760s as a moment 
of “feudal revival” in the colonies: Mancke, The Fault Lines of Empire; John Murrin and 
Rowland Berthoff, “Feudalism, Communalism, and the Yeoman Freeholder: The 
American Revolution Considered as a Social Accident” in John Murrin, Rethinking 
America: From Empire to Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 131-160. 
See also Steven Pincus’s work, which casts the debate in terms of a clash between Patriot 
and Establishment Whigs: Steven Pincus, The Heart of the Declaration: The Founders' 
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It was well-connected merchants in the mid-Atlantic, not New England, who 
drove this new phase of colonial interest in Nova Scotian land. In addition to Franklin, 
Wayne's company included Franklin's friend John Hughes, an anti-proprietary politician 
and speaker of the House in the Pennsylvania assembly.459 John Foxcroft, Franklin's co-
Deputy Postmaster for North America, was involved in the early days of planning.460 
Franklin's political enemies were also well-represented among the speculators. William 
Smith, president of the College of Philadelphia—today's University of Pennsylvania—
headed up another well-capitalized company centered on the College and including 
several other Church of England ministers.461  
Other Philadelphians also took active interest. Matthew Clarkson, a future mayor 
of Philadelphia at that point heavily involved in trade in western Pennsylvania, led 
another company along with his physician brother Gerardus.462 Two future signers of the 
Declaration of Independence—Richard Stockton and John Witherspoon—were involved 
 
Case for an Activist Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016); For roughly 
compatible but somewhat different explanations of the crisis hinging on different notions 
of the imperial relationship, see T. H. Breen, “Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve of 
the American Revolution: Revisions Once More in Need of Revising,” The Journal of 
American History 84, no. 1 (June 1, 1997): 13–39; Anderson, The Crucible of War 
459 Anderson, The Crucible of War, 675. 
460 Benjamin Franklin, John Foxcroft, and John Hughes to Alexander McNutt, 10 July 
1764, Nova Scotia Correspondence, John Hughes Papers, HSP (hereafter cited as JHP). 
461 Ralph L. Ketcham, “Benjamin Franklin and William Smith: New Light on an Old 
Philadelphia Quarrel,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 88, no. 2 
(April 1964): 142–63; James H. Hutson, “Benjamin Franklin and William Smith: More 
Light on an Old Philadelphia Quarrel,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 
Biography 93, no. 1 (January 1969): 109–13. 
462 For the careers of Matthew and Gerardus Clarkson, see John Hall, Memoirs of 
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at various points in a third group that would later attempt to develop land at Pictou.463 
This company was centered on the College of New Jersey in Princeton but also included 
Philadelphian merchants like the Rhea and Wykoff brothers.464 At least seven other land 
companies from the Philadelphia area were active in Nova Scotia the mid-1760s. Some of 
them were modest. Silversmith William Ball, for example, headed up a group of artisans 
and farmers from the Northern Liberties that were shut out of the first phase of the 
boom.465  
This sudden interest in Nova Scotia in a region that had previously had little to no 
involvement in Eastward appears to be at least partially—if not entirely—the result of 
efforts by Alexander McNutt. McNutt was born in Ulster, grew up in rural Virginia, and 
gained notoriety in the 1760s as a promoter and land agent working in and around Nova 
Scotia. In memorials and meetings, McNutt claimed to have contacts throughout North 
America and Northern Europe and contracts with thousands of prospective settlers, and 
he had a particular interest in bringing in Philadelphians. He was, at least for a short 
period, spectacularly successful. At the height of his influence, on one day in 1765 his 
name was included on grants making up over one million acres of land.466  
 
463 Donald MacKay, Scotland Farewell: The People of the Hector (Toronto: Natural 
Heritage/Natural History Inc., 2006), 76, 124–125.  
464 Ibid., 124. 
465 For the membership of the creatively-named Nova Scotia Lands Company, which 
included four merchants, three shopkeepers, two silversmiths, two blacksmiths, two 
farmers, a coppersmith, a house carpenter, a saddler, a notary, an innholder, and a tanner, 
see 20 November 1766, Minutes of the Legislative Council; "Philadelphia Township 
Articles of Agreement," 13 February 1768, Box 1662-1769, Ball Families, Papers, 1676-
1879, HSP (hereafter cited as Ball Papers). 
466 Minutes of the Legislative Council, 2 July 1765, RG 1 vol 188, NSA. 
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McNutt, when historians have paid attention to him at all, has not come across 
particularly well. Bailyn refers to him as “frenetic and unscrupulous.”467 Others have 
called him “utterly unreliable,” and “distinctly untrustworthy,” while one early 
biographer stated that as many of McNutt’s statements were “so grossly at variance with 
facts” that the author “hesitate[d] to believe that a person who could so boldly make them 
can properly be regarded as sane.”468 He was a man who had no compunctions about 
overstating his achievements or credentials: for example, he claimed at one point to have 
brought more people to Nova Scotia than currently lived in the province, and, in the 
1780s, he insisted to the Continental Congress that he had an official contract to settle the 
entirety of the Ohio River Valley, the Susquehanna, and most of what is now upstate 
New York.469  During the American Revolution he took it upon himself to declare Nova 
Scotia an independent republic, which he called New Ireland, and wrote two pamphlets 
laying out a detailed plan of government.470 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that McNutt had a rather fluid relationship 
with the truth. But in his consistent articulation of a land policy and imperial vision based 
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on the absolute rights of Protestant settler families, McNutt represents the effort to 
incorporate the Canadian Maritimes into a colonial order more reminiscent of the 
Pennsylvania and Virginia Backcountry than anything the Board of Trade had in mind. It 
was an ideology that placed working settler families at its heart, demanding a wide 
latitude of independence and freedom for some while simultaneously rejecting dealings 
with non-Protestants and non-whites.  
McNutt was a Scots-Irish immigrant who likely arrived in the colonies with his 
family as a child or very young man. His family would have been among the many that 
arrived in Philadelphia in the 1720s and 1730s and quickly fanned out into the 
Pennsylvania and Virginia “backcountry.” The McNutts eventually settled in the southern 
end of the Shenandoah Valley on land known as the Burton Tract, probably sometime in 
the early 1740s.471 This region had been purposefully settled starting in the 1720s and 
1730s by Virginia Governor Sir William Gooch, pursuing a weaponized settlement 
strategy very similar to that envisioned for Nova Scotia in the 1740s, 1750s, and 1760s. 
Nervously viewing the mountainous region beyond Virginia plantation country, Gooch 
believed that the only way to protect the colony from Native attack, French 
encroachment, and slave insurrection fomented by mountain maroon communities was to 
 
471 On the “McNutt Grant,” see George Norbury MacKenzie, ed., Colonial Families of 
the United States of America, vol. 5 (Baltimore: The Seaforth Press, 1912), 379. If the 
genealogies are correct, the family first went to Hagerstown, MD, just a few miles north 
of the Shenandoah Valley. For McNutt’s earlier years, see also Eaton, “Alexander 
McNutt, The Colonizer,” 1066.  
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create a barrier settlement of imported Protestants, much like the kind McNutt helped 
build thirty years later.472  
As in Nova Scotia, Gooch’s weaponized settlement rhetoric paid little practical 
attention to the real human cost of policies that understood families as little more than 
chess pieces to be deployed against a faceless “savage” enemy. Historians have shown 
how the rapid expansion of white settlement in Appalachia and the Ohio Country 
transformed the region into a powder keg, as diplomacy with Native nations gave way to 
land grabs and casual violence. Indeed, Peter Silver argues that a shared rhetoric of fear 
and suffering that demanded authorities choose between white settlers and Native people 
was what bound the region’s settlers together, creating a rhetoric he calls the “Anti-Indian 
Sublime.”473 
 McNutt’s home valley was typical of the region as a whole. In 1742, a party of 
28 Oneidas and Onondagas led by Onondaga leader Jonnhaty passed through the 
Shenandoah. What happened next depended on who you asked: colonists claimed that the 
Native men had “appeared in a hostile manner among us killing & carrying off horses 
&ca,” while Jonnhaty and his men claimed that they had been followed and harassed by 
colonists who eventually forbid them to continue in the region.474 Either way, their 
journey ended near the forks of the James and Maury rivers, where a firefight resulted in 
 
472 See Warren R. Hofstra, The Planting of New Virginia: Settlement and Landscape in 
the Shenandoah Valley (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 6–7. 
473 Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, xx. 
474 Quoted in  Merrell, Into the American Woods, 171. 
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with eight Virginians and four Haudenosaunee men dead. The following upset was not 
resolved until the Treaty of Lancaster two years later.475   
McNutt served as a captain in the Virginia militia in the early years of the Seven 
Years’ War. 476 By 1758, however, he had exchanged one Scots-Irish enclave for another, 
moving to the inland New Hampshire town of Londonderry. He continued to serve as a 
captain in colonial militias: in 1760 his company was sent to Nova Scotia to garrison Fort 
Cumberland. It seems to have immediately struck him as a special place, as the colony 
became the center of his world for the next fifty years. McNutt later claimed to have 
acted as an agent for Governor Charles Lawrence during the early Planter years; indeed, 
in his typical grandiose style, he occasionally took credit for the entire migration.477 In 
late 1760, McNutt obtained Lawrence’s permission to act as an agent to bring in settlers 
from Northern Ireland, and had a number of townships reserved in his name for this 
purpose.478 McNutt’s plan was immediately popular on both sides of the Atlantic, in no 
small part because he promised to bring in settlers at no public cost.479  
McNutt spent the next few years travelling between Halifax, London, 
Londonderry, and Philadelphia in pursuit of his plans. Just how many people he brought 
to Nova Scotia during this time is a matter of contention, particularly as McNutt routinely 
exaggerated his own successes. However, by 1763 he seems to have settled roughly 500 
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478 Board of Trade to George III, 5 March 1761, CO 217, LAC. 
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people from Northern Ireland and New England in the townships of Onslow, New 
Dublin, and Maugerville—the latter two, it should be noted, without permission from the 
Nova Scotia government.480  By 1764, he had, through his connections with Hughes and 
Franklin, managed to nearly single-handedly create the Philadelphian land boom.481 
The lands that McNutt and the Philadelphians were party to were in the form of 
township grants. Indeed, the vast majority of the 2.5 million acres given away at the end 
of October by the British Crown were parceled out in 100,000 acre townships, a system 
explicitly meant to reduce Native political power by promoting speedy, orderly 
settlement.482 Townships, as distinct from large individual grants or small individual 
plots, were intended for swift and relatively centralized settlement by families who would 
be recruited by the township proprietors. They were also significantly larger than New 
England town grants, which were standardized at six square miles, or about 23,000 acres. 
The Board of Trade and others intended these grants to ensure that the process of 
settlement could be focused on particular areas to create zones of relatively dense 
settlement. They had originally been formulated as a military strategy intended as 
 
480 Belcher to the Board of Trade, 3 Nov 1761; “Halifax, in Nova Scotia Oct 15,” New-
York Gazette, 9 Nov 1761, 2; Belcher to the Board of Trade, 7 Sept 1762, CO 217, LAC; 
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481 2 July 1765, Minutes of the Legislative Council; Anthony Wayne to John Hughes, 9 
July 1765, JHP. 
482 2 July 1765, Minutes of the Legislative Council; Anthony Wayne to John Hughes, 9 
July 1765, JHP. This pattern can be clearly seen as well by looking at the lands that were 
later escheated: Ells, “Clearing the Decks for the Loyalists,” 56–8. 2,065,667 acres of 
land were escheated between 1770 and 1788, 1,680,140 acres of which had been granted 
in October 1765, mostly in 100,000 acre township lots. 
181 
 
"security...against the insults and incursions of neighbouring Indians or other enemies," 
and had been a cornerstone of the Board of Trade's instructions to Nova Scotia governors 
on how they should be distributing land since 1749.483 Because responsibility for 
attracting setters could be delegated to a limited number of proprietors and the land 
revoked quickly if terms were not met, granting land in townships also met the Board of 
Trade's requirements for cost effectiveness.  
Delegating the responsibility of settlement to a small number of hand-picked 
people, rather than opening a land market directly to individual families, also helped 
ensure that the Board of Trade could maintain some control. It also reflected the deeply 
status-conscious nature of the period: township grants, and really any grants at all, were 
reserved for men from the upper echelons of society or who had performed some kind of 
service. Considering the first wave of post-war land applications, the Board of Trade 
wrote that while they did not have intimate knowledge of the petitioners, those they 
approved  
are either Officers of Character and Consideration, who appear to have acted in 
His Majesty’s Service with Merit either in a Military or Civil Capacity, or are 
Persons of known Substance and Ability.484 
 
Status was equally important for those who petitioned the Nova Scotia governor rather 
 
483 Quoted in Reid, “Pax Britannica or Pax Indigena?,” 177. 
484 Report of the Board on Trade on Land Grants, 6 June 1765, CO 324/17, TNA; the 
same language is used in the Board’s report of the following year. The applicants whose 
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than the crown.485 Francis Bernard, attempting to reserve land for himself in 
Passamaquoddy Bay, pointedly asked Michael Francklin to remind the Governor that “all 
the Gentlemen concerned in the partnership, except myself, are members of 
Parliament.”486  
 Indeed, although all the individuals and companies involved in the land boom 
hoped to profit in some way, the desire for land was expressed in terms of service to the 
empire. A land grant was either the reward for service, as in the case of applicants who 
had served in the Seven Years’ War, or else it was given in exchange for a promise of 
future service—the proper development of the grant. Writing in May 1764, for example, 
Franklin expressed that assisting in the settlement of Nova Scotia could be a means for 
him to continue to be of service to the British empire. The previous year, Franklin had 
come out against the actions of the Paxton Boys, a settler vigilante group that had 
murdered 20 Susquehannocks. Now perceived as opposing the interests of white rural 
Pennsylvanians, Franklin believed that there was “no Likelihood” of him “being engag’d 
in any Project of a new Government.” However, he wrote, “the Popular Character I have 
 
485 The Board of Trade considered requests for grants of land in Nova Scotia, New York, 
East and West Florida, and Georgia together, suggesting the particular imperial 
importance of those colonies. See for example Report of the Board on Trade on Land 
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in America may at least be of Use in procuring Settlers for some Part under an old 
one.”487  
In part because of the involvement of men like Franklin, both the Board of Trade 
and government at Halifax felt that the Philadelphia associations had both the “ability and 
intention” to settle the townships.488 The companies, in turn, were willing to spend a 
great deal of money to prove their good intentions. The Board of Trade reported to the 
King in May of 1766 that, even before receiving the grants, the companies had spent 
upwards of £1,500 sterling on surveying and “taking other measure preparatory to the 
execution of the plan.”489 In 1768, the Board of Trade spoke glowingly to the King of the 
activities of “the principal Persons of Pennsylvania” in Nova Scotia, pointing to them as 
prime examples of their efforts in the peripheries. It is clear that the attempt to harness 
colonial money and people to settle Nova Scotia was not, as has been suggested by some 
historians, a “fly-by-night” scheme consumed with the promise of profit at the expense of 
the Province, but a serious effort to transform it.490 
It is therefore unsurprising that the Philadelphian representatives sent to Nova 
Scotia in the early spring of 1765 received an enthusiastic welcome from the Governor 
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and Council.491 The council approved reservation of all the lands McNutt requested—16 
townships, with a promise of at least 8,000 Protestant settlers—with full grants only 
pending approval from the Board of Trade and proper surveys. They concluded that the 
scheme “required all possible encouragement, on consideration of the many advantages 
to be gained by such an increase of people,” and even approved McNutt's petition for a 
charter for the projected Atlantic coast city of Jerusalem—a bold move during a period 
when the city of Halifax still lacked a charter.492  
The Philadelphia men were quickly integrated into Halifax society. Writing home 
to Hughes only a week and a half after arriving in town, Wayne recorded multiple dinners 
with the Governor and various Halifax gentlemen.493 Ingratiating themselves with elite 
Haligonians was essential, and, indeed, part of the instructions given to the agents as a 
means of managing the intense competition for the best land.494 Surveyor Benjamin 
Jacobs, for example, was told to discover the religious affiliations of Halifax’s power 
players and reminded of the fact that there were “Church men, Quakers, & presbyterians” 
among the membership of his company.495  
 
491 The Council records contain some of McNutt's complaints even as they approve of his 
new grants: 30 April 1765, Minutes of the Legislative Council. 
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Out-and-out bribery and espionage were also important tactics. “I plainly see that 
there will be old tuging and pulling for land this summer,” Jacobs wrote to his brother.496 
He then asked for £20 for “what is called secret services” to ensure that the company 
would gain title to the best lands.497 Jacobs was not the only one so instructed. In July, 
Wayne complained to Hughes that a “Mr. Lesket” had ingratiated himself with council 
enough that he was able to convince “many of the Gentleman of the Councill here, that 
he will be the only man that is Capable of Complying with the terms of Settlement.”498 
As a result he was able to secure five townships—many more, and much sooner, than 
other Philadelphia companies.499 Wayne's own account for the year included £7 worth of 
wine given as a gift to Attorney General William Nesbitt—a man known for padding his 
meager salary any way he could—“for Obtaining a Grant…of Land.”500  Ultimately, 
Hughes, Wayne, and Franklin's company joined with Jacobs and Smith's and Clarkson's 
in a strange alliance of political enemies to get the grants for two townships, Monckton 
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on the Petitcodiac River and Frankfort along the St. John.501 The company centered on 
Princeton gained title to a grant they called Philadelphia Plantation on the northeast shore 
of the province. In total, at least seventeen townships were granted to McNutt and his 
affiliates.  
The large number of grants made in McNutt’s name, the fact that few of them 
were ultimately settled, and his habitual self-aggrandizement have led many historians to 
portray McNutt as a ruthless land speculator. But examining his many memorials, in 
which he went out of his way to aggravate individuals who were key to any financial 
success he may have had suggests that, far from financial gain, McNutt was motivated by 
a near fanatical adherence to an ideology of empire that placed the smallholding 
agricultural settler family at the forefront. He saw himself as the champion and facilitator 
of hard-working Protestants everywhere who simply “a little encouragement to transport 
themselves.”502 As he put it in a memorial to the Continental Congress in the late years of 
the American Revolution,  
his undertaking [was] wholly calculated for the relief of the distressed of the 
human species on both sides of the Atlantic, not confined to seats or parties, party 
views or party plans, but wholly for the public good, and for the benefit of all 
those of fair moral character who may embrace the opportunity503  
 
The Crown and government were needed to encourage promoters like McNutt, who saw 
himself, rightly or wrongly, as directly deputized by the royal authority to settle Nova 
 
501 In his letter to Hughes, Wayne also claims to have obtained a township on St. Mary's 
Bay, but I have been unable to find any further mention of this. Anthony Wayne to John 
Hughes, 7 October 1765, Wayne Correspondence, JHP.  
502 Benjamin Franklin, John Foxcraft and John Hughes to Alexander McNutt, 10 July 
1764, JHP. 
503 Memorial of Alexander McNutt to the President and Congress, 15 June 1781. 
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Scotian lands. That authority was needed to protect settlers from forms of land granting 
that McNutt saw as predatory, and to ensure their civil and religious liberties so that they 
might “take their own way to happiness.”504 In short, in the eyes of McNutt, the heart of 
the empire was a network of independent small householders, and the correct role of 
imperial authority was to facilitate an orderly transfer of lands to white settler families 
who would work them. Although few were as explicit as McNutt, and were more 
obviously interested in financial gain, the colonial speculators he attracted nevertheless 
broadly shared his vision of an empire of smallholding Protestant families. They 
uniformly framed their role as that of middlemen facilitating—and profiting from—sale 
to white families, with some limited proprietary rights centered mostly on the control of 
mills.505 
Franklin, certainly, published a number of tracts articulating his opposition to the 
spatial politics of difference epitomized by the Proclamation Line, an opposition bound 
up in his understanding of trade and the economy. Taking up what Steve Pincus has 
identified as a “radical Whig” or “Patriot” ideology of empire—which was especially 
popular and resonant among colonists—Franklin argued in the 1750s and early 1760s for 
an empire based on profits from colonial consumption of manufactures.506 Settler 
 
504 Alexander McNutt Memorial to the Board of Trade, 16 April 1763, CO 217, LAC. 
505 For a discussion of mill rights in the context of the Philadelphia projects, see 
Alexandra Montgomery, “An Unsettled Plantation: Nova Scotia’s New Englanders and 
the Creation of a British Colony, 1759-1776,” (master’s thesis, Dalhousie University, 
2012), 102-126. 
506 Pincus, The Heart of the Declaration, 15–18. 
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expansion into the west should therefore be encouraged as much as possible.507  The 
many ties that the Philadelphian speculators had to other land projects in the west and 
beyond the Appalachian mountains suggests that a great many of them also shared 
Franklin’s opinions. Certainly they agreed about the crucial role of manufactures in the 
imperial economy, arguing that access to Nova Scotia's plentiful raw materials—most 
notably fish, but also timber and minerals—would facilitate Philadelphia's ever-
increasing consumption of British-made goods.508  
Although they differed about the political role of white settlers and where they 
should be allowed to live, the Philadelphian speculators—at least those associated with 
Franklin—shared assumptions about the geopolitical power of settlement. In July 1764 
Franklin, Hughes, and Foxcroft wrote a memorial to McNutt, expressing the belief that 
allowing settlers to take up individual plots, as they claimed was the case in the near 
colonial west, meant that "the frontier is so thinly settled that the people are an easy 
pray[sic] to the Indians." Dense settlement—and, implicitly, the displacement of Native 
people—was the solution, which could only be obtained by putting control over large 
amounts of land in small amounts of hands.509 In other writings, Franklin made clear the 
effect he thought such dense settlement had on ethnic others. Discussing Québec, but 
 
507 See especially Franklin, Observations; Franklin, The Interest of Great Britain 
Considered; Franklin also repeated this belief in direct relation to his involvement in 
Nova Scotia in a letter to Jonathan Shipley: Benjamin Franklin to Jonathan Shipley, 10 
March 1774, in Willcox, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Vol. 21 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1978), 138. 
508 See Wilmot to the Board of Trade, 30 April 1765; McNutt, “Memorial Against the 
Reservation of Trees.”  




echoing earlier arguments about the demographic effects of settling Nova Scotia, he 
wrote in 1760 that "from the crouds of English settling round and among them,” French 
habitants would soon “be blended and incorporated with our people both in language and 
manners.”510  
The Philadelphians also expressed their goals within a framework influenced by 
the arrival of huge numbers of Germans to Pennsylvania beginning in the 1720s, the 
same Germans that the planners of the 1740s had hoped to channel to the Eastward in the 
earliest direct settlement schemes. Echoing fears of “backcountry” settlement emanating 
from the Board of Trade, the companies argued that these Germans had flooded their 
home region to such an extent that all of the good land had been used up, forcing some of 
them further into the interior, and rendering the rest "useless persons."511 Earlier, Franklin 
had written about these German migrants using much the same logic as he used when 
considering the power of Anglo-American settlers to crowd out the French, suggesting 
that German settlers in the Philadelphia area would “shortly be so numerous as to 
Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them.”512 As Franklin, Hughes, and Foxcroft put 
it in their memorial, by removing these potentially dangerous Germans to Nova Scotia, 
they would become "not only be useful to themselves, but advantageous to Brittain."513 
 
510 Benjamin Franklin, The Interest of Great Britain Considered, 48. 
511 Wilmot to the Board of Trade, 30 April 1765. See also Benjamin Green to the Board 
of Trade, 24 August 1766, CO 217, LAC; Alexander McNutt, "Alexander McNutt 
Memorial to the Board of Trade," n.d, CO 217, LAC. A huge number of Germans had 
indeed immigrated to Pennsylvania—nearly 60,000 between 1727-1760, although the 
highest rates of migration were before the war.  Bailyn and DeWolfe, Voyagers to the 
West, 25. 
512 Franklin, Observations, 23. 
513 Franklin, Hughes, and Foxcraft to McNutt, 10 July 1764.  
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Whether or not they were fully aware of it, they were also playing into the dream of a 
German-based settlement plan that only recently had been the bedrock of northeastern 
colonization. 
Yet as Philadelphians scrambled across the province and in and out of Haligonian 
parlors, their compatriots at home were becoming entangled in a different imperial 
drama. In June, Hughes had shared with Wayne the exciting news of his appointment as 
stamp-master; by September, only armed patrols recruited by his political allies kept an 
angry mob from destroying his house. According to Fred Anderson, “the strain of staying 
up all night under arms after weeks of enduring anonymous threats sent Hughes into 
physical collapse.” By the beginning of October, when the stamped paper arrived, he was 
“teetering on the edge of the grave.”514 Hughes left Philadelphia, settling in New 
Hampshire after 1769, his political career in ruins.  
The Stamp Act Crisis shaped the timing of the grants and the terms that the 
Governor was willing to offer and the companies were willing to accept. Nova Scotia was 
among a handful of colonies in which stamped paper was actually used. The Nova Scotia 
Gazette, for example, printed several issues on stamped paper. In response, mobs 
throughout the colonies burned copies of the paper in taverns. An especially scandalized 
writer for the New-York Gazette referred to the appearance of a stamped Halifax paper as 
“the most noble ignoble tragedy that ever could be tragedized since the creation of 
man.”515 Beyond concerns over rights to tax, what the implementation of the Stamp Act 
 
514 Anderson, The Crucible of War, 675. 
515 New-York Gazette, 23 December 1765. Also re-printed as “New York, Dec. 23,” The 
Boston Evening-Post, 30 December 1765, and, ironically, The Halifax Gazette, 30 
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on 1 November 1765 meant in practical terms was that the cost of getting a land grant in 
Nova Scotia was about to skyrocket. The price for a 100,000 acre township would have 
increased by at least £39, on top of the £70 in "office fees" estimated by Wayne in 
October 1765.516 This combination of ideological opposition and practical monetary 
concerns meant that Philadelphia men were determined to have the grants completed 
before the Stamp Act came into effect. The Nova Scotian government, however, was 
locked in an ongoing transatlantic correspondence with the Board of Trade, whose 
officials had made it abundantly clear that they were not permitted to act until they 
received official approval of the terms of the grants.517  
The good will of spring and early summer evaporated as a lack of flexibility and 
attempt to centralize land granting in Whitehall combined with uproar over the Stamp 
Act. By the beginning of October, the companies and the Nova Scotia government had 
come to an uncomfortable impasse. Acting governor Francklin explained to the Board of 
Trade that the representatives of the companies had effectively imported the Stamp Act 
protests that had otherwise spared the province. They flatly refused to pay stamp duties 
on their grants and threatened to simply go home. The result was that in order to save the 
deal the government was obliged to give terms that were not approved of by the Crown, 
terms that were still thought to be too harsh by the companies, who accepted them only 
reluctantly.518  
 
January 1766. For various tavern-burnings, see “Philadelphia,” The Pennsylvania 
Journal, 26 December 1765; The Halifax Gazette, 27 February 1766. 
516 Wayne to Hughes, 7 October 1765.  




The terms were indeed harsh by the standards of both previous and later grants. 
They also laid bare the very different goals of the Philadelphia men and the Board of 
Trade, despite their shared assumptions about the benefits of the economic development 
of Nova Scotia through Native dispossession and elite-controlled white settlement. Using 
private individuals and companies to develop the townships was considered by the Board 
of Trade to be both efficient and economical, but it wanted to minimize the amount of 
time the land was held by such companies due to fears over the dangers of land 
speculation.519 The timeline each company was given to settle Protestant families was 
therefore very tight: 100 families of five on each township within four years of the date of 
the grant, or else risk escheatment.520 This provision proved contentious. Company 
members expressed concerns that this condition was impossible to fulfil, particularly as 
the grants had not been completed until late in the season, which meant that nothing 
could be done until the following spring.521 
As this drama was playing out, another, parallel story of the Nova Scotian land 
boom was developing. While the bulk of the acreage was distributed as townships, the 
Board of Trade and the Nova Scotian government also made smaller personal grants with 
more relaxed stipulations. Unlike townships, which were 100,000 acres and typically 
granted to companies, these allotments were made to individuals and tended to be 
somewhat smaller—although at 20,000 acres, they were far from modest, and indeed 
 
519 Report of the Board of Trade, 15 May 1766. 
520 For the terms, see "Frankfort Grant," 31 Oct 1765, JHP. Each family was assumed to 
have 5 persons, for a total of 500 people living on a completed township. 
521 See for example McNutt, "Memorial Against the Reservation of Trees."  
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almost as large as a New England town. These smaller parcels were often granted 
alongside townships; Franklin, for example, received at least one, as did many other of 
the proprietors. It was this type of grant that was most popular with those who saw in the 
land boom the opportunity to reinforce or establish their identities as aristocrats.  
Manorial schemes, in contrast to the freehold townships imagined by McNutt and 
the Philadelphians, were especially attractive to Nova Scotian government insiders and 
members of the British aristocracy. For example, Michael Francklin, one of the most 
important—or perhaps simply ubiquitous—political figures in 1760s Nova Scotia, 
obtained a grant on the southern side of Chignecto Bay. Clearly signaling his intentions, 
he named this tract Francklin Manor and was seeking tenants for his property in Germany 
as early as 1765.522 A number of proposals written by Francklin between 1765 and 1768 
show that he was experimenting with terms and his role as landlord. In 1765 he drafted 
sample agreement with German tenants, which laid out eye-watering rents of £10 per 
year and disallowed tenants from selling their lands or moving without his permission. 
Later, he also experimented with rents paid by turning in one third of merchantable 
produce and half of the “increase of their stock” on a yearly basis.523  
In his revisions, however, Francklin made his proposed terms lighter. In 1767, one 
of his proposals shows a tenant scheme that looked much more like a modified version of 
the low-rent leases determined on lives by which many peasants held their land in 
 
522 Settlement Agreement, c.1765, enclosed in Michael Francklin to the Earl of Egmont, 
29 Aug 1769, fols.23-24, Nova Scotia Materials, Egmont Papers, British Library 
(hereafter cited as Egmont Papers). 
523 These proposals are all held together as “Francklin Proposals for Settling Francklin 
Manor,” vol.16, Townshend Papers, British Library. 
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England in the early eighteenth century.524 Tenants would be granted 160 acres, leased to 
his tenants for three lives, with rent that slowly increased over five years to the extremely 
modest sum of 1 shilling. In addition to this largely ceremonial rent, Francklin’s tenants 
would pay the King’s quitrents for their lands and all rates and taxes, which came to 
about 4 shillings.525 The same clause also appeared in freehold grants. This form of 
tenancy was relatively light, and left the leaseholders almost total control over their lands 
in a way not dissimilar to farmers who had purchased their land but were still required to 
pay quitrents to the Crown. Indeed, one seventeenth-century observer referred to 
arrangements of this kind as “estates ‘more in show than in substance.’”526 
The next year, working on pseudo-Philadelphian Hillsborough Township on the 
Petitcodiac, Francklin drew up terms that asked for nothing but a “free rent” of 1d per 
acre, which would have come to 5 shillings for the 60 acre plots proposed. Francklin’s 
landlordly experimentations, however, were not a simple progression from harsh to easy.  
A 1768 document in the same collection, however, lays out very different terms for a 
settlement “on the River Pilquediac.” These do not mention rents, but stipulates that the 
tenant must give the landlord one third of their mercantable produce and half of the 
“increase of their stock” on a yearly basis.527  
 
524 Joan Thirsk, The Agrarian History of England and Wales, Vol 5, 1640-1750, Regional 
Farming Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 198-203. In this 
system, profit would come mainly from the fines paid to renew leases after the death of 
the original tenant rather than annual higher rents. 
525 “Francklin Proposals for Settling Francklin Manor,” Townshend Papers. 
526 Quoted in Thirsk, Agrarian History, 5:207. 
527 “Francklin Proposals for Settling Francklin Manor,” Townshend Papers. 
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Francklin was far from alone. Other Nova Scotian officials, such as future 
governor J.F.W. DesBarres, also enthusiastically adopted a manorial model, and similar 
grants were made to others close to the government. In 1767, for example, William 
Owen, a close friend and sometime employee of Governor William Campbell, received a 
large grant in Passamaquoddy Bay, then considered part of Nova Scotia. Owen’s claim 
included the largest island in the bay, which he renamed Campobello in honour of his 
patron.528 Owen arrived in Passamaquoddy Bay in June 1770 with 38 indentured servants 
to found a settlement he called New Warrington, after the town in England where the 
voyage had been fitted out.529 Owen’s plan was to develop Campobello as an English 
estate. He planned to grant 99-year leases to his tenants in return for a tax on livestock 
and half of any profits or produce, including grain and slaughtered animals.530 As the 
region’s sole JP, he would also be responsible for meting out justice for his tenants—
many of whom were his unfree servants.531 While his commission as JP had been 
separate from his land grant, the effect was to recreate a feudal manor where both land 
and justice were monopolized by one person: Owen. 
 
528 Paltsits, ed., “Narrative,” 714. 
529 Paltsits, "Narrative," 715. Owen’s settlers—only seven of whom were women—seem 
to have come from Montgomeryshire or Warwickshire, where Owen lived and owned 
land. 
530 William Owen Advertisement for Settlers, 20 Feb 1772, reproduced in Paltsits, 
“Narrative,” bet 754–5. Campobello ultimately was run in such a fashion, but not 
successfully until after the Revolution, and caused a great deal of tension between the 
Owen family and their tenants. See Ibid., 758. 
531 Owen’s plans fell apart even faster than most. After less than a year in 
Passamaquoddy, Owen sailed back to England with all of his servants, and his claim was 
not taken up again until after the Revolution: Paltsits, “Narrative,” 753–8. 
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James Boyd, the younger brother of a Kilmarnock merchant and a relation of the 
Earl of Erroll, also received a reservation from Governor William Campbell in 1767 for 
50,000 acres of land at Passamaquoddy in exchange for a promise of settling 50 
families.532 By 1773, he had reportedly brought 26 families amounting to 125 people, but 
perhaps only one of these households remained after the Revolution.533 It is unclear what 
terms Boyd planned to offer his settlers, but he seems to have been viewed as a would-be 
aristocrat by the migrant fishermen who summered at Passamaquoddy. Alexander 
Hodges, for instance, recalled that Boyd had made it impossible to carry on a profitable 
fishery, presumably because of his claims to control when and how the area was 
fished.534 Alexander Nichols, another fisherman, remembered that Boyd had arrived in 
the bay “pretending right from the Governor at Halifax,” but that he had been ignored.535 
Owen recorded several incidents of clashes between Boyd and New Englanders in his 
journal. For instance, Owen revoked a license he had given Boyd to clear ships leaving 
the province after “the skippers and fishermen of all the New England schooners…to a 
man, vowed they would have nothing to do with Squire Boyd.”536 
 
532 William Boyd to George Chalmers, 20 Jan 1815, vol.13, Papers Relating to Nova 
Scotia, George Chalmers Collection, NYPL (hereafter cited as Chalmers Collection); 
William P. Boyd, History of the Boyd Family, and Descendants, with Historical Sketches 
(Rochester, NY: John P. Smith Printing Company, 1912), 120. 
533 William Nesbitt to George Chalmers, 12 Nov 1773, Chalmers Collection; Deposition 
of William Ricker, 8 Nov 1797, NBP, MHS. 
534 Alexander Hodges, James Brown, and Jeremiah Frost Depositions, 19 July 1797, 
NBP. 
535 Interrogation of Alexander Nickles, 25 Sept 1797, WP. 
536 Paltsits, "Narrative," 724. 
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This miniature feudal revival also prompted the heirs of long-defunct claims to 
attempt to resuscitate them.537 William Alexander of New York, for instance, claimed the 
dormant title of the Earl of Stirling beginning in 1759. Based on his ancestor Sir 
William’s original patent, Alexander then claimed title to a large swath of 
Transpenobscotan land. In 1768, he went so far as to put out an ad offering to sell 1,000 
acre tracts around Penobscot Bay and town lots in his eponymous proposed city of 
Alexandria.538 As an open conflict with the still precarious Penobscot Townships, this 
claim was roundly rejected by the General Court of Massachusetts (and later the Board of 
Trade), who questioned both the continued validity of the Stirling patent and Alexander’s 
own pretentions to the earldom.539 To make their opposition especially clear, Bernard 
even published a proclamation denouncing Alexander’s claims.540 
 
537 For “feudal revival,” see Murrin and Berthoff, “Feudalism, Communalism, and the 
Yeoman Freeholder,” 131-160. 
538 Enclosure in Francis Bernard to John Pownall, 8 Sept 1768, CO 5/893, TNA. 
Alexandria would have overlapped with the General Court granted Township #3, later 
known as Majabigwaduce and incorporated as Penobscot after the Revolution. This 
township, along with neighboring townships nos. 4&5 (later Naskeag/Sedgewick and 
Blue Hill), was the population center (such as it was) for the Penobscot Townships region 
in the 1760s. Bernard claimed in a letter to Alexander (also enclosed) that “500 trainable 
men” lived east of the Penobscot, a number which may be inflated—see for instance 
Francis Bernard to Thomas Pownall, 26 Nov 1768, vol.6, pp.168-173, FBP, where in his 
accounting of the Penobscot settler population he mentions only one town around Fort 
Pownall (on Waldo’s land) and “another…just now begun upon.” However, an extract 
from an anonymous letter published in August 1769 claimed that 2,000 settlers lived east 
of the Penobscot, a number in keeping with Bernard’s 500 fighting men estimate. 
“Extract of a Letter from Boston, Feb 17,” 28 Aug 1769, Boston Post-Boy, 1. At this time 
there were a little over 13,000 settlers in Nova Scotia: “A General Return of the several 
Townships in the Province of Nova Scotia the first day of January 1767,” no.1, RG1 vol 
442, NSA. 
539 See enclosures in in Francis Bernard to John Pownall, 8 Sept 1768, CO 5/893, TNA. 
540 Francis Bernard, “Proclamation,” 7 Sept 1768, enclosed in in Francis Bernard to John 
Pownall, 8 Sept 1768, CO 5/893, TNA. This proclamation was also published in several 
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Other would-be landlords were already members of the British aristocracy. The 
most notorious of these was John Perceval, Second Earl of Egmont. In late 1763, he 
petitioned for a grant of all of St. John’s Island, the modern province of Prince Edward 
Island.541 Owen, who of course had his own manorial schemes for Nova Scotia, wrote of 
the Earl’s plans that 
He proposed dividing it into certain Lordships, lots, or divisions, to be held under 
him by Feudatories, upon a system somewhat similar to the old feudal tenures in 
England; and that it should be governed by a new Code of laws calculated upon 
that principle. Thus would his Lordship, like the duke of Athol in the Isle of Man, 
have been King in St. John's; acknowledging the sovereignty of the King of 
England, but not subject to any acts or ordinances of the Legislature. His patent 
was absolutely made out; but before it passed the Seals, the eyes of the Ministry 
were opened and it was cancelled.542 
 
His initial plans thwarted, Egmont scaled down the acreage of his request, but not his 
vision. In 1768, Egmont received a 22,000 acre grant stretching from Jeddore Harbour on 
Nova Scotia’s eastern shore to the Shubenacadie River.543 By the following year he had 
drawn up detailed plans, which called for a “Mansion House, Park, Castle, &c” held in 
demesne located in what is now Head of Jeddore, Nova Scotia.544 He was also interested 
 
newspapers: see Francis Bernard, “Proclamation,” 22 Sept 1768, New-York Journal, 
supplement 1.   
541 Earl of Halifax to the Board of Trade, 18 Jan 1764, CO 217, LAC. 
542 Paltsits, “Narrative," 94–95. 
543 Egmont Group Grant, 7 June 1768, Egmont Papers. After the township boom of 1765, 
the governor was restricted to grants no larger than 20,000 acres; William Campbell 
expressed regret that he could not grant Egmont the full 100,000 acres. William 
Campbell to the Earl of Egmont, 15 March 1769, fols.8-9, Egmont Papers. 
544 Joseph Gerrish to the Earl of Egmont, 15 March 1769, fols.6-7, Egmont Papers. 
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in perhaps getting a second grant for Isle Madame and additional lots along the 
Shubenacadie River.545  
A beautifully detailed map created for Egmont of his new holdings in 1769 shows 
his plan for laying out his American estate (see figures 10 and 11). Originally annotated 
by the surveyor with details of the survey, it was then heavily annotated in a different 
hand, most likely Egmont himself. These annotations single out such details as a 
blockhouse to be built next to the mansion house where settlers could flee in time of war, 
an arrangement combining a medieval castle with modern frontier defense tactics. In a 
long marginal note composed in October of 1769, Egmont explains that the plans for a 
future “large town” would be done along the same lines as had been done for the Island 
of St. Johns. He also sketched out six perfectly square three mile by three mile 
settlements, divided into individual square miles in an even checkerboard pattern. In his 
marginal note, Egmont wrote that within each of the squares he intended settle the central 
squares himself; the four “angular” squares in each were to be “granted away in Fee to 
any 4 Gentlemen who will plant each 4 Families of 5 to a Family on his Respective 
Square Miles” or to a set of 16 families.546 Egmont explained the importance of the mile 
divisions by reference to William the Conqueror, who, according to Egmont, granted 
 
545 Ibid.; Joseph Gerrish to the Earl of Egmont, 10 April 1769, fols.14-15, Egmont 
Papers; Joseph Woodmass to the Earl of Egmont, 15 Dec 1769, fols.25-30, Egmont 
Papers. Egmont was able to purchase about 1,000 acres from councilman John Newton in 
July 1770: Shubenacadie Grant, 2 July 1770, fols.35-36, Egmont Papers. Notably, both 
Isle Madam and the Shubenacadie River were crucial geographies of Mi’kmaw power 
and political organizing.  
546 Map of Egmont Holdings with Annotations, Egmont Papers. 
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square mile fiefs to the men who had assisted him in the conquest.547 Unsurprisingly, 
Egmont’s map completely erases any evidence or mention of Mi’kmaw people. 
 
Figure 10. Detail from map of the Earl of Egmont’s Nova Scotian lands showing the siting for the 
mansion house and block house. (Map of Egmont Holdings with Annotations, Egmont Papers.) 
 
 
547 Egmont also indicated that he wanted divisions of these square mile plots to be 
referenced using medieval names, i.e. carucates, virgates, and furlongs—although in true 
Enlightenment fashion Egmont standardizes these divisions, rather than using their 
original subjective measurings which referred to how efficiently a specific plot of land 




Figure 11. Detail from Egmont map showing a proposed town. 
Egmont’s scheme was warmly supported by both Governor Campbell and 
significant members of government like Francklin and Joseph Gerrish. Indeed, Gerrish, 
who acted as one of Egmont’s agents, proclaimed that Egmont Harbour would be “a great 
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& valuable Setlement, so necessary for the well Being of this Colony.”548 Surveyor 
Charles Morris Jr — the son of the province’s original surveyor — wrote to Egmont that 
“we may compare this Province to a rough Diamon[d] of immense value [which] castes 
but little lustre at present,” and needed only the help of men like Egmont to be 
transformed into a “well polished Jewell [that] woud yield as bright a Lustre as any Gem 
in the British Crown.”549 Francklin, for his part, offered to cut Egmont in on his existing 
scheme to recruit German tenants. He sent Egmont an estimate for the costs of 
“importing” forty German families, which would be divided up between Francklin and 
Egmont’s lands.550 In addition to the Germans, Egmont seems to have early on contracted 
with a group of settlers from Jersey.551  
It is unclear how much of Egmont’s tract was ever settled. Egmont’s agent, 
Joseph Woodmass, wrote in December of 1769 claiming to have recruited 38 recently 
arrived Irish immigrants.552 He proposed to settle them on the Stewaicke River, close to 
the Scots Irish settlements in Colchester and Onslow. That same month, Woodmass 
placed an ad in The Nova-Scotia Chronicle looking for new settlers, and implying far 
more Shubanacadie land than there in fact was.553 Egmont died the following year. While 
 
548 Joseph Gerrish to the Earl of Egmont, 10 April 1769, fols.14-15, Egmont Papers. 
549 Charles Morris Jr. to the Earl of Egmont, 6 Feb 1770, fols.31-34, Egmont Papers. 
550 Michael Francklin, “Estimate of the Expence of Importing Forty German Families in 
Nova Scotia,” enclosed in Michael Francklin to the Earl of Egmont, 29 Aug 1769, fol.22, 
Egmont Papers. Francklin also left room for his German agent and “another Gentleman” 
who might join them in the scheme. He estimated a little over £3,000. 
551 Joseph Gerrish to the Earl of Egmont, 10 April 1769, fols.14-15, Egmont Papers. 
552 Joseph Woodmass to the Earl of Egmont, 15 Dec 1769, fols.25-30, Egmont Papers. 
553 “To all Persons,” 26 Dec 1769, The Nova-Scotia Chronicle, p 7. 
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his heirs continued to interested in his other scheme to create a plantation colony in East 
Florida, they quickly abandoned his Nova Scotian projects.554 
Most of Nova Scotia’s landlords erred more on the side of Francklin’s approach 
than Egmont’s. However, for many observers, even the mere suggestion of being a tenant 
was an insult enough. While holding land as a tenant was the norm in the British Isles and 
Europe throughout the eighteenth century, the British American colonies are often 
understood as special domain of the independent yeoman freeholder. In truth, land 
ownership was hardly universal even among free whites. However, the relatively free 
availability of land for white settlement, pried from the hands of a kaleidoscope of Native 
nations, remains perhaps the central fact of North American colonial history.555 For those 
opposed to tenancy in general, even the lightest of copyholds was seen as ideologically 
anathema.556 
McNutt had a particular animosity towards any land scheme in which settlers 
were tenants, and insisted the settlers he brought should be the full and clear owners of 
their land.557 For example, in 1763 he accused the grantees of several large Nova Scotian 
 
554 For Egmont’s schemes in the Floridas, see Bailyn and DeWolfe, Voyagers to the West; 
see also, for example, John Holliday on behalf of Lady Egmont and Trustees to Stephen 
Egan, 28 Jan 1772, fols.39-40, East Florida Materials, Egmont Papers, British Library. 
555 Daniel K Richter, Trade, Land, Power: The Struggle for Eastern North America 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 5. 
556 This was the case in England as well as the colonies: Thirsk, Agrarian History, 5:207. 
For opposition to rents in the early United States and British North America, see Rusty 
Bitterman, Rural Protest on Prince Edward Island: From British Colonization to the 
Escheat Movement (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); Charles W. McCurdy, 
The Anti-Rent Era in New York Law and Politics, 1839-1865 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2001); Taylor, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors. 
557 See for example Memorial of Alexander McNutt to the Board of Trade, 16 April 
1763; Memorial of Alexander McNutt to the Board of Trade, 17 April 1766; Memorial of 
204 
 
patents of using their influence to deny grants of land to his settlers, thereby forcing them 
to become tenants on their land.558 A few years later he repeated his accusations, 
claiming that the tenants on these properties “cannot properly be called by any other 
name than slaves.”559 He even drew up a special map, showing the Board of Trade 
exactly which grants he felt were damaging attempts to settle the province by interrupting 
township layouts, offering poor terms to tenants, and reducing settler access to the best 
provincial lands (see figures 12 and 13). Among the landowners specifically singled out 
were Francklin and DesBarres. 
 
Figure 12. Map made by Alexander McNutt showing lands claimed by him (red) and lands he 
claimed had abusive land policies, usually based on tenancy rather than freehold (yellow). (CO 
700/NOVASCOTIA 43, TNA.) 
 
Alexander McNutt to the President and Congress, 15 June 1781; McNutt, 
“Considerations,” 42. 
558 Alexander McNutt Memorial to the Board of Trade, 16 April 1763. 




Figure 13. Detail of above map showing Francklin Manor and DesBarres’ lands, colored yellow. 
While McNutt’s erratic behavior was key to his downfall, his vocal opposition to 
the land plans of the men who in fact ran the province he hoped to shape likely played a 
larger role that has been previously appreciated. As early as August 1765, Wayne 
remarked to John Hughes that McNutt had “powerfull enemies” in Halifax “which he 
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little suspects.”560 In 1766, the Nova Scotia Council and acting governor Francklin wrote 
a scathing report to the Board of Trade on McNutt’s claims that seems to have decisively 
turned the imperial government against him.561  Yet McNutt’s populist tendencies 
became only more pronounced after his fall from grace. In 1767, for instance, he was 
censured by the Nova Scotia Council for parceling out land to settlers in New Dublin 
township that had not been granted to him, claiming that he had a right from the crown to 
redistribute all Nova Scotian lands to settlers. Some of this land was likely owned by 
Attorney General William Nesbitt, who brought the complaint against him, and whose 
land he had singled out in a memorial to the Board of Trade.562 Despite conventional 
narratives that argue McNutt was delusional and unliked, he seems to have continued to 
find common cause with Nova Scotia’s everyday settlers. In 1771, for instance, the 
leaders of Cornwallis Township recorded that they planned to apply to him “on the 
Matter of applying to His Majesty for a Charter of Privileges Both Sivil & Relidgeous,” a 
prospect that no doubt would have delighted McNutt.563 
These debates, as well as the generally difficult atmosphere created by the Stamp 
Act boycotts, soured the initial goodwill between the township proprietors and the Nova 
Scotian government. Nevertheless, after receiving the grants, surviving evidence suggests 
 
560 Anthony Wayne to John Hughes, 15 Aug 1765, JHP. 
561 Committee to the Board of Trade, 30 Aug 1766. 
562 Minutes of Legislative Council, 27 June 1767, RG 1 vol 188, NSA. 
563 Cornwallis Township records, in Nova Scotia Township Records, NEHGS. 
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that serious attempts were made to settle at least three of the townships—Monckton, 
Philadelphia Township, and the Philadelphia Plantation, aka Pictou—at great cost.564  
Soon after the grants were confirmed, advertisements from competing companies 
appeared in Pennsylvania newspapers.565 Company representatives also trolled 
Philadelphia and the Pennsylvania and New Jersey countryside for recent immigrants—
largely Germans, but some Scots-Irish—to recruit.566  The township of Monckton 
experienced particular early success. The 1766 census, taken in the fall of that year, 
recorded 201 "Petitcodiac new settlers that came last year and this summer.”567 By 
January 1767, Monckton was substantial enough to warrant its own column in yet another 
census. The census-taker recorded 60 individuals, 49 of them "Germans and other 
foreigners."568 This number, however, was still somewhat short of the 125 persons who 
 
564 A fourth township, Hopewell, which was just down the Petitcodiac River from 
Monckton, likely also belongs in this accounting, as it seems to have been financed 
largely from Pennsylvania; There also appears to have been significant Philadelphian 
involvement in nearby Hillsborough. See Esther Clark Wright, The Petitcodiac: A Study 
of the New Brunswick River and the People Who Settled Along It (Sackville, NB: Tribune 
Press, 1945), 26–37.   
565 5 February 1767, Pennsylvania Gazette, 1; 14 April 1768, Pennsylvania Journal, or, 
Weekly Advertiser, 3; 25 January 1768, Pennsylvania Chronicle; 28 January, 
Pennsylvania Gazette 
566 Indentures of Samuel Wessel, Jonathan Kamstar, and Niklos Fermer, 24 December 
1767, Ball Papers; Henry Bruner Indenture, 18 March 1766, JYB; “Articles of 
Agreement," 7 Jan 1766, Oversize, JHP; MacKay, Scotland Farewell, 125; Bailyn and 
DeWolfe, Voyagers to the West, 371; Wright, The Petitcodiac, 40–45. 
567 "A Report of the Present State of the Several Townships, With the Number of 
Inhabitants in the Province of Nova Scotia," 1766, CO 217, LAC. 
568 "Return of Several Townships in the Province of Nova Scotia on the First Day of 
January 1767," Jan 1767, CO 217, LAC. 
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were supposed to have been living on the grant within the first year.569 Other companies 
also had muted success. Although the proprietors of Philadelphia Township were of more 
modest means and had not received their grant until a year after the rest of the 
Philadelphia companies—and, indeed, only even gained title to 20,000 of the 100,000 
acres they requested—they were as successful, if not more so, at peopling their plot.570 
By fall 1768, there were at least a dozen and perhaps twice as many families in what was 
occasionally known as "New Philadelphia."571  
These settlers, however, were not the docile placeholders imagined by the 
proprietors and imperial officials, and they objected to the land they were planted on. 
Despite the enthusiasm of Wayne and the other surveyors, the land obtained by the 
various Philadelphia companies, like most Nova Scotian land, was of very poor quality 
for agriculture. One friend of a settler recalled years later that the land at Philadelphia 
Township was "roccy and barren."572 The proprietors of Pictou complained that a certain 
"Mr. Anthill" was spreading similar—and not unsubstantiated—rumors that their grant 
 
569 Wayne claimed to the Council in late September 1766 that they had "introduced more 
than their quota of settlers for the first year" at Monckton, but this does not appear to be 
true. 29 September 1766, Minutes of the Legislative Council, NSA. 
570 This effort seems to have been spearheaded, at least initially, by John Hall, the agent 
for Monckton township: 20 Nov 1766, Minutes of the Legislative Council. Samuel 
Wessel Indenture, 25 Dec 1766; Jonathan Gamester Indenture, 25 Dec 1766; Nicklos 
Fermer Indenture, 25 Dec 1766; William Watten Indenture, 3 March 1767, Ball Papers; 
“Account of Expenses With the Schooner to Novascotia,” 1768, Ball Papers. So far as I 
can discern, the majority of the company's recruits were Germans living near Salem, New 
Jersey. 
571 This population estimate is based off of Shepard's claim to have over a hundred 
settlers in summer 1768 and an analysis of the mill records, which list several heads of 
household. “Petition of Nathan Sheppard,” 29 June 1768, PC 1/59/6/1, TNA; 
“Novascotia Mills in Accompt with the Proprietors,” 1769. 
572 Memorial of Noah Miller, Woodruff Papers, 13. 
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was "rocky, barren, and unfit for improvement."573 There was, after all, an ecological 
reason that most European settlement in the province had been confined to the Acadian 
heartland—it was the only region of the province suitable for large-scale farming, the 
backbone of Anglo-American land use.574  Proprietary and imperial obsessions with 
import-export centered visions of empire had neglected the fact that the majority of the 
kinds of settlers they hoped to attract were focused on subsistence farming and the 
attainment of a “competency,” a model for which Nova Scotia was ill-suited.575 
Settlers soon began agitating for more acreage and threatened to vote with their 
feet. Nathan Sheppard, the agent for Philadelphia Township, wrote home in 1768 that the 
settlers there were demanding 500 acres of land rather than the previously agreed upon 
200 and were going to leave if they did not get it.576 Franklin’s son William and others 
also mentioned in their letters that settlers in Monckton were planning to leave if action 
was not taken by the companies to assist them.577 One tradition reported in the nineteenth 
 
573 21 August 1766, Minutes of the Legislative Council, NSA. This was likely a member 
of the prominent Antill family of New Jersey, one of whom, in an interesting twist, 
immigrated to Nova Scotia following the American Revolution and briefly acted as a 
Loyalist land agent: Guy Carleton to John Parr, 5 Sept 1783, #9015, British Headquarters 
Papers, NYPL (hereafter cited as BHP). 
574 For some of the ecological and other problems that made agriculture in Nova Scotia 
eternally problematic, see Julian Gwyn, Excessive Expectations : Maritime Commerce 
and the Economic Development of Nova Scotia, 1740-1870 (Montréal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998). 
575 Daniel Vickers, “Competency and Competition: Economic Culture in Early America,” 
William & Mary Quarterly 47, no. 1 (January 1990): 3–29. 
576 Nathan Sheppard to Company, 1 October 1768, Ball Papers. This was, in fact, the 
amount of land per family suggested by the Board of Trade, suggesting that the company 
may have been trying to pull one over on the settlers. 
577 William Franklin to Benjamin Franklin, 23 Oct 1767, in Larabee et al, eds., The 
Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Vol. 14 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 291; 
Charles Baker to John Hughes, 24 July 1769, JHP. Wright suggests that this letter was 
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century by proprietor Benjamin Jacobs' son holds that while the proprietors were able to 
find many prospective settlers, as soon as they reached Nova Scotia the settlers "scattered 
about wherever they chose...the result was an entire failure."578 Company agents were 
frustrated. Sheppard wrote in 1768 that "the disagreeable task of dealing with so many 
ordinary people as I have this summer has quite discouraged me from having any thing to 
do with agency again in settling our lands."579 Faced with the fact that their settlers were 
little inclined to do as they were told, that no more seemed to be coming, and that the 
townships they had been given did not meet the needs of the settlers they brought, 
proprietary resolve—already strained by the Stamp Act and Native opposition—began to 
crumble further still.  
Many of the individual proprietors continued to be engaged in their Nova Scotian 
lands into the next decade.580 Pictou, for example, found new life after the company 
turned to Witherspoon, who was able to recruit a boatload of Highland Scots in 1773. 
The arrival of the ship Hector ensured Pictou's survival as a town, if not necessarily as a 
proprietorship.581 As early as 1769, however, it was painfully clear that the 
transformation of Nova Scotia, if it was going to be done, was not going to be done by 
 
not so much an earnest plea for help as an attempt to get attention from the proprietors, 
who were by now distracted by other things: Wright, The Petitcodiac, 47. 
578 Samuel Pennypacker, Notes, fol.16, Jacobs Family Papers, Letters 1744-1769, HSP, 
16. 
579 Sheppard to Company, 1 October 1768. 
580 See, for example, Franklin to Shipley, 10 March 1774. 
581 The story of the Hector has reached mythic proportions in modern Nova Scotia, where 
a recreation of the ship now floats in Pictou Harbor. This voyage is generally credited as 




the Philadelphians.582 The escheating of American lands in Nova Scotia began the next 
year, when two of Alexander McNutt’s township grants were revoked.583 Although there 
is no direct evidence, the previous effects of the Stamp Act and the timing of proprietary 
withdrawal suggest that renewed tensions between Great Britain and the colonies after 
the passage of the Townshend Acts was another major blow to the Philadelphia 
schemes.584  
By the time Dickinson took direct aim at the attempts to develop Nova Scotia in 
Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, the key document in generating a colonial 
resistance movement to the acts, Philadelphian interest in Nova Scotia lands had 
evaporated almost entirely.585 Some of the Philadelphia proprietors—many of whom 
frequented David Hall's stationary shop, where Dickinson purchased writing equipment 
while composing the Letters—may have suddenly found themselves agreeing with 
Dickinson’s harsh judgement of the colony as a frozen money pit.586 Nova Scotia, once a 
geographic space that promised imperial cooperation and a shared vision of empire, was 
 
582 Hughes, for example, sold his shares in 1769: Hugh Hughes to John Hughes, 16 
March 1769, JHP. 
583 Minutes of the Legislative Council, 14 April 1770, NSA; William Campbell to 
Hillsborough, 9 Oct 1770, CO 217, LAC.  
584 Active involvement in the townships seems to have dropped off dramatically by late 
1768, but picked up again in the early 1770s before ceasing again around 1774-5, an 
admittedly impressionistic assessment that would seem to follow the contours of the 
imperial crisis. 
585 Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires, 311–2. 
586 Based on a sampling of David Hall's account book for the years 1764-1768. The 
account book is found in Series II, David Hall Papers, Mss B-H124, American 
Philosophical Society, Philadelphia PA. Hall's customers included members of the 
Pictou, Philadelphia Township, and Monckton companies; many Halls, including a David 
Hall, were also involved; they may or may not have been relatives of David Hall the 
stationer and partner of Franklin. Hall also published the final version of the Letters. 
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now a symbol of everything colonists were growing to hate about their attachment to 
empire. 
Critiques of both Nova Scotia’s peculiar settlement history made their way into 
political discourse. Pro-colonial merchant Dennys deBerdt, for instance, wrote 
suspiciously of Parliamentary support of Nova Scotia, Georgia, and the Floridas. He drew 
a clear line between these colonies and the older ones they bracketed. “All the Colonies 
but Georgia & Nova-Scotia, were originally settled by persons drove from their native 
Country,” he wrote. “If you consider the thousands that have been expended in settling 
Georgia & Nova-Scotia, you will better judge of the merit of the other Colonies which 
settled themselves without any expence to their mother Country.”587 Franklin made a 
similar observation on several occasions. Barely two years after he became involved in 
the Nova Scotia land rush, he scribbled in the margin of a pamphlet that  
Except the late attempted Colonies of Nova Scotia and Georgia, No Colony ever 
received Maintenance in any Shape from Britain: And the Grants to those 
Colonies were mere Jobbs for the Benefit of ministerial Favourites: English or 
Scotchmen.588 
 
Franklin continued this judgement on the spoils of Nova Scotian settlement in the 
margins of another pamphlet sometime after 1770. First remarking that all colonies 
except Georgia and Nova Scotia had been founded by settlers at no expense to the crown, 
he concluded that those Atlantic peripheries “were sent wrong People who dy’d or went 
 
587 Dennys DeBerdt to Lord Dartmouth, rec 5 Sept 1765, in Letters of Dennys de Berdt, 
1757-1770, ed. Albert Matthews (Cambridge, MA: J. Wilson & Son, 1911), 437. 
588 MS notations in the margins of a copy in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania of 
[Josiah Tucker], A Letter from a Merchant in London to His Nephew in North America 
(London, 1766).  
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away.”589 It is hard to say if he acknowledged himself as a contributor to what he now 
saw as an utterly failed and wasteful cause. Although it is impossible to claim direct 
causation between Franklin and DeBerdt’s views and the failure of the Philadelphian 
companies, colonial perceptions of Nova Scotia’s currency as a worthwhile field of 
action sharply declined after 1766. DeBerdt, for instance, dismissed an overture to invest 
in (yet another) Philadelphia Nova Scotia project by writing scornfully that “Nova 
Scotia…is in general a bleak, barren country.”590 
Nova Scotia was also drawn into patriot discourse as a symbol of both colonial 
contributions to empire and the empire’s ungratefulness. In pamphlet after pamphlet 
coming out of Boston, Massachusetts’ Eastward services were invoked to argue for how 
colonists had strengthened the British Empire. The many conquests of Acadia/Nova 
Scotia and Louisbourg took center stage. For example, in the General Court’s official 
statement on Massachusetts’ value to the empire written in 1774, they devoted nearly the 
entire document to descriptions of Acadian conquests stretching back to 1690. The 
Louisbourg campaign of 1745, and the heavy loss of life that came with it, was especially 
highlighted.591 Nova Scotia was then both a symbol of imperial overreach, and the ways 
in which the government in London had failed to acknowledge the contributions of 
colonists. 
 
589 Marginalia in a Pamphlet by Matthew Wheelock. 
590 Dennys De Berdt to Joseph Reed, 18 March 1766, in Letters of Dennys de Berdt, 
1757-1770, 443. 
591 “State of the Merits and Services of the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay,” 29 Aug 
1774, Boston Evening-Post, 2. See also Benjamin Franklin, “An Imaginary Speech,” 7 
Feb 1775, The Public Advertiser. 
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Friends of the King also took up the distinction between Nova Scotia and the 
older colonies (and Massachusetts in particular), although they interpreted it differently. 
An article in the Gentleman’s Magazine, for instance, proposed boycotting New England 
products and vessels and barring them from the banks fishery in response to colonist’s 
boycotts of English products during the Townshend Act crisis. “The effects of such a 
measure,” the author wrote, 
would be presently felt by these haughty colonists; and perhaps it would in the 
end prove highly advantageous to Great Britain; for in the first place it would 
oblige all the fishermen in that country to remove into the province of Nova 
Scotia, and the other obedient provinces; the ship-builders would follow them, 
and so would the Indian traders; Boston would soon dwindle into a poor, 
smuggling village, and Hallifax and St. John’s would rise upon its ruins.592 
 
 
For colonials and British officials, the shared belief that their social and economic 
goals could be met by bringing white Protestants into the province at the expense of First 
Nations and Acadian people created a rare moment of colonial-imperial cooperation 
during a time of deepening crisis. However, like other encounters during the 1760s, what 
had seemed like agreement proved chimerical, and the debates over an imaginary Nova 
Scotia only served to show just how out of step colonial and British elites had become. 
By the outbreak of hostilities between some of the mainland colonies and the 
Crown, then, Nova Scotia had gone from an example of the promise of the British 
Empire to a cautionary tale. While the landscape and geography of Nova Scotia itself had 
 
592 “Remarks on the Foregoing Resolutions,” Gentleman’s Magazine (London, Oct 
1768), 467-468.  
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not changed, where once it had been possible for all to see “a place of great importance,” 
more and more now saw simply “a bleak, barren country.”593  
  
 




Chapter Five: Crown v Colony: Struggle in the Sagadahock 
 
One major player was missing from the Nova Scotia land boom: Massachusetts. 
After the disastrous experiments with government sponsored recruitment of Germans in 
the 1740s and 1750s, New Englanders rapidly cooled on the project of institutionally 
supported Eastward expansion of all kinds, as well as meddling in affairs beyond the 
formal borders of the colony.594 In 1764 Governor Bernard wrote to the Board of Trade 
that he had been blocked from holding a general council with the Penobscot by the court 
due to a reluctance to spend money on anything to do with the Eastward, including 
garrisoning eastern forts.595 After the Planter boom of 1759-60, migration into Nova 
Scotia from New England slowed to a trickle and was primarily family reunifications. A 
not insignificant number of Planters even took the reverse voyage, abandoning their Nova 
Scotian lands.596 
As Nova Scotia became a battleground over how the empire should be run, land-
minded members of the planning class turned their attention to the province’s own 
Eastward claims. Massachusetts’ northern counties, particularly the land east of the 
Penobscot that had been “conquered” by Thomas Pownall In 1759, shared in the general 
post-war boom in land speculation. Indeed, referring to his personal interests in land at 
 
594 For the argument that New England ceased to care about Nova Scotia following the 
arrival of the Planters, see George Rawlyk, Nova Scotia’s Massachusetts (Montréal & 
Toronto: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1973). 
595 Francis Bernard to the Board of Trade, 29 June 1764, pp.11-16, CO 5/892, TNA. See 
also Francis Bernard to John Pownall, 16 June 1766, vol 5, p 127-130, FBP; Francis 
Bernard to the Board of Trade, 7 July 1766, CO 5/892, TNA. 




Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Bay, Francis Bernard wrote that “Land jobbing is 
becoming a great bubble: If I do anything to good purpose, it must be by catching hold of 
sudden occasion, which I shan't miss.”597  
Increased interest in the Eastward, however, reawakened the dormant conflict 
over authority in the Sagadahock Country. Claimed by both Nova Scotia and 
Massachusetts, and subject to multiple attempts to transform it into its own colony along 
the lines of Dunbar’s abortive Georgia project, the land between the Kennebec and St. 
Croix Rivers soon became another flashpoint between the British Empire and its 
colonies. As a result, unlike in Nova Scotia, where imperial power was directly 
responsible for settlement efforts, in the Sagadahock tensions between colonial and 
imperial visions served instead to stymie settler advance until after the American 
Revolution.  
In the Sagadahock country, Anglo-American settlement was strategically 
deployed not just in an attempt to displace undesirable French and Native bodies, but also 
in an attempt to resolve the dispute over whether it was the Crown or Massachusetts who 
had the right to govern the land between the Penobscot and St. Croix rivers. These 
simmering disputes between Crown and colony predated the outbreak of the American 
Revolution, but it was the fault lines created by them that would ultimately determine the 
location of the modern United States-Canada border. 
Francis Bernard was given the governorship of Massachusetts in late 1759 and 
arrived in the province the following summer. He was not an especially imposing figure. 
 
597 Francis Bernard to Richard Jackson, 19 Feb 1764, vol.3, p.132, FBP. 
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A former lawyer and old neighbor of Governor Pownall and his brother John—the 
secretary of the Board of Trade—he was known primarily for his competent two year 
tenure as governor of New Jersey, and his notably large family of eleven children. This 
large family, as he opined to his patrons and friends, meant that his income did not go far, 
although he still elected to renovate the governor’s two residences upon his arrival. What 
was worse, he had been forced to buy not one but two commissions due to the death of 
George II less than a month after his gubernatorial appointment.598 
When the Penobscot townships were granted in 1762, Bernard was granted the 
entirety of Mount Desert Island in Penobscot Bay.599 The grant was proposed by 
Bernard’s once and future enemy James Otis, perhaps to ingratiate Bernard with the 
popular party in the General Court.600 Bernard understood it as a good will gesture meant 
to help him offset his costs.601 The grant, however, also had the effect of making him 
personally and financially involved in the question of the eastward’s future and the fate of 
the proposed new townships. Writing to Massachusetts’ provincial agent in London, 
Bernard noted that his Mount Desert grant came with “a tacit consideration, that I should 
give my utmost assistance towards obtaining the Kings approbation of the grants of the 
Townships.”602  If placating Bernard was part of the plan, it was certainly successful. He 
 
598 Francis Bernard to John Pownall, 4 March 1762, vol.2, pp.33-34, FBP; Francis 
Bernard to Richard Jackson, 29 Oct 1762, vol 2, p.215, FBP. 
599 Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, 17:168. 
600 John R. Galvin, Three Men of Boston (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 
1976), 42. 
601 Draft Memorial on Mount Desert Grant, Oct 1764, vol.10, pp.199-206, FBP. For 
Mount Desert as his legacy to his children, see Francis Bernard to the Earl of Halifax, 15 
Oct 1764, vol.3, pp.176-178, FBP. 
602 Francis Bernard to William Bollan, 2 March 1762, vol.2, pp.32-33, FBP. 
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wrote excitedly to his old friend John Pownall that the assembly’s grant “affords the 
Strongest proof that the Annimosities[sic] that have prevailed here do not arise in any 
way from me, my Conduct or estimation.”603 A few days later he wrote with similar 
sentiments to his patron Lord Barrington, citing the grant as “an evident proof that a 
personal opposition to me has no part in their dispentions.”604  
Bernard was eager to develop Mount Desert as quickly as possible, seeing in it the 
answer to his perennial financial woes. There was, however, something that stood in the 
way of both him and the other new proprietors of eastern lands. This something was the 
special designation of the lands lying between the Kennebec and St. Croix Rivers. While 
included in Massachusetts’ Charter, this region, by then known as the Sagadahock 
Country or Province, was only partially under Massachusetts’ sovereignty. By the terms 
of the Charter, Massachusetts could grant lands there, but those grants needed to be 
confirmed by the Crown before they would take effect. It was this jurisdictional dispute 
between the colony of Massachusetts and the crown of Great Britain that proved to be 
perhaps the most significant roadblock to fulfilling Pownall’s dreams of making the land 
“English.” This dispute meant that all the Anglo-American settlements in Maine east of 
the Penobscot River prior to 1783 existed in, at best, a legal gray area. 
The area called by the British the Sagadahock in fact had many names and 
identities. Most fundamentally, it contained most of the homelands of the Kennebec, 
Penobscot and Passamaquoddy people, and debates over who could control it frequently 
 
603 Francis Bernard to [John Pownall], 13 Feb 1762, vol 2, p.31, FBP. 
604 Francis Bernard to Lord Barrington, 20 Feb 1762, vol 2, p.29, FBP.  
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involved the St. Johns River-focused Wolastoqiyik community as well. Champlain 
identified the region the home of the Etchemin people in the early seventeenth century, 
suggesting that at that early point it had an ethnic and perhaps political identity separate 
from the agricultural Almouchiquous to the south and the Souriquois to the northeast. 
Although the extent of ethnogenesis and community disruption during the ensuing 
centuries is unclear and disputed, what is clear is that the region became increasingly 
important to Wabanaki people as they faced pressure from both Massachusetts and Nova 
Scotia. In addition to Wabanaki people from what is now southern Maine, greater 
Penobscot, Peskotomuhkatik, and Wolastoqiyik absorbed refugees from King Philip’s 
War and other southern conflicts. What Anglo-Americans identified as the Sagadahock, 
therefore, should be though of primarily as Indian country and the locus of Wabanaki 
power outside of the Nova Scotian peninsula.  
Wabanaki understanding of the lands connected by the great watersheds of 
Penobscot, St. Croix, and St. Johns was intimate and deep. In contrast, Europeans had 
knowledge that was sketchy, fluid, and decidedly impressionistic. Even the French, who 
had an early Franco-Penobscot power base at Pentagueot had little practical knowledge of 
the area and relied heavily on Penobscot goodwill and alliances to navigate the region. 
On the British side, the first non-captive Briton or Anglo-American known to have 
travelled the well-worn Native route to Québec from Penobscot was not until 1711.605 As 
 
605 John Livingston, “Item 673, A Journall of Ye Travails of Major John Livingstone 
from Annapolis Royall in Novia Scotia to Québeck in Canada, from Thence to Albany 
and Soe to Boston, Begun Oct. 15, and Ended Feb. 23, 1710/11” In Calendar of State 
Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1710-June, 1711, vol.25, ed. Cecil 
Headlam (London, 1924), 371–386. 
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late as the 1764, this route remained poorly understood and un-surveyed, and the route 
from the St. Croix watershed inland was unknown until well after the American 
Revolution.606 Even the sea coast remained something of a mystery. Official maps of 
Passamaquoddy Bay were so poor that even basic issues like the shape of harbors and the 
number of rivers was unknown.607 
The name ultimately given to the region by the British reflects this lack of on-the-
ground knowledge, as well as the poor track record of English colonization projects in the 
region. The term was ultimately derived from a Wabanaki word referring to a specific 
part of the complex Kennebec River watershed—specifically, the main channel which 
carries the outflow from the Androscoggin and Kennebec rivers into the sea. The original 
term is unclear, but has been interpreted variously as “mouth of the river” or “going out 
of waters into the sea.”608 In the early seventeenth century, the name was given to a failed 
English colony—also known as the Popham Colony—which was attempted at the mouth 
of the Kennebec River from 1607-1608.609 The name, however, was erroneously 
interpreted by many English observers as a general name for the entire river watershed, 
and it was still occasionally used into that sense into the eighteenth century. The 
expansion of this very specific term to refer to the entire region between the Kennebec 
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and the St. Croix is suggestive of the general lack of knowledge about anything east of 
the mouth of the Kennebec.  
Despite this lack of practical knowledge, based in part on the precedent of the 
Popham Colony, the British crown had been making claims to the entire area since the 
late seventeenth century. The high point of settlement efforts before the 1760s had come 
in 1730, with David Dunbar’s short-lived colony of Georgia and the court case that 
followed. That case confirmed the language of Massachusetts’ charter, acknowledging 
the colony’s right to govern the region but reserving the right to grant lands to the Crown. 
Despite the outcome of the court case, the Dunbar incident was not the end of the 
struggle over Sagadahock. Indeed, as the region was overcome by successive imperial 
wars, the issue simply went dormant. Both Massachusetts and Nova Scotia—which 
remained a Board of Trade puppet colony—continued to claim the Sagadahock country. 
Without making it obvious, however, the geography of the region changed slightly. After 
the Seven Years’ War, the success of the proprietary townships in mid-Maine—which 
were firmly tied to Massachusetts, both financially and politically—meant that claiming 
the Kennebec region was a non-starter for the Nova Scotian party. Instead, the main 
region of contention shifted north and east, in the region between the Penobscot and St. 
John valleys. Nevertheless, commenters continued to use the term “Sagadahock” to cover 
the region, despite no longer insisting that the Sagadahock itself was part of the tract.   
The resurrection of active disputes over where Massachusetts ended and Nova 
Scotia began coincided with the flurry of survey and settlement activity that marked the 
period immediately following the Treaty of Paris. Among Governor Bernard’s planned 
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surveys, as has already been discussed, was one of the St. Croix River meant to clarify 
colonial boundaries. This survey was tied directly to the Penobscot Township grants. 
Bernard wrote to Nova Scotia governor Jonathan Belcher in July of 1762 that because of 
the township grants, "it appears to me necessary, that measures should be speedily taken 
for settling the Line in order to prevent all Interfering between the two Provinces.”610 
Referencing the grants, Bernard suggested that it would be in both provinces’ interests to 
finally figure out the precise location of the border between them.611  
The responses Bernard received to this request were the first indication that things 
with the grants would not go smoothly. Belcher responded to Bernard’s request with a 
lengthy list of historical proofs asserting Nova Scotia’s claim to the land east of the 
Penobscot River.612 With evident surprise, Bernard quickly sent a letter of self-defense to 
Whitehall.613 But in December Bernard received an angry letter that seemed to confirm 
his worst fears. “You cannot be ignorant,” the Board declaimed, “that the River 
Penobscot has always been deem'd and declared to be the Western boundary of Accadia 
or Nova Scotia.” They further added that Bernard’s failure to inform the Board before 
planning the survey was “such an aggravation of your misconduct as Our Duty to His 
 
610 Francis Bernard to Jonathan Belcher, 3 April 1762, enclosed in Jonathan Belcher to 
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Majesty will not permit Us to pass Over without animadversion.”614 What was worse, the 
Board presented what seemed like endless hoops to jump through before they would even 
consider presenting the grants to the King and Council. 
Bernard, of course, was not undertaking these surveys solely in the interest of 
Massachusetts Bay. His claims at Mount Desert Island meant that his personal finances 
were now tied to the question of who controlled the lands beyond the Penobscot River. 
The resistance of the Nova Scotian governor and the Board or Trade to clarifying the 
extent and nature of colonial power in the Sagadahock was not entirely unanticipated, 
however. Both Bernard and the General Court were well aware of the charter proviso 
requiring Crown approval for grants. They were also aware that the process had never 
been attempted before. For this reason, Bernard advised Bollan to inform the Board of 
Trade only of his own grant, and wait before announcing the twelve townships. He 
reasoned that “it may be better that the first instance should be a single one” and the 
“easiest & cheapest manner” would be preferred, taking “no notice of what is to come 
after.”615 Despite this bit of self-serving sleight of hand, both Bernard and his 
correspondents in London didn’t seem to initially anticipate that gaining approval for the 
any of the grants would be difficult.   
As a result, The Board of Trade learned of the townships only by chance, when, in 
December of 1762, a flustered Jaspar Maudit, the newly minted agent for Massachusetts, 
reported that, while he had not been informed directly, twelve townships and Bernard’s 
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grant of Mount Desert Island had been made earlier in the year.616 The Lords wrote their 
disapproving letter to Bernard shortly thereafter, and the harsh tone was no doubt 
influenced by Bernard’s lack of forthrightness. Nevertheless, the following year the 
Board of Trade, in consultation with the King agreed that the St. Croix would, for the 
time being, serve as the boundary—so long as the King’s rights in the Sagadahock lands 
were reserved.617 Once the two Governors, the King, and the Board of Trade all agreed 
that the river bounding Stirling’s grant would also bound a reconstituted, modern Nova 
Scotia, the survey could finally go forward. To that end, Massachusetts sent a team of 
surveyors to Passamaquoddy Bay in 1764, and Nova Scotia conducted its own survey the 
year after.618  The outcome of these surveys, as has been discussed, was in fact to extend 
and reinforce the jurisdictional overlap under the influence of Passamaquoddy power 
brokers, laying the groundwork for further confusion and conflict later in the century 
In London, however, the Board of Trade continued to debate what to do with the 
contested region. As the surveys were underway in Passamaquoddy, the Board—now led 
by Wills Hill, the Earl of Hillsborough—agreed that settling the Sagadahock coastland 
was important. However, they suggested that it would be best “if this district could be 
sever'd from the Charter of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, and erected into a 
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separate Province, under the immediate Government of the Crown.”619 Reflecting an 
increasingly negative opinion of colonists and the forms of government of, in particular, 
the New England colonies, the report took especial exception to extending 
Massachusetts’ Assembly-dominated government—whose current state the report 
characterized as one of “great Disorder and embarrassment in the Administration of 
Government”— over yet more territory, and provisions they saw in the grants as 
enshrining dissenting forms of Protestantism at the expense of the Church of England.620  
The King and Privy Council never explicitly denied Massachusetts’ grants. Their 
refusal to take action, however, left grantees scrambling. The proprietors of the townships 
granted by Bernard were forced to repeatedly petition for extensions to the conditions in 
their grants that required they receive Royal approbation by a certain date, and they had 
difficulty raising capital and people for a venture where they could not guarantee clear 
land titles.621 Reflecting the fragility of settlement schemes, Bernard complained to his 
friend Richard Jackson that “these kind of undertakings require the utmost 
encouragement: a little damp presently knocks 'em up.”622 In a later letter, he bemoaned 
that the government at London seemed to be passing up a great opportunity. “What a deal 
of money has it cost the Government to make such a settlement in other parts?” he wrote. 
 
619 Report on Grants to the East of Penobscot River, Board of Trade to the Privy Council, 
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“Here nothing is askt of it but its permission.”623 Here, he may well have been thinking of 
Nova Scotia. 
This imperial resistance to the Massachusetts grants was potentially a huge 
problem for Bernard personally. In his enthusiasm, Bernard had already dived 
pocketbook first into the project of “developing” Mount Desert. The July following the 
grant, he personally participated in a round of eastern surveys, travelling with the 
surveying party.624 He left them at Mount Desert with an ambitious itinerary. He planned 
to erect a house, “lay out a Town for…a 100 families now waiting; contract for erecting 2 
or 3 saw mills,” and “look for brick clay & Limestone &c.”625 At Mount Desert he found 
what seemed to him a lawless world, where the few European inhabitants who lived there 
did so without any title and hunted, farmed, fished, and lumbered without any regard for 
the claims of either the Penobscot or their (possible) governor and (potential) landlord, 
Bernard.626 Later he recalled that the island when he first visited was in danger of “being 
wasted & improvidently possessed,” presumably by the “poor people” he found there, 
who he desired to “make…useful to the publick.”627  
In October 1762 Bernard returned and began the actual work of laying out the 
township. The population was growing. Bernard was told that there were two families 
living at the head of what is now Some’s Sound, and another four on the Cranberry 
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Islands just off the coast, which Bernard considered to be part of his grant.628 At least one 
of these families, that of Abraham Somes, had contracted with Bernard for the grant. 
With the detached eye of an aristocratic landholder, Bernard described his visit to the 
Somes’ family in much the same way he described the plant and animal life of Maine: 
At the end of it we turned into a bay & there saw a settlement in a lesser bay. We 
went on shore & into solme's log house; found it neat & convenient, tho not quite 
finished; & in it a notable Woman with 4 pretty girls clean & orderly.629 
 
Bernard also took the opportunity of this trip to recruit even more settlers for his still 
unconfirmed lands, presumably from among those same “poor people” he encountered 
there.630 
Bernard reacted to the news of the possible threat to the confirmation of the grants 
in two ways. In public, and in several memorials to the Board of Trade, Bernard pushed 
Massachusetts’s claim to the eastward. Citing Pownall’s expedition, the 1691 charter, and 
the fact that Penobscot people had been treating with Massachusetts and not Nova Scotia 
for decades, Bernard collaborated with the General Court to make a strong claim to the 
lands between the Penobscot and the St. Croix.631 He also clearly believed that keeping 
the Eastward as part of Massachusetts was the most efficient way to channel new bodies 
into what he referred to as “the transpenobscotan country.”632 He attributed this at least 
partly to New Englanders’ attachment to their own forms of government, as well as its 
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booming population.633 Keeping the region within Massachusetts was the path of least 
resistance. “What a pity will it be,” he lamented, “that this opportunity should be lost 
upon account of a refined distinction.”634  
 Privately, however, Bernard was not so insistent. He went out of his way to 
signal his neutrality and flexibility to his superiors. Throwing the twelve townships under 
the proverbial bus, Bernard instead asked only for a grant to be made that confirmed his 
ownership of Mount Desert while leaving the question of which colony it belonged to 
undecided. Writing on his plan to Massachusetts agent William Bollan, Bernard noted 
defensively that “I don't mean to desert the Province's cause; but I can see no particular 
use in having my business hung up, for the whole time this question may be agitated.”635  
Bernard’s suggestions for the fate of the eastward also went far beyond proposing 
pragmatic grants. Recognizing the 1760s as a unique chance to reorganize the empire and 
wanting to leave his mark on it, in response to his Penobscot difficulties Bernard came up 
with an entirely new scheme for the northeast. Assuming that the crown’s reluctance to 
confirm the grants was due to plans for a new colony, Bernard argued that the key to 
more effectively governing the North American colonies was redrawing colonial borders 
themselves. Anticipating the contours of modern Maine, Bernard suggested that a colony 
that ran from the Piscataqua to St. Croix with its capital in modern Portland would “make 
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one of the finest Provinces in America.”636 To compensate Massachusetts’ loss, he 
suggested annexing Rhode Island—whose government he disapprovingly referred to as a 
“Mobboccracy”—and New Hampshire.637 In later years he refined his plan to include 
dividing Connecticut between New York and Massachusetts on the grounds that charter 
governments were a "Monster in Politicks."638 He also proposed an additional new 
colony to take in the lands between Penobscot and the St. John River with a capital at 
Machias.639 In increasingly pathetic tones, he repeatedly offered to travel to London to 
discuss his ideas for the political reorganization he assumed was imminent.640 It was, but 
not in the way Bernard had thought. 
Bernard imagined all kinds of ways his ownership of the island—and, by 
extension, the Transpenobscotan country more generally—would serve the Crown. He 
argued, for instance, that it would make an ideal “rendezvous for fleets & Transports in 
case of an expedition to the West Indies,” while its remoteness would prevent “danger of 
desertion or irregularity.”641 Bernard also hoped to develop a number of industries on his 
Mount Desert estate. He claimed to be planning to recruit hemp farmers from his old 
home in Lincolnshire, as well as developing a potash manufactory.642  
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He also turned his mind to developing specialty fisheries.643 In January of 1764, 
for instance, he wrote Benjamin Franklin to both thank him for retrieving his wayward 
university-drop-out son from Virginia, and to request he track down a gentleman in 
Trenton who produced “The best pickled Sturgeon I ever eat.” With this recipe Bernard 
hoped to set up a sturgeon fishery and pickling facilities at Mount Desert and had his eye 
on a salmon fishery as well.644 In October of that year, he drafted a document proposing 
that he would loan local fishermen two schooners and a whaleboat for their use, on the 
condition that one fifth of their catch would go to Bernard.645 Bernard later cast this 
business arrangement as a humanitarian effort, describing how he had given fishing boats 
to “poor tho’ honest and industrious” men out of “public concern, [rather] than private 
interest.”646  
In addition to his financial interests in the region, Bernard took advantage of his 
lands at Penobscot to satisfy his rather clumsy, if gentlemanly, interest in natural 
philosophy. Convinced he had discovered a new variety of hemp—or maybe it was 
flax?—he engaged in pseudo-scholarly correspondence with Thomas Pownall about its 
potential scientific and agricultural merit.647 Nothing came of it, for which he blamed not 
himself, but the Penobscot people who claimed they had lost the seeds in a canoe incident 
and who were generally unenthusiastic about the project.648 Bernard also commissioned a 
 
643 Proposals for Settling at Mount Desert, 1764?, vol.10, pp.222-225, FBP. 
644 Francis Bernard to Benjamin Franklin, 23 Jan 1764, vol.3, pp.19-20, FBP. 
645 Proposals for a Fishery at Mount Desert, 5 Oct 1764, vol.10, pp.207-210, FBP. 
646 Draft Memorial on Mount Desert Grant, Oct 1764, vol.10, pp.199-206, FBP. 
647 Francis Bernard to Thomas Pownall, 17 March 1766, vol.5, pp.95-96, FBP. 
648 Francis Bernard to Thomas Pownall, 28 Aug 1767, vol.6, p.37, FBP. 
232 
 
full-sized canoe from a skilled female artisan—whom he declared was “esteemed the best 
hand for a Canoo in America”—as a gift for his patron, Lord Barrington.649 However, 
miscommunication—or perhaps an intentional slight—resulted in the production of only 
a pint-sized model canoe, which he nevertheless dutifully sent to Barrington. He later 
successfully received a full-scale vessel, but it did not have the effect on Barrington 
Bernard had hoped. In a letter explaining that he was returning the canoe to Bernard, 
Lord Barrington wrote that “Nobody can navigate it or will venture to go into it. If it 
receives damage nobody can mend it, & I have no place to put it in.” He suggested 
instead giving it to the Duke of Cumberland.650 
Whitehall, however, continued to drag its feet on the question of confirmation. 
Discussing the question of the legality of the grants was first put off due to the loss of the 
original grants, followed by rapid changeover within the British government.651 While 
the Board of Trade had recommended that Bernard’s grant be approved, they were less 
enthusiastic about the townships to which the Mount Desert grant was so intimately 
connected.  They approved heartily of settling the region with British Protestants; but the 
question of which colony would control the settlement was more vexing. Despite 
Massachusetts’ strong claim to the region, they objected to the colony’s form of 
government, arguing that adding new townships to the colony would further dilute the 
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power of the appointed council and governor as more and more elected representatives 
were sent to Boston, a dangerously republican threat. Leaving the townships under 
Massachusetts authority would also allow for the expansion of the Congregationalist 
church, shutting out the Church of England. Instead, the Board agreed with Bernard’s 
perspective, suggesting confirming the townships only if the Sagadahock lands could be 
established as a new colony.652 Despite the report, nothing was done either way, and the 
question of confirmation remained in an uncomfortable limbo. 
Despite the discouragement, Bernard continued his work. In late summer of 1764, 
Bernard made a contract with 80 German families for 2,000 acres of Mount Desert 
land.653 Laying his case before the Board of Trade, Bernard claimed that this “colony of 
Germans” would lead inevitably to mass migration from the old country.654 But as the 
months and years dragged on without any confirmation, Bernard grew more and more 
frustrated. Sometime later he wrote to the Board that “disorderly people” had destroyed 
the houses he had built and were cutting down wood and making “great havock,” but 
without the confirmation he was able to do nothing. He despaired at having to shoulder 
the burden of the some £1,500 he had spent on improvements with no source of income 
but his governor’s salary, an amount he dismissed as hardly enough to cover his “bare 
subsistence.”655 He opined to John Pownall that if the grant was not confirmed, “tho' it 
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will not ruin my fortunes, it may break my spirit.”656 Worse still, the continued 
uncertainty over the grant meant that he risked losing the contract with the Germans.657 
By 1766, after narrowly surviving the Stamp Act Crisis, Bernard bemoaned to his friend 
Richard Jackson that “now I see all my schemes there running to ruin, & myself 
further.”658 The grants were brought before the King again, and again, nothing 
happened.659 
By this time, Bernard had all but given up on his island. The promised Germans 
never came, and his lack of grant meant he had no real authority over the white settlers of 
Mount Desert Island.660 “I think of it as little as possible,” he wrote, “but the Sums of 
Money I have expended there, the Disappointment I have met with & the Ruinous 
Condition of my Works there will not suffer me to put it out of my Mind.”661 He claimed 
the confirmation problem had infected the whole region. Without the ability to appoint 
Magistrates and other governmental officials in the region west of the Penobscot, Bernard 
complained that “the people increase & live in great Anarchy & confusion” without the 
steady hand of himself or other proprietors.662 His inability to get his confirmation was 
used by his political enemies, particularly James Otis, as an example of his 
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ineffectiveness and lack of credit at Whitehall.663 At some point in 1767, Bernard—or 
someone close to him—rather inexplicably translated his booster description of Mount 
Desert into Latin.664 Perhaps his grand schemes to provide for his children had by then 
become simply a copybook exercise.   
During the later 1760s Bernard attempted to circumvent the issue of confirmation 
by forming a company with several other British gentlemen, including Thomas Pownall, 
with plans to take up townships in Passamaquoddy Bay under the seal of Nova Scotia. 
Indeed, Benjamin Franklin appears to have been first made aware of the speculation 
opportunities in Nova Scotia by Bernard’s good friend Richard Jackson, who attempted 
to involve him.665 Although he continued to associate with the company for some time, 
Franklin never followed through, leaving Bernard hanging for some time as he awaited 
yet another grant that never came.666 Bernard was finally offered confirmation of Mount 
Desert in 1771, as part of a package of rewards—including a baronetcy—that were given 
to the beleaguered outgoing governor.667 This act, however, was meant more as another 
display of imperial rights in America than an approval of the transpenobscotan 
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settlements. While Massachusetts granted more eastern townships after 1762, they all 
remained unconfirmed and therefore technically illegal until after the Revolutionary War.  
In addition to concerns over Massachusetts’ form of government, imperial 
discomfort with granting land in the Sagadahock was intimately tied up with questions of 
lumbering and access to the forests. White pine trees that could be used as masts by the 
Royal Navy had been protected in Massachusetts since the 1691 charter, and made 
general to the northern colonies in 1710 with the creation of the so-called “King’s 
Woods.”668 This reservation was restricted to white pine trees of greater than two feet 
diameter and taller than a foot, but in practice they made all forms of logging the northern 
woods suspicious from an imperial perspective. Although on the books throughout the 
period of actual Anglo-American settlement in the far northeast, attempts to enforce these 
claims grew more intense alongside settlement efforts.  
Rumors of the “Tresspasses, waste and the destruction of the King's Timber” in 
Maine swirled through Whitehall, directed primarily at grantless settlers east of 
Penobscot.669 The 1710 act had a provision for trees on private property; however, 
colonial landholders in Maine (where most of the tension occurred) and the Board of 
Trade had different understandings of just what private property entailed. New 
Englanders, particularly large land holders, considered both their large tracts and 
particular township plots to be private property whether or not they were developed. The 
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Board, on the other hand, seems to have considered only worked land to be covered 
under the private property exception, and considered New England communal land 
granting practices to be a cheap excuse to try and circumvent the King’s power and 
rights.670 This created immediate tension between colonial landholders and the 
increasingly onerous imperial apparatus.  
The tensions over tree rights were in fact a long standing sore point in the 
eastward. David Dunbar’s primary job, after all, was not to bring new Protestant families 
to the eastward, but to preserve the king’s rights in the North American woods. As the 
King’s Surveyor, Dunbar was to identify and set aside 200,000 acres of trees suitable for 
masts and other naval uses in Nova Scotia, and another 100,000 between the Penobscot 
and St. Croix.671 In fact, rather than promoting settlement, Dunbar’s primary role was to 
restrict it by removing settlers and prosecuting them for illegal lumbering. The job 
description of the Surveyor of the King’s Woods put them in direct opposition to the 
desires of the Anglo-American settlers who had settled in Southern Maine and were 
venturing further and further east for timbering.  
Unsurprisingly, it was reported that these settlers actively worked to make the job 
of the Surveyor of the Woods as difficult as possible, for example by reclaiming seized 
logs and throwing them in the rivers, either for later reclamation or just to get them out of 
 
670 Report of the Board of Trade to the Attorney General, 2 Nov 1758, fols.143-156, CO 
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the hands of the surveyors.672 While still in England, Dunbar learned from the deputy of 
his predecessor that Armstrong had confiscated 200 logs that had been felled by settlers. 
The settlers who had chopped them down insisted that the trees were within the bounds 
of their township, and therefore they were well within their right. Armstrong insisted that 
they were within the jurisdiction of the admiralty and the King’s Woods, and planned to 
sell them, no doubt for a tidy profit.673  Several months later, Dunbar’s brother and 
assistant Jeremiah seized another 200 logs suitable for masts from the outskirts of Exeter 
township on the modern Maine-New Hampshire border.674 
Thomas Haley directly linked the lack of Royal control of the Sagadahock to the 
local politics of trees. He framed the struggles over timber in the Eastward as a battle 
between the King’s authority and unruly settlers, writing that “country people” could get 
away with what he thought of as illegal logging and harassment as 
where this valuable timber is cut, is at so great a distance from Piscataqua, Casco, 
or any other place where a surveyor can be supposed to stay that without people 
of resolution in our own pay, it is impossible to secure them.675 
 
What was worse, he accused these same settlers of selling the mast timber to Spain, 
directly helping Britain’s “enemies abroad” at the empire’s own expense.676 
Dismissively, he claimed that the great proprietorial townships that had been laid out 
earlier in the decade had been created “merely to evade the Act of Reservation.”677 In 
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another letter, he wrote that “we have many enemys in the country, but they are generally 
amongst that sett who hold our authority in contempt, as they would the sacred majesty 
from whom it is derived.”678 
These same tensions continued through the next decades, and quickly became a 
particular issue for the Maine proprietors. The Kennebec Proprietors, for example, played 
a large role in this question. Because their land had theoretically been granted before the 
Charter—the same reason it had been confirmed to them in 1731—they believed that 
their entire tract was exempt from cutting by the King’s surveyors. In 1757 news reached 
them that deputies of the King’s surveyor were cutting mast wood on their tract. 
Immediately, they wrote an angry letter to Benning Wentworth—who was Surveyor 
General of the King’s Woods as well as Governor of New Hampshire—expressing their 
outrage. Threatening to cease their settlement efforts, they wrote that they saw 
Wentworth’s intrusions as “a very great Grievance and an Infringement on the Rights of 
private property.” They threatened to bring the Governor up on charges of trespassing.679 
Interestingly enough, that same year the proprietors voted to include a reservation of mast 
pines in their own grants to settlers, preserving to themselves the rights sought by the 
King, although this vote was overturned six months later.680  
 
678 Thomas Haley to David Dunbar, 6 March 1729, enclosed in Privy Council Report, 31 
July 1729, fol.260, CO 5/870, TNA. 
679 Thomas Hancock, Silvanus Gardiner, James Pitts, and Benjamin Hallowell to Benning 
Wentworth, 1 June 1757,vol.6, vol.2, pp.123-125, KPP. Wentworth’s report of this 
incident is what kicked off the inquiry, quoted above. 
680 Meeting minutes, 2 Nov 1757, vol.6, vol.2, p.133, KPP. The Kennebec Proprietors 
indeed took a great deal of interest in preserving their own rights to the woods on their 
lands and talked about “intruders” in terms similar to the King and Massachusetts 
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After the war had ended, the Board once again reviewed the rules around the 
reservation of trees. Finding that the current rules did little to preserve the timber, they 
proposed a sweeping overhaul designed to get around the private property exemption. 
They recommend first that land grants in the areas they identified as major white pine 
growing regions cease immediately.681 After a careful survey of all the trees on ungranted 
lands in those regions, they would reopen the question of settlement, reserving settlement 
in areas identified as particularly rich in pines to small communities meant to provide the 
needed for the labor of cutting and hauling the mast wood. Secondly, the Board proposed 
giving landholders equivalent land elsewhere in exchange for surrendering pine rich 
lands in their tracts.682 
The Board’s suggestions were not implemented, and the clash between the King’s 
surveyors and the Kennebec Proprietors soon reemerged. In 1769, the Proprietors sent a 
letter to Governor John Wentworth of New Hampshire that was nearly identical to the 
one they had sent his uncle twelve years earlier. In it, they informed him that while they 
would do their best to preserve mast trees for the King, anyone who entered their lands 
with Wentworth’s license to harvest masts would be considered a trespasser and 
prosecuted as such.683 The next year, a motion by the Massachusetts Council to publish a 
 
government; it was simply that they believed that they, not the crown, had the right to the 
trees. See for example Committee to Briggs Hallowell, 25 Oct 1771, vol.1, KPP. 
681 The regions singled out by the Board in this memorial were the area around Lake 
Champlain, the land between the Connecticut and Hudson rivers, New Hampshire, and 
the eastward between Androscoggin and St. John rivers. 
682 Report of the Board of Trade to the Privy Council, 24 July 1767, fols.242-267, CO 
5/920, TNA. 
683 James Bowdoin, James Pitts, Silvanus Gardiner, and Benjamin Hallowell to John 
Wentworth, 16 Oct 1769; Same to Same, 8 Nov 1769, vol.1, pp.27-29,  KPP. The second 
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proclamation reaffirming the King’s right to white pine trees and promising to punish 
magistrates who shirked their duties was blocked by the House of Representatives.684  
 The question of the King’s right to mast trees also reached Nova Scotia. In 
response to Alexander McNutt and the Philadelphia men’s extensive grants, the Board of 
Trade recommended that the tree provision should be included in all grants, effectively 
removing the private property exemption.685 It had an immediate effect on Philadelphian 
settlement efforts, and several threatened to abandon their grants. McNutt, of course, was 
deeply dismayed by this new provision, writing a memorial to the Board in early 1766 
that characterized it as an attack on property rights. He also drew on a Patriot Whig 
understanding of manufactures as the heart of the imperial economy and objected to the 
implicit economic calculus of the provision. “The several Companys,” he wrote,  
had principally in view the carrying on an extensive Fishery in order to 
enoble[sic] them to make remittances to Britain for their manufactures…One 
Hundred Thousand pounds sent to Britain for her manufactures wou’d its 
presumed be of more value than any imaginary advantage arising from the 
reservation of timber. 686 
In miniature, these objections to the tree reservation provision replayed the clashes over 
the nature of the empire that characterized the era of the Imperial Crisis. It pitted a vision 
 
letter claims that Wentworth’s predecessor had recognized their right to the trees in 1757. 
The issue was still unresolved in mid-1770, when the proprietors, in keeping with their 
usual method of problem solving, suggested taking it to the courts: Same to Same, 7 May 
1770, vol.1, pp.35-36, KPP. 
684 Minutes of the Massachusetts Council, 10 Nov 1770, enclosed in Thomas Hutchinson 
to the Earl of Hillsborough, 30 Nov 1770, fols.123-124, CO 5/894, TNA. This round of 
letters triggered yet another legal review of the tree reservation laws and the rights of 
Massachusetts land holders: John Pownall to Richard Jackson, 16 May 1771, fols.383-
385, CO 324/18, TNA; John Pownall to Richard Jackson, 29 May 1771, fol.408, CO 
5/902, TNA. 
685 Report of the Board of Trade to the King, 15 May 1766, CO 217, LAC. 
686 McNutt, "Memorial Against the Reservation of Trees."  
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of empire that placed a premium on colonial consumption and unfettered settler access to 
and use of land against that of the Board of Trade, which desired more controls over both 
land and trade. 
The Kennebec Proprietors agreed with McNutt’s perspective. Writing about the 
same issue several years later, the Proprietors threatened that if lumbering on private 
lands was made illegal,  
there would be a Stop to all further settlements in America; the trade to the West 
India Islands would in a great measure cease; the plantations there, from loss of 
trade, and want of Lumber (for which they depend on the Northern Colonies) 
would be much injured and Great Britain would not only be much detrimented 
thereby, but must be dependent on foreign States for a Supply of Lumber 687 
 
Both McNutt and the Kennebec proprietors proposed that the mast tree issue would be 
best resolved by giving property owners more, not fewer, rights over their lands. The 
proprietors, for example, argued that the present situation incentivized landowners to 
quickly cut down potential mast trees before they became a nuisance. Instead, they 
argued, landowners should receive a bounty and be charged with procuring the trees 
themselves.688 
 
The combination of concerns over preserving mast trees and discomfort with 
giving Massachusetts more political power meant that no new townships outside the 
bounds of already-established proprietary grants could be made by any governmental 
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body in the Sagadahock country. As a result, most Euramerican settlers in the region 
lived in illegal squatter communities, recognized by no one, and with no governmental 
institutions or even Justices of the Peace. Free of the geopolitical reins imagined by 
proponents of weaponized settlement, these settlers were considered a nuisance at best 
and a threat at worst by both the imperial government and the Wabanaki. 689 As a result 
of their presence, Penobscot country was by far the hardest hit of the Wabanaki 
homelands in this era.690 However, it does not seem likely that there were more than 
5,000 Europeans thinly distributed east of Penobscot by the outbreak of the Revolution, 
and probably considerably less.691 
 
689 Conference between Thomas Hutchinson and Joseph Orono, 1 April 1773, enclosed in 
Thomas Hutchinson to Lord Dartmouth, 17 April 1773, CO 5/895, TNA.   
690 Kennebec country was by far the worst off, but this was mostly a continuation of 
forces which began before the fall of New France, discussed in chapter 3.  
691 The pre-war population of downeast Maine is a tricky topic clouded with much 
misinformation based often on taking claims of colonizers at face value. Lincoln county, 
which before the Revolution included all the land east of the Androscoggin river, had a 
population of approximately 15,546 in 1775. The vast majority of this population lived 
between the Androscoggin and the Kennebec, with population tapering off dramatically 
as you went east. In the Penobscot Bay area, most settlement prior to the war was 
centered on the townships of Belfast and Frankfort on the west side of the Bay, both on 
the safely undisputed lands of the Waldo tract, which had populations of 245 and 891 in 
1790 respectively. Other than the Penobscot Townships granted by the General Court, 
these were the only official townships in the region, although Machias emerged as an 
important—if illegal—settlement by the end of this period. An anonymous newspaper 
writer claimed that there were “2,000 men” east of Fort Pownall in 1769, which would 
produce 10,000 as a very high estimate assuming all those men were heads of families, 
which was almost certainly not the case; instead it seems more likely to be an estimate of 
total population. The “regional metropolis” of Machias, the largest community in 
Downeast Maine before the war, had less than 700 people at the outbreak of the 
Revolution, and an analysis of surviving township books for the Penobscot Townships 
reveals a population that was barely more than a handful. The 1790 census counted 
12,308 people living in the two Transcpenobscotan counties of Hancock and Washington, 
with only 2,759 living in the easternmost county of Washington, almost certainly a 
dramatic increase from the pre-war era for reasons explored in the final chapter of this 
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Many of the residents of the eastward townships were displeased with their quasi-
legal status. The residents of still unconfirmed township number 5 petitioned the General 
Court for a Justice of the Peace, writing dramatically that  
upwards of Sixty Families and neither Law no Gospel embraced among us, every 
one doing whats right in his own Eyes and a great spirit of Mobbing and Rioting 
prevails, Cursing, Swearing, fighting, threatening, Stealing, pulling down Houses 
and the like as we cant sleep a nights without fear692 
 
Governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts seemed to share their opinion of the state of the 
eastward. He wrote to Hillsborough in 1770 that he had urged the sheriff of Lincoln 
County to appoint a deputy at the rapidly growing squatter township of Machias. “If these 
Settlers are suffered to go on without check,” he continued, “there is danger of their being 
as troublesome as the Regulators in North Carolina.”693  He took it upon himself to 
update Hillsborough with the goings on in the eastward as often as he could.694  
Hutchinson was cautious over the value and practicality of ejecting “squatters” in 
the eastward, but nevertheless expressed frustration that the opposition party in the 
General Court had, among other things, “declined taking any measures for ejecting the 
Intruders upon the Lands East of Sagadehoc.”695 Despite their disinterest in eastward 
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affairs just a few years before, Massachusetts’ rabble-rousing popular party was now 
aligning their cause with the Sagadahock’s disaffected settlers. 
Unsurprisingly, conflict over control of the Sagadahock and Transpenobscotan 
lands continued into the Revolutionary war years. The Declaration of Independence did 
nothing to convince the Crown and Board of Trade of Massachusetts’ claim to the 
eastward, and they continued to view the region east of Penobscot as actual or potential 
Crown territory. As the war began to turn against the British after Saratoga and the 
American alliance with the French, concerns over the fate of displaced loyalists became 
increasingly pressing. Creating a new colony in the eastward was far from a new idea, 
although two individuals seem to be most responsible for the creation of what became 
known as New Ireland. John Calef had, before the war, been employed by Thomas 
Hutchinson in his quest to get legal recognition for the Transpenobscotan settlers. Just 
before the outbreak of hostilities between Massachusetts and the Crown, Calef had 
contacted Francis Bernard and informed him that the Penobscot settlers were asking for 
their own government, an idea that must have delighted him. After the war began, 
Bernard then passed this information on to Lord Dartmouth, suggesting that this new 
government could act as a haven for New England loyalists.696John Nutting, a lumber 
merchant, was also a booster of the project in the right place at the right time.697 
 In 1778, the King agreed to finally take action on the Sagadahock issue and erect 
the region into a new loyalist province. British Secretary of State George Germain wrote 
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to Commander-in-chief Henry Clinton in fall announcing the decision and giving 
guidance for land grant terms. Looking to capitalize on the precarious legal status of 
Penobscot settlers that had in part been created by the Crown, Germain instructed Clinton 
to promise existing settlers who signed a loyalty oath that their lands would be legally 
secured to them once a civil government had been formed.698 Boosters of the nascent 
province of “New Ireland” even sought to have the capital as far south as Falmouth, 
modern Portland Maine, far west of the contested Penobscot country.699 
 The installation at Penobscot was meant not just as a humanitarian project for 
refugee families. Supporters pointed to the deep harbors, capacity for naval stores, and, in 
particular, timber—in other words, the features that had long made the region attractive 
to the planning class—as boons to the flagging war effort.700 Securing these resources by 
bringing in a loyal population would not only ensure that the British had access, but 
would also ensure that Massachusetts and the other rebelling colonies did not. Germain, 
for instance, wrote to Clinton in April of 1779 on the settlement efforts that “increasing 
the Distress of the rebellious Inhabitants of the New England Provinces…is the only 
means of making them sensible of the ruinous consequences of their attempts at 
Independancy.”701  
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 The British detachment under the command of Francis McLean arrived at 
Penobscot in early June of 1779.702 Finding a hostile population who assumed the fleet 
were privateers sent to raid in their communities, McLean immediately released a 
proclamation announcing the King’s intention to confirm grants to settlers who signed 
loyalty oaths.703 This tactic worked. By the end of the month, McLean wrote to Clinton 
that around 500 settlers in the surrounding area had signed on.704 McLean felt that Fort 
Pownall was far too small for his needs, and so set about building new defenses, 
employing locals to help speed the work.705 
 This new military installation would be needed very soon. United States forces 
had quickly learned about the new activity at Penobscot, and began planning an attack. 
The fleet arrived in late July and immediately began an assault on the British position.706  
In addition to this military action, American leaders also took aim at inhabitants who had 
responded positively to McLean’s proclamation and signed loyalty oaths. American 
Brigadier-General Solomon Lovell released a proclamation of his own, threating settlers 
who sided with the British and demanding that all inhabitants show themselves at the 
American camp or be branded traitors.707 Despite these efforts, however, the American 
efforts to retake Penobscot were a catastrophic failure. McLean was able to hold back the 
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fleet until a support squadron appeared. The Americans were routed and the land forces 
forced to flee on foot.708 
Not to be outdone, McNutt resurfaced during the war to comment directly on the 
New Ireland scheme. Perhaps unsurprisingly given his political leanings, he was a 
staunch supporter of the American cause. He spent most of the period from 1778 to end 
of the war living in Salem Massachusetts, frequently traveling to Philadelphia to petition 
the Continental Congress, which had replaced the Board of Trade as his preferred target. 
Mentally, however, he never left Nova Scotia. Several of his petitions to Congress were 
meant to bring the province  into the war on the side of the Americans.709 In 1780, shortly 
after the siege of Penobscot, he wrote a series of pamphlets in which he laid out his vision 
for an independent Nova Scotia.710 In what seems like a direct parallel with the failed 
loyalist colony, he re-named the region—which included Prince Edward Island, Cape 
Breton, and Newfoundland—“New Ireland.”711 Instead of a loyalist haven, however, the 
Bill of Rights, Constitution and Frame of Government written by McNutt were modeled 
on the ultra-democratic Pennsylvania constitution of 1776, using much of the same 
language and lifting whole passages verbatim. Like that constitution, McNutt envisioned 
a republic with a massively expanded franchise, direct voting for most positions, and a 
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plural executive consisting of a twelve-member “supreme council.”712 But McNutt, of 
course, added his own twist. New Ireland was to be an explicitly Christian republic, in 
which state power was directly interested in the behavior and morality of its citizens. 
Nothing came of his pamphlets, and it is unclear if he meant them as a serious call to 
action or as some kind of semi-satirical project. 
 
Figure 14. Frontispiece from McNutt, “Considerations.” Houghton Library copy. 
 
712 Alan Taylor, American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804 (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 2016), 359. 
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Neither vision of New Ireland, however, would come to pass. Despite their 
military success, The British in New Ireland did not show much sympathy for the 
beleaguered inhabitants and showed little enthusiasm for the New Ireland project. George 
Collier wrote to Clinton that “I can’t perceive one single end a Settlement here will 
answer; all the inhabitants are Rebels who take an oath to the King one day, & another to 
Congress tomorrow.”713 Collier, who was also ill and feverish, expressed distaste for the 
landscape as well as the people. “The face of the whole country is as dreary as can be 
imagined,” he wrote, “and the greatest part uncleared and fit for nothing but wild 
beasts.”714 The loyalist settlers who had come to Penobscot were evacuated to 
Passamaquoddy Bay at the end of the war, where they would ultimately create a 
settlement that would shore up the power of the British Empire — though in a way far 
different than originally intended. 
  
 





Epilogue: Loyalist Colonies and Native Dispossession 
 
Twenty years after Anthony Wayne surveyed New Jerusalem, McNutt’s 
ambitions for a new city at Port Roseway were suddenly realized. Practically overnight, 
between 10,000 and 14,000 settlers arrived to make a new home on Nova Scotia’s south 
shore.715 The new settlement they made, Shelburne, was briefly the largest city in British 
North America. Then again, there was no longer much competition: The American 
Revolution, finally over after eight long years, had decimated Great Britain’s colonial 
holdings and removed the largest centers of Euramerican population on the continent 
from British control. In the process, the Dawnland was split in two, with a new 
international boundary running straight through the heart of Passamaquoddy country. 
The unprecedented settler influx on both sides of this new border in the years 
immediately after 1783 in many ways represented the fulfillment of plans that had been 
laid many years previously. Viewed with the efforts to settle the far northeast from the 
siege of Acadia onwards, the arrival of 30,000 loyalist refugees in the Dawnland 
following the 1783 evacuation of New York, and the dire conditions this influx created 
for the region’s Native people, represented a fulfillment of British and Anglo-American 
plans. Loyalist settlement in the far northeast filled out a map that had been sketched long 
before the 1760s. The majority of loyalists moved into the regions that previous schemes 
had failed to attract. Much of the land granted post-1783 was newly escheated from 
1760s grantees.716 Across the border in Maine, post-war conditions led to a similar 
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population boom, finally filling up the proprietary townships and inspiring new 
speculative schemes in the far northeast. The new international border finally resolved 
conflicts over who controlled the Sagadahock Country. Ironically, it took the destruction 
of the North American empire to achieve the level of Euramerican population in the 
Dawnland that imperial planners had been calling for as a security measure for decades. 
For Wabanaki people, the arrival of so many settlers at the same time dramatically 
altered their political realities. Although shaken by the departure of the French and 
exhausted after generations of war, the lack of Euramerican settlers — and, with them, 
Euramerican on-the-ground power — had allowed Wabanaki nations to adjust and 
maintain their de facto sovereignty. Now, just as planners had predicted for decades, 
being surrounded by settler families made controlling their ancestral lands next to 
impossible. 
Most — if not all — of the 30,000 new settlers in Nova Scotia and the newer 
colonies of Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick were loyalist refugees. Lord 
Sydney wrote to Nova Scotian governor John Parr in 1785 that the province would soon 
become “the envy of the subjects of the neighbouring states,” an assessment echoed by 
some prominent loyalist refugees such as Edward Winslow.717 Even before the peace and 
the evacuation of New York, Sir Guy Carleton, in many ways the architect of loyalist 
resettlement, wrote to Parr that the future of Nova Scotia was now of the “highest 
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consequence” to the empire and that “much future good may be expected to arise” from 
the region.718  
This greatness was predicated on the arrival of settlers fleeing the newly 
independent states. The war left 60,000 people as exiles, largely men and their families 
who had tied their fortunes to occupying British armies who faced retaliation if they 
stayed in what was now the United States.719  About half of these refugees arrived in 
Nova Scotia in 1783 and 1784, nearly tripling the European population of the colony. To 
manage the arrival of so many new families, mainland Nova Scotia was erected into a 
new colony, New Brunswick.720 Much of the recent American work on the loyalist 
diaspora has focused on elites, who were able to draw on their pre-existing Atlantic 
connections to create new lives for themselves. Many of the men, women, and children 
who had been left homeless by the war, however, were destitute and desperate. Most 
dramatically, this population included the so-called “Black loyalists,” former slaves who 
had been given their freedom in exchange for loyalty to the British Crown. There were 
also many middling families — generally from the mid-Atlantic states — who hoped to 
recreate the lives they had before the war as a new loyalist elite.721  
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Loyalist resettlement was a logistical nightmare. Seen through the lens of 
weaponized settlement, however, it was also a tremendous opportunity. Like the 
Germans, New Englanders, and Scots Irish of earlier generations, planners re-imagined 
refugee families as a strategic asset that could — when settled properly — strengthen 
borders, tie remaining colonies more closely to the mother country, and accomplish older 
dreams of British power in the far northeast.722  Unlike those earlier potential settler 
families, however, loyalists, landless, often penniless, and beholden to imperial officials, 
could be directed and controlled in unprecedented ways — at least initially.  
Carleton well understood that potential. He wrote to Parr in April 1783 
encouraging the creation of a “strong frontier” on the St. Croix and St. John Rivers. This 
involved the erection of forts, but more crucially, Carleton imagined a series of 
permanent and self-reproducing military settlements, composed of disbanded military 
men and their families. In case Parr missed his intention, Carleton suggested that 
individual grants in these settlements be laid out  
as may resemble in some degree the cantonments of an army, with such 
distinction of favor to the Officers as will enable them to preserve their authority, 
and collect the whole, if need should require, into all the arrangements requisite 
for defence.723 
 
By fall of that year, seven government surveyors were hard at work on the St. John River, 
and three at St. Croix and Passamaquoddy.724  
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In peninsular Nova Scotia, loyalists were settled in the very regions that planners 
had hoped to develop in the 1750s and 1760s. Most of the incoming loyalists would be 
settled on land originally promised to McNutt and his Philadelphian friends. These were 
regions that had long been considered to have strategic importance, and that lay outside 
of the pale of Halifax and the old Acadian heartland. As in the 1760s land boom, for 
example, there was a particular emphasis on the St. John River Valley—consistently 
proposed as the ideal site for military settlement from the 1750s on—and the southwest 
Atlantic coast, particularly Port Roseway/Shelburne.725  
Although Passamaquoddy country did not receive the bulk of Loyalist refugees, 
its transformation in the immediate post war years is one of the most dramatic examples 
of how British planners were able to use weaponized settlement to fulfil geopolitical 
ambitions, as well as the disastrous effect this had on Dawnland people and nations. 
When the 1783 Treaty of Paris declared the St. Croix River to be the border between the 
United States and British North America, the old debate over which waterway was 
actually the St. Croix had not been resolved. The situation remained as it had been after 
the 1764/5 surveys, with Massachusetts and Nova Scotia claiming, respectively, the 
Maguagadavic and Cobscook as the true St. Croix. 
However, perhaps because it promised easier navigation into the continent as well 
as the ability to better command the Bay itself, the surveyors and planners sent to 
 
725 “Settlements under Survey for Refugees & Disbanded American Troops.” According 
to this report, seven surveyors in the government employ were at work in the St. John 
River Valley that fall, and six in the greater Port Roseway region. Greater Annapolis 
Royal had five, Passamaquoddy had three, and a handful of less important regions of 
settlement had one surveyor apiece. 
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Passamaquoddy to lay out Carleton’s “strong frontier” unilaterally decided that the 
Schoodic was the true border and planned accordingly. As the heart of Peskotomuhkatik, 
Passamaquoddy people had been actively working to maintain their sovereignty by 
controlling how Euramericans interacted with the river and by ensuring it did not become 
a contested border. Once the decision had been made that the Schoodic was the St. Croix, 
however, loyalist settlers arrived so quickly that neither Passamaquoddies nor 
Massachusetts officials could effectively oppose the decision. Planning must have begun 
even before the treaty was signed. Within a month and a half of the treaty, three 
surveyors were hard at work laying out a settlement on top of the Passamaquoddy 
gathering place and burial ground at Qonasqamkuk. This new settlement was to be called 
St. Andrews, and forty families had already arrived.726 By 1788, an anonymous pamphlet 
writer claimed that there were over six hundred houses in the town, and “upwards of 
three thousand” Loyalists and other British subjects living along the eastern bank of the 
Schoodic.727 
Passamaquoddies threatened—and, on at least one occasion, captured—surveyors, 
attempting to slow or halt the progress of the settlement. The sheer number of refugees, 
however, meant that there was little they could do short of re-launching a war, something 
all sides were loath to do after many years of hardship during the Revolution.728 
 
726 “Settlements under Survey for Refugees & Disbanded American Troops”; Allan to 
Hancock, 15 December 1783, PCC. 
727 “Progress of New Brunswick,” 1788, vol 6-96, WP. 
728 For Wabanaki displacement during the war and the British occupation of the coast 
from Pemaquid to Passamaquoddy, see Harald E. L. Prins and Bunny McBride, Asticou’s 
Island Domain: Wabanaki Peoples at Mount Desert Island, 1500-2000, vol. 1 (Boston: 
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American wartime Indian Superintendent John Allan wrote several letters to surveyors, 
prominent newcomers, and the Continental Congress, to little effect.729  To add insult to 
injury, in 1784 some residents of St. Andrews in a “drunken frolick” pulled down a cross 
at Qonasqamkuk. Although British officials erected a new cross for them, 
Passamaquoddies were forced to refocus their religious life at Sipayik on the other side of 
the border.730 Continuing the disastrous Nova Scotian land policy developed in the 1760s, 
British officials did not believe that Native title was valid and held no conferences or 
treaties as they occupied the Passamaquoddy homeland. 
 From a Passamaquoddy perspective, the ensuing diplomatic battle between the 
British and Americans over the identity of the St. Croix—and, therefore, the location of 
the new international border—was further complicated by deep divisions that had 
occurred during the Revolution. Louis Neptune, evidently upset that the sachemship had 
passed to his nephew Francis Joseph, had stolen the latter’s medal — evidently a symbol 
of his authority — and sided with the British, who recognized his claim.731 Most the rest 
of the nation, like the Penobscots and many Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik, had sided with 
the Americans and spent the war years fighting with Allan around Machias and 
 
Northeast Region Ethnography Program, National Park Service, 2007), 238–240. For the 
capture of a Loyalist surveyor, see Allan to Hancock, 15 December 1783, PCC. 
729 John Allan to Elias Boudinot, 7 Sept 1783, PCC; John Parr to Guy Carleton, 13 Sept 
1783, #9119, BHP; Letters from John Allan to British Surveyors, 24 Sept-24 Oct 1783, 
Samuel Adams Papers, NYPL. 
730 Alexander Hodges, James Brown, and Jeremiah Frost Depositions, 19 July 1797, 
NBP. 
731 The medal was likely a gift of the French from before the Seven Years’ War, which 
were important symbols of authority throughout Wabanakiak.  
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Penobscot. Both John Baptiste Neptune and Francis Joseph Neptune were prominent 
Patriot allies in the northeastern theater of the war.732  
After Louis Neptune’s death sometime around 1784, loyalist officials claimed that 
it was he who had told them that the Schoodic was the St. Croix, contradicting his 
identification of the Maguagadavic during the 1764 Massachusetts survey. Several 
individuals reported that during the early planning for loyalist settlement in 
Passamaquoddy, Louis Neptune made “a sketch or plan of the river with a piece of coal 
on the floor” that was copied and sent directly to the Nova Scotian governor.733 It is 
unclear if this episode was misinterpreted, made up, or was born of Louis Neptune’s 
bitterness over his exile from the Passamaquoddy nation, but his actions became an 
important source of legitimacy for the British claims during later negotiations. 
Other Passamaquoddies, at least those whose voices can be heard in the archives, 
uniformly supported the American claim that the Magaguadavic was the true St. Croix.734  
Louis Neptune’s actions and the partisan climate, however, significantly reduced their 
ability to make unequivocal claims that the British would accept. What is more, the very 
 
732 Frederic Kidder, ed., Military Operations in Eastern Maine and Nova Scotia during 
the Revolution, Chiefly Compiled from the Journals and Letters of Col. John Allan 
(Albany, NY: Joel Munsell, 1867), 102, 163, 234, 275, 258–259. Louis Neptune took the 
family medal from his nephew in 1778, following the death of Louis’s brother and 
Francis Joseph’s father John Baptiste Neptune. He was exiled from Passamaquoddy and 
Penobscot, at least temporarily, for allying with the British. He was referred to by some 
Americans as the “pretended chief” of the Passamaquoddy. Bahgulwet died around 1774. 
733 Deposition of John Curry, 19 July 1797, NBP; Deposition of Charles Morris, Jr., 17 
July 1797, WP. 
734 See for example Deposition of Nicholas Hawwawwas, 7 Oct 1796; Francis Joseph 




presence of a significant Loyalist community at St. Andrews constrained the ability of 
both Passamaquoddies and Americans to renegotiate the location of the border. Loyalist 
officials, for their part, seem to have been unconcerned about the threat posed by the 
Passamaquoddy. In December of 1784 Edward Winslow wrote to Sir John Wentworth 
that while “Allen[sic] the drunken partizan” had “thrown out some threats that he will 
employ the Indians to remove” the people at St. Andrews, Winslow’s contacts in the 
region were “under no apprehension from him or his adherents.”735  
American diplomatic efforts were similarly frustrated by the sudden arrival of so 
many Loyalists. Allan wrote to John Hancock in December of 1783 worriedly pointing 
out that most of the newcomers were former soldiers, just as Carleton had intended. He 
speculated that the settlement was a deliberate attempt to re-draw the border, writing that 
“they mean to take possession, and once fixed suppose they cannot be removed, weather 
the land falls easter or westward of the line.”736 These concerns proved well founded. 
Benjamin Lincoln and Henry Knox were sent by Massachusetts in fall 1784 to investigate 
Allan’s reports. While unflagging in their belief that the Magaguadavic was the St. Croix, 
their report to Governor Hancock expressed concerns that the necessity of removing the 
Loyalists already established along the Schoodic “would always embarrass a settlement 
of the line agreeable to the Treaty of Peace.”737 Congress requested that the British 
remove their settlers from the contested land later in the year, to no effect.738  
 
735 Edward Winslow to Sir John Wentworth, 26 Dec 1784, Vol 4-19, WP. 
736 Allan to Hancock, 15 Dec 1783, PCC. 
737 Knox and Lincoln to Hancock, 18 Oct 1784, WP. 
738 Hancock to Parr, 12 Nov 1784, WP. 
260 
 
Concerns over which river was the border simmered until 1794. The Jay Treaty, 
signed in that year, mandated the creation of an official commission to finally resolve the 
issue. These commissioners descended on the Passamaquoddy in 1796. The practical 
problem posed by the quasi-military British settlement erected on Passamaquoddy land at 
St. Andrews, however, had only grown more entrenched. American commissioner James 
Sullivan wrote secretly to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering that he feared that 
Loyalist settlement in the contested region between the Schoodic and Magaguadavic had 
hopelessly complicated negotiations.739 Nevertheless, Americans—not to mention 
Passamaquoddies—continued to insist that the Maguagadavic was the proper boundary, 
and both sides went about collecting depositions from longtime inhabitants they hoped 
would prove their arguments. 
While surveyors in the 1760s had relied almost entirely on knowledge from living 
Native informants, in the 1790s the commissioners mostly interviewed white men about 
the supposed opinions of dead Passamaquoddies, particularly Louis Neptune, Jean-
Baptiste Neptune, and Bagulwet.740 Somewhat suspiciously, deponents recalled that 
Bahgulwet and Jean-Baptiste Neptune had expressed opinions that lined up rather too 
well with the deponent’s current political affiliation. For instance, John Curry, who had 
been part of Campbell and Owen’s nascent Nova Scotia establishment on Campobello in 
the 1770s and remained loyal during the war, remembered both men telling him the 
 
739 Sullivan to Pickering, 30 July 1796, NBP. 
740 Manuscript versions of these depositions can be found in the WP; NBP; and those 
used in the final hearings are published in Moore, International Adjudications. 
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Schoodic was the St. Croix.741 Meanwhile, deponents who found themselves on the 
American side of the line or allied with the Patriot cause during the war remembered 
those same men always insisting on the Magaguadavic.742 Curiously, none of the 
deponents recalled any Native person identifying the Cobscook as the St. Croix, a 
position that had been quickly discredited following the arrival of the Loyalists despite 
being the foundation of Nova Scotia’s claims in the 1760s and 1770s.743 Passamaquoddy 
flexibility about the location of the St. Croix, which had worked so well in the 1760s, 
now came back to haunt them. 
The depositions and other evidence collected by the 1790s border commission 
also reveal how the long-dead claims and failed settlements of the seventeenth century 
suddenly took new importance in the emerging context of settler control. The texts of 
Champlain’s Voyages and Alexander’s grant became perhaps the two most important 
documents for the commission, along with other early documents such as the French 
King’s 1632 charter to Isaac de Razilly, Charles II’s 1662 grant to his brother the Duke of 
York, and early letters between the Governors of Massachusetts and the Board of 
Trade.744 These texts had had almost no effect on the people of Passamaquoddy Bay for, 
in some cases, nearly 200 years. But now, as the arrival of a mass of white settlers filled 
 
741 Deposition of John Curry, 19 July 1797, NBP. 
742 See i.e. William Ricker Deposition, 8 Nov 1797, NBP; James Boyd Deposition, 10 
Aug 1798, WP. 
743 For the discrediting of the Cobscook see Deposition of Charles Morris, Jr., 17 July 
1797, WP; Robert Morse to Guy Carleton, 15 Aug 1783, #8723, BHP. 
744 Moore, International Adjudications, 2:425–431. 
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out the spectral outlines of the grants, they suddenly became more important than the 
people who had been shaping the land for centuries. 
In the place of the Passamaquoddy testimony that had influenced the contours of 
colonial control for over a generation, it was an amateur archeological dig that finally 
decided the issue. Armed with a rare copy of Champlain’s plan of St. Croix island, 
Robert Pagan, a prominent St. Andrews Loyalist, turned up evidence of Champlain’s 
camp on a small island in the Schoodic. He and five other Loyalists “discovered” a 
number of ruins on Mehtonuwesk island which they claimed were a perfect match with 
the plan.745  Turning his dig into a gentlemanly spectacle, Pagan returned that Friday with 
“a large party of pleasure.” Unsurprisingly for a place Passamaquoddies had named after 
its use as a “place like a store where we put things in to be safe,” when the men of the 
party took “a few minutes” to dig into the earth they found a number of artifacts that 
spoke to the scattered yet persistent European presence in the bay.746 The combination of 
physical evidence and seventeenth century map sealed the Schoodic’s new permanent 
identity as both the St. Croix and the new international border.747 This discovery 
effectively nullified Passamaquoddy testimony and took the future of their homeland out 
 
745 Judging by the depositions of Nicholas Hawwawwas and Francis Joseph Neptune, the 
presence of these ruins and their connection to early French presence was well known to 
Passamaquoddies; see note below.  This island was also known to Loyalist settlers as 
Bone Island or Dochet Island. 
746 Notes on Nicholas Hawawes Deposition, 7 Oct 1796, NBP; Deposition of Robert 
Pagan, 21 July 1797, NBP. Francis Joseph’s deposition also referred to the island’s 
storage capacity, though apparently in reference to its use as such by the French: Francis 
Joseph Deposition, 9 Nov 1797, NBP. 
747 Deposition of Robert Pagan, 21 July 1797, NBP. 
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of their hands and placed it squarely into those of a long-dead French explorer, as 
channeled by contemporary British settlers.  
The combination of the arrival of so many new settlers and official disavowal of 
Native land tenure also proved to a nearly insurmountable challenge to Wabanaki nations 
elsewhere in the territory. In the heartland of Wolastoqiyik, the St. John River Valley, so 
many loyalists arrived at once that in 1784 a new colony, New Brunswick, was created to 
support the massively expanded population. The Wolastoqiyik were forced move their 
main village after New Brunswick’s new capital, Fredericton, was built practically on top 
of it.748  Many Native people appear to have simply left, either for more interior parts of 
the region or Newfoundland. 749 John Reid, one of the foremost scholars of Mi’kmaq and 
Wolastoqiyik interaction with the British Empire, argues that despite new hardships, 
native people in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick retained enough power in the first 
loyalist generation to continue to extract significant concessions and attention.750 While it 
is true that Mi’kmaw and Wolastoqiyik people did not disappear after the arrival of the 
loyalists and continued to demand reciprocal relations, the crucial first ten years of 
loyalist settlement demonstrate a striking lack of official interest in Wabanaki people and 
the effect of so many new Anglo-American settlers on them.  
 
748 Erikson, “Maliseet-Passamaquoddy,” 124. 
749 John Allan to John Hancock, 15 December 1783, PCC. 
750 For variations on this argument, see Reid, “Pax Britannica or Pax Indigena?”; John G. 
Reid, “Imperial-Aboriginal Friendship in Eighteenth-Century Mi’kmaq’ki/Wulstukwik,” 
in The Loyal Atlantic: Remaking the British Atlantic in the Revolutionary Era, ed. Jerry 
Bannister and Liam Riordan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 75–103; John 
G. Reid, “Empire, the Maritime Colonies, and the Supplanting of 




The Board of Trade, for example, did not receive a single surviving letter 
concerning the region’s native inhabitants for over ten years after the 1782 death of 
Superintendent for Indian Affairs Michael Francklin.751 Francklin’s successor George 
Henry Monk was appointed in summer 1783, but his earliest surviving letter to the Board 
of Trade was not sent until 1794.752 In fact, there are hardly any mentions of Native 
people at all in the Colonial Office records between the declaration of Peace in 1783 and 
the outbreak of war with France in the early 1790s.753 This stands in stark contrast to the 
previous thirty or so years, when correspondence with the governor regularly included 
Native American topics.754  
 
751 Francklin’s last missive was 16 June 1782: Francklin to Shelburne, 16 June 1782, CO 
217, LAC; For Francklin’s death, see Parr to Townshend, 12 November 1782, CO 217, 
LAC; For Monk’s appointment in his place, see North to Parr, 8 August 1783, CO 217, 
LAC. 
752 George Henry Monk to John Wentworth, 24 Jan 1794, in Wentworth to Dundas, 19 
May 1794, CO 217, LAC. 
753 This observation is based on a search of the calendar for CO 217, the incoming and 
outgoing correspondence between Nova Scotia and the Board of Trade. The calendar for 
CO 217 can be found published in Douglas Brymer, Report on Canadian Archives for 
1894 (Ottawa: S .E. Dawnson, 1895). For the reappearance of Native people in the 
context of the new war, see for example Wentworth to Dundas, 3 May 1793, CO 217, 
LAC; Wentworth to Dundas, 27 August 1793, CO 217, LAC 
754 For the importance of Native people in colonial correspondence during the late 1750s 
and 1760s, see Reid, “Pax Britannica or Pax Indigena?”; Plank, An Unsettled Conquest; 
That the well-being or even existence of Native people was only considered important 
during times of war, when they could be either allies or, as the popular fear went, 
mobilized by enemies as easily-manipulated mercenaries, is consistent with larger 
findings by scholars on Indian policy in post-Revolutionary British North America: J. R. 
Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens : A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada, 
Rev. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 104. 
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This absence is also reflected in Monk’s own letterbook and record of his 
interactions with Native people.755 Monk, unlike Francklin, had little experience prior to 
his appointment with either Native people or Native diplomacy and seemed very 
unwilling to learn. Between 1784 and 1793 there is no record that he met with any 
Mi’kmaw leaders or communities, and he tended to treat Native people as disagreeable 
charity cases rather than as powerful allies whose displeasure was not to be risked—a far 
cry from the period prior to the loyalists’ arrival.  
Monk’s lack of knowledge or interest in Native diplomacy, as well as the 
increasingly dire position of peninsular Mi’kmaw communities, is revealed in an episode 
from January of 1794 worth examining at length. A group of four Mi’kmaw orators 
appeared at Monk’s home in Windsor and attempted to initiate a conference in order to 
air the grievances of their communities and access customary gifts and supplies, things 
increasingly necessary as settler pressure had excluded them from much of their 
homeland. Monk, however, was baffled by the ritual protocol invoked by the men, 
complaining in his notes that they made “made a long set speech in Indian” with one man 
acting as an interpreter despite the fact that the orators “both speak English enough to 
make known their wants.”756  
Monk distributed a few small parcels of cloth and shot, given specifically to the 
men’s families and not the community at large. Frustrated, the men remarked that they 
 
755 George Henry Monk Indian Affairs Letter Book, James Monk Family Papers, MG 23 
G II 19, LAC (hereafter cited as Monk Letterbook). 
756 Monk Letterbook, 12 Jan 1794. For the elaborate and ritualized elements of Native 
diplomacy in eastern North America, as well as the importance of interpreters, see  
Merrell, Into the American Woods. 
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“did not believe [Monk] wrote to the Gov’r as [he] ought to do” to inform him of their 
circumstances—which, indeed, appears to be true. Monk responded that he was only a 
servant of the King and could only do as he was told, which did not include giving the 
men any food or support for their communities. John Paul, a younger man and son of the 
sachem of one of the most important Mi’kmaw communities, had clearly had enough of 
Monk. “If King George was so poor that he could give no more to Indians,” he burst out 
in English, “the Indians better take nothing.” Monk’s reaction is telling:  
at this I expressed regret at having given him any thing and some inclination to 
take from them all what I had given them — upon which they hastily took up their 
packs & went away without the usual acknowledgements of thank ye & gooday as 
others had made — and John Paul on going out of the house said I won’t trouble 
you again, the Indians must take care of themselves — I told him that such young 
stout men as he was were well able to take care of themselves & ought to learn 
how to behave themselves.757  
Clearly, the Anglo-Mi’kmaq friendship pact was strained nearly to the breaking point. 
Shortly after this encounter Monk forwarded a petition from the Mi’kmaq of 
peninsular Nova Scotia to the Governor that reflected this near total neglect of the Native 
population. The petitioners recalled that between the early 1760s and the death of 
Francklin, they had had regular meetings with imperial officials and received the supplies 
and provisions that were both increasingly necessary for Mi’kmaq subsistence and a 
marker of a healthy reciprocal relationship as defined by treaties that had been made 
between the two peoples—the very process so hastily disregarded by Monk.758 Before the 
 
757 Monk Letterbook, 12 Jan 1794. John Paul later returned, his family close to the brink 
of starvation, to beg for supplies; Monk complied but only after refusing him several 
times to punish him for his previous behavior and then publicly humiliating him: Monk 
Letterbook, 31 Jan 1794, 6 Feb 1796. 
758 The petition refers to the time between “when we made peace with the English” to 
Francklin’s death; I have taken this to refer to the 1760-1 treaty which actually marked 
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loyalists, stated the petitioners, there had been “country enough in Nova Scotia for all the 
English, French, and Indians then in the province.” But “while the Indians were getting 
supplies, the English were taking all their country; and when the English had taken all, 
the Indians got no more supplies.” Not until the appointment of Governor John 
Wentworth in 1792, they stated, had they once again begun to receive some assistance; 
but this was meagre indeed, and did not address the central issue of unfettered land loss 
and restricted access to hunting and fishing grounds.759  
Nor were governors and the Board of Trade the only people uninterested in 
Native responses to settler expansion in the early loyalist period. Settler reports could 
also be quite dismissive.  Edward Winslow, a prominent loyalist, met with 
representatives of a Wolastoqiyik community in the summer of 1783 while he was in the 
St. John River Valley promoting his plans for the separate loyalist province that 
eventually became New Brunswick. Winslow, however, clearly did not take the presence 
of Native peoples in the region seriously, or consider the meeting to be an important part 
of his ongoing campaign to remake the region into a loyalist haven. Recounting the event 
to his friend Ward Chipman, he wrote that meeting the “three Indian Chiefs a High Priest 
Squaws & attendants” had been “ridiculous enough,” noting that “a relation of the 
 
the end of formal hostilities between the Mi’kmaq and English rather than one of the 
earlier treaties which promised, but failed, to do so.  For Mi’kmaw perceptions of the 
treaties between the 1720s and early 20th century, see Wicken, Treaties on Trial; William 
Wicken, The Colonization of Mi’kmaw Memory and History, 1794-1928: The King v. 
Gabriel Sylliboy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). 




particulars may afford fun at some future day.”760 In the context of peacetime settlement, 
Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik were barely considered an issue. 
Governmental inaction is unsurprising when previous discussions over the role of 
Native people in Nova Scotia are considered. Francklin himself had written to the Board 
of Trade in 1766 when he was acting governor of the province that concessions to Native 
people in Nova Scotia would last only until British “settlements can be so formed round 
them” as to neutralize them as a military threat.761 The loyalist influx allowed this vision 
of a British settler Nova Scotia unbeholden to the region’s first inhabitants to finally 
come to fruition, leaving the Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik communities of Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick with, in the words of one petition, “no brothers, except among 
themselves.”762  
Conditions outside peninsular Nova Scotia and the densely settled St. John River 
Valley varied. Particularly in Cape Breton, where loyalist immigration was only a trickle, 
Native people found it much easier to control white settlement and obtain official 
recognition for a least some of their land holdings.763  Even in these regions, however, 
over-hunting and -fishing by profit-minded colonials soon began to take a serious toll on 
the health of Native communities. Miramichi, in what is today northern New Brunswick, 
experienced relatively little settlement compared to the loyalist hot spots in Shelburne, St. 
 
760 Edward Winslow to Ward Chipman, 7 July 1783, Vol 2-105, WP. 
761 Francklin to Lords of Trade, 3 Sept 1766, CO 217, LAC. For similar sentiments, see 
Jonathan Belcher to the Lords of Trade, 8 July 1763, CO 217, LAC. 
762 “The Petition of the Mickmack Indians.” 
763 Reid, “Empire, the Maritime Colonies, and the Supplanting of 
Mi’kma’ki/Wulstukwik, 1780-1820,” 83–84, 88–89. 
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John, and Annapolis. But competition over the salmon fishery—one of the few 
potentially profitable industries in the region as seen through European eyes—made it 
much more difficult for Native bands and households to feed themselves. Writing to 
Winslow from Miramichi in summer 1785, Benjamin Marston reported that salmon nets 
had been “extended fairly quite accross the River to the better exclusion of the poor 
Savages above,” suggesting a deliberate attempt to block Native access.764  
The provincial and imperial response to the Native distress rediscovered in the 
1790s was to push a policy that urged Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik bands to become 
sedentary agriculturalists and send their children to Protestant mission schools.765 These 
programs, however, were decidedly unsystematic, and had little positive effect. Efforts to 
transform peninsular Mi’kmaq into farmers, for example, did not come along with grants 
of land or the creation of reserves. This situation led reformer Walter Bromley to observe 
in 1822 that “You will scarcely meet an Indian, but who will tell you that he has cleared 
and cultivated land sometime or other, but that the white men have taken it from him.”766  
 
764 Benjamin Marston to Winslow, 17 July 1785, Vol 4-101, WP. In the same letter 
Marston complains about the low number of settlers and difficulty of turning a profit in 
the region. For similar report about settlers blocking rivers, this time in Cape Sable in 
1802, see Reid, "Empire, the Maritime Colonies, and the Supplanting of 
Mi'kma'ki/Wulstukwiuk, 1780-1820," 83. 
765 Wentworth to Dundas, 19 May 1794, CO 217, LAC; George Leonard to Edward 
Winslow, 11 October 1791, Vol 7-118, WP; For the creation of early religious schools 
meant to educate Native American children in Maritime Canada in the 1790s, see J. R. 
Miller, Shingwauk’s Vision: A History of Native Residential Schools. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1996), 64–66.  
766 Quoted in Reid, “Empire, the Maritime Colonies, and the Supplanting of 
Mi’kma’ki/Wulstukwik, 1780-1820,” 86. 
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 Downeast and mid-Maine were also transformed. The population of 
Massachusetts’s most northern counties doubled between 1770 and 1780, and grew by 
another 50% to 96,540 by the time of the first federal census in 1790.  The loyalist 
refugee migration has obvious connections to the conditions of the American Revolution, 
but Maine’s population growth was also linked to the events of the war. As Alan Taylor 
has demonstrated, it represented a northeastern front of the massive movement of 
Americans into previously uncolonized lands immediately before and after the war.767 
Maine also received a small, if significant, number of patriot refugees, largely from Nova 
Scotia.768 Most important, however, were the activities of land speculators operating in a 
particular post-war environment, when millions of acres of Maine land were sold to pay 
off Massachusetts war debts.  
The settlement of Downeast and interior Maine became a major priority for the 
new state government of Massachusetts for reasons both geopolitical and financial. Like 
the British, the Americans understood that borders had little meaning without a loyal 
population to back them up, and they were deeply concerned by reports of British 
encroachment in the years immediately following the peace.769 Perhaps equally 
compelling, however, was Massachusetts’ massive war debt. Selling eastern lands to 
 
767 Taylor, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors, 5–6. 
768 See Noah Miller Narrative, Woodruff Family Papers, Kislak Center for Rare Books 
and Manuscripts; George A. Rawlyk, “Eddy, Jonathan,” in Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography, vol. 5 (University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–), 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/eddy_jonathan_5E.html. 
769 Resolves of July 7 and 9, Oct 21, 1784 and March 17 1785, in Acts and Resolves of 
Massachusetts, 1784-1785 (Boston: Wright & Potter, 1890), 242, 246-7, 254-5, 265, 397-
8, 409; Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, August 1784, HKP; Henry Knox to George 
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individual settlers and land companies was believed to the best, and, possibly, only, 
means to paying down this debt, through both immediate revenue from the sales 
themselves and future returns from an increased tax base.770 While sales to individual 
settlers were slow, this soon resulted in a run on Maine lands by speculative companies 
and the transfer of millions of acres of Maine lands into private hands, particularly in the 
sparsely settled and previously little visited far east and interior of the state.771 
This approach to Maine land actually exacerbated the geopolitical effects of the 
heavy loyalist presence in Charlotte County, New Brunswick. While British commanders 
viewed settlement on the border as a geopolitical issue, Americans did not. Rather than 
emphasizing the creation of a well-settled border as itself an immediate geopolitical 
priority, the settlement of Massachusetts’ border lands was seen as a state-level issue that 
was primarily economic. The sale of eastern lands, it was hoped, would pay off the state’s 
not-inconsiderable war debt.772 While Great Britain granted land to loyalists free of 
charge as a compensation for what they had lost, Massachusetts needed to sell land for a 
profit. The state pursued a populist land sales tactic, at first by eschewing speculators and 
attempting to sell directly to individuals and, later, by dividing up the easternmost part of 
 
770 Michael Blaakman, “Land Mania, Fledgling Governments, and the Problem of the 
Public Coffers in the Revolutionary American Republic” (paper presented at the McNeil 
Center for Early American Studies Friday Seminar, 16 October 2015), 11-12. Cited with 
permission of author. 
771 For this, see Blaakman, “Land Mania,” 11-15. 
772 William Bingham and Benjamin Lincoln, A Description of the Situation, Climate, 
Soil, and Productions of Certain Tracts of Land in the District of Maine and 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Philadelphia[?]: 1793), 5; Lincoln, Draft of 
Observations on Maine, 30 Nov 1787, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS; Lincoln to 
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the district into six-mile-square townships that would be sold at a lottery. But a lack of 
interest led to the majority of the territory being sold off in huge tracts to wealthy 
speculators, including Henry Knox and Benjamin Lincoln.773  
These men did make attempts to settle their lands and make terms with squatters, 
but going was slower than expected, and the population of Washington County—while 
roughly comparable to Charlotte County on the other side of the border—remained 
clustered around better-established Machias, further to the south, rather than around 
Passamaquoddy.774 Indeed, the locations of the lottery townships themselves are a good 
indicator of the effect of aggressive loyalist settlement in the region. While Americans 
maintained until 1798 that the “true” St. Croix—and therefore the international 
boundary—was the Magaguadavic, the lottery lands nevertheless stopped at the 
Schoodic, a tacit admission that those lands had already been granted under British 
auspices and had determined the de facto border already. The few Americans who lived 
in the Bay, particularly those on the islands, found their navigation routes compromised 
and their titles in question as the British also took the language of the treaty to mean that 
all the Bay islands were under the jurisdiction of New Brunswick.775 
Further south in mid-Maine, the importance of older land granting schemes meant 
to transform the region into a white Protestant stronghold is reflected in the renewed 
 
773 Blaakman, “Land Mania.”  
774 Based on an analysis of the 1790 census. 
775 For issues of navigation and concern over the islands, see John Allan to Benjamin 
Lincoln and Thomas Russell, 7 April 1786, Benjamin Lincoln Papers. Concern over the 
islands persisted after 1798, and was not resolved until after the war of 1812. See John 
Allan to James Sullivan, 19 Feb 1799, NBP. 
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importance and development of proprietary land grants.776 The post-Revolutionary boom 
should have been the moment the proprietary companies had been waiting for since 1710. 
Many of the pre-war members of the companies, however, had fled the United States as 
loyalist refugees, leaving their claims to be taken up by a new generation of would-be 
landed elites. Henry Knox, for example, was able gain control of the old Waldo patent 
through his marriage to Samuel Waldo’s granddaughter, Lucy Flucker. Flucker’s loyalist 
parents, who had controlled the majority of the grant before the war, had their property 
confiscated by the state of Massachusetts. Knox was able to use his high status in post-
Revolutionary America to both gain control of the grant—theoretically on his wife’s 
behalf—and get the state legislature to confirm it.777 Reflecting on the chaotic state of the 
grant, he remarked that until he had gotten it reunited and confirmed, “there did not 
appear to be any estate at all.”778 Like many proprietors and planners before them, 
however, the revitalized Waldo, Kennebec, and Pejepscot proprietors would learn that 
settler families did not share the goals and concerns of large landowners. As Taylor has 
argued in Liberty Men and Great Proprietors, old tensions over land title merged with 
questions about the meaning of liberty, erupting into violence on the Maine frontier.  
As in Nova Scotia, these new settlers arrived in a region profoundly affected by 
the legacy of older settlement schemes. While the land regime that emerged in post-
Revolutionary Maine was different in many respects from loyalist New Brunswick and 
 
776 For the post-Revolutionary grants in general, see Taylor, Liberty Men and Great 
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Nova Scotia, from a Native perspective the results were similar. While Indian title—and 
how to best extinguish it—remained a much more live issue on the U.S. than on the 
British side of the border, many believed Massachusetts Governor Pownall’s 1759 cruise 
up the Penobscot to be an act of conquest that had extinguished Penobscot land title.779 
The French conquest theory also found supporters in Maine. Despite his reputation as 
supporter of Indian land title, an anonymous history of the ownership of the Waldo Patent 
found in Knox’s papers—and most likely written by him—argued that previous French 
possession and British conquest of 1710 had “defeat[ed] the Indian title” throughout 
Maine.780 While Knox never acted on this view—which directly contradicted his view on 
Indian land ownership elsewhere in the country—in his negotiations with the Penobscot 
people he made it clear that in his view they were merely “permitted to occupy” lands in 
Massachusetts, a view anticipating the ruling of John Marshall in Johnson v McIntosh 
some thirty years later.781 
 
779 David Demeritt, “Representing the ‘True’ St. Croix: Knowledge and Power in the 
Partition of the Northeast,” The William and Mary Quarterly 54, no. 3 (July 1997): 529. 
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peoples” see for example Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and 
Power on the Frontier (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 130–133, 151. 
Knox’s statements about Maine Indian land tenure—however scattered—seem to suggest 
that he viewed the situation in Maine as essentially different from the situation of Native 
people elsewhere in the young Republic. 
781 Henry Knox and Benjamin Lincoln’s speech to the Penobscot, 4 September 1784, 
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As in the Maritime provinces, Maine Wabanakis struggled to cope with the arrival 
of so many new settlers and fought to have their own boundaries recognized. Both 
Penobscots and Passamaquoddies, as well as many Wolastoqiyik and Mi’kmaw people, 
had fought on the side of the Americans in the Revolution. Penobscots, under Chief 
Joseph Orono, had pledged to help the American cause in exchange for the permanent 
recognition of their land claims. Specifically, they asserted that the region above the head 
of the tide on the Penobscot river (near modern Bangor) and the six miles on either side 
of it were and should always remain Penobscot country. This agreement, known as the 
Watertown Resolve, reversed Pownall’s “conquest” of the Penobscot and reintroduced 
the issue of Native title.782 Yet as soon as the war was over, Orono and his people were 
visited by Knox, whose land claims abutted Penobscot territory, and Benjamin Lincoln, 
who would soon buy a massive tract at Passamaquoddy, acting as representatives of 
Massachusetts and seeking to re-negotiate.783 Knox and Lincoln—claiming that the 
“lands you occupy far exceed the quantity necessary for your own use”—pushed the 
Penobscot to exchange their claim for “all what may be necessary for you to occupy on 
one side of the river or on both aides higher up, so that the interest of the state shall be 
promoted.”784 Orono, invoking the Watertown Resolve, responded that  
The General desired that we would not suffer any person to come on our land. 
The Almighty placed us on the land and it is ours. The General said that no person 
 
782 Prins and McBride, Asticou’s Island Domain, 1:231. 
783 For the extent of the Waldo patent as understood by Knox, see Report on the 
Muscongus Patent, 27 April 1784, HKP. Knox later attempted to buy out this claim, 
using the Indian claim as leverage to get a cheaper price: Land purchase instructions for 
Henry Jackson and other agents, 2 June 1791, HKP. 




should interfere and take any of our lands but that we should have them. Now 
why should we not hold the Lands as the Almighty gave them to us. The General 
Court fixed the bounds at the head of the falls up to the head of the river. The 
English will come on us from before and you on the other side so that we shall 
have but little left.785 
 
Orono ended his speech by repeatedly stating that the Penobscots wanted the state to 
survey and mark out the bounds of their country, “that we may know what we 
possess.”786 They refused to renegotiate, and, in turn, Massachusetts refused to respect or 
mark Penobscot boundaries. Indeed, a few years later Knox attempted to buy claims to 
Penobscot land on the east side of the river from the state, attempting to the use as yet un-
extinguished Indian claim as leverage to get a cheaper price.787  
However, it was not until 1796, squeezed by the ever-rising numbers of white 
settlers and facing a Massachusetts government entirely unwilling to enforce the 
boundaries of the Watertown Resolve, that Orono and his people sold the vast majority of 
their homeland in exchange for a yearly supply of provisions and more secure rights to  
the Penobscot river and islands.788 Faced with overwhelming settler encroachment 
unleashed by the war and facing a government actively disinterested in preserving 
Indigenous borders, Penobscots, like the Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik further north and 
east, were forced to find new strategies for survival within, not beside, a white settler 
world.  
 
785 Document recording the result of negotiations between Henry Knox, Benjamin 
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In 1783, Allan wrote to John Hancock that the end of the war had brought “great 
distress” to the Wabanakis. “Their principal complaynt,” he noted, “is that between both 
countrys they are deprived of” their homelands.789 When he met with representatives of 
the Mi’kmaq, Penobscot, Wolastoqiyik and Passamaquoddy communities shortly after 
the announcement of peace, speaker Nicholas Hawwawwas—observing the settlement at 
St. Andrews, the loyalist arrival in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and the newly 
active land market in Maine—despaired at what he saw already saw as a division of their 
homelands, disavowal of their sovereignty, and an obstruction of their way of life. Before 
and even during the war, he said, 
the road was open from our villages, to the other towns in America. There was 
nothing to stop us. But it is now shut up. A number of people have come among 
us whom we don’t know and taken our lands and streams.  You say it is peace 
with America and England, but we don’t hear any thing is done for us, no mention 
made of the Indians in this country. We have been fighting for you and secured 
for America all the lands of this Eastward Country to the River St. Croix, and 
always been ready to take up the hatchet when you called. You promised to 
secure for us our hunting ground, with an extensive right to the bever hunting. 
How must we live now. We know nothing but hunting. You White Men can live 
otherways.790 
Before the war Wabanakis had been embattled, but still able to enforce many of their 
boundaries and their status as communities to be treated with as equals. After, in the 
words of ethnohistorian Harald Prins, they were “reduced to powerless ethnic minority 
status,” within, not apart, from the white settler world.791 This was only made possible by 
the massive demographic upheaval created by the American Revolution.  
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Furthermore, it was accomplished not simply by the fact that white settlers 
wanted Indian land. Instead, it was the result of a long process by which imperial, 
colonial, and, later, state and national governments took clear steps to both encourage and 
place settlers in the region and diminish the legal importance of Native land rights. 
Before the Revolution, this had been but one dream among many; after, it became lived 
reality. In the case of the border commission, it was not that Indian testimony, 
knowledge, and land rights had suddenly become less respected; instead, the 
demographic shifts created by the American Revolution combined with the plans of the 
colonial era meant that the old empire and the young republic finally had the power to 
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